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Abstract 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a new topic in finance which can be viewed 
from two different perspectives: that of the business (CSR), and that of the individual 
investor (Socially Responsible Investing, SRI). The evidence from this study 
suggested that in the short-term, there were no significant price effects on the SRI 
stocks around the announcement dates of the SRI constituent lists. In contrast, the 
returns of SRI portfolios over the sample period seemed to be superior to those of 
conventional firms. The regression analysis found that generally the SRI coefficients 
were insignificant; however using one of the models during the fifteen year period, it 
was found that SRI constituents attained a ROE that was 11.18% higher than 
conventional peers as well as a ROA that was 1.824% lower than conventional firms. 
When the period was restricted to 2004-2009 it was found that social performance 
was positively (and sometimes significantly) correlated with ROE. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is quickly becoming a fad in the global business 
place. The real questions are: is it a legitimate business concern and is it here to stay? 
This interesting area of finance gained academic momentum during the 1970s as more 
and more questions were being asked of it. One of the first people to suggest the 
benefits of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) was Milton Moskowitz in 1972. Since 
then there have been numerous papers dedicated to looking at this anomalous effect in 
the financial markets and trying to explain how it has come about. In this topic, there 
are various questions that can be asked with some of the more popular questions being: 
‘Do socially responsible firms outperform conventional firms?’; ‘Do socially 
responsible investments perform as well as conventional investments; and ‘What is the 
causal direction for these effects?’. This last question asks whether good social 
performance leads to good financial performance, or if the relationship between these 
two variables is the other way around.  
 
In terms of the existing academic literature, there have been various definitions and 
constructs used to explain this topic. This dissertation will attempt to use some of these 
ideas to test the existence of CSR in a South African context and add to the existing 
body of literature. Since the beginning, one of the major shortcomings of research in 
this area has been a distinct lack of a measure for Corporate Social Performance (CSP). 
This is essentially due to the inherent nature of this topic, in that it is difficult to 
measure performance in social arenas, as they are so diverse, encompass many different 
aspects, and sometimes have no tangible benefits to measure. Due to this problem, 
academics have used a range of methodologies to try and overcome this issue, from 
survey instruments, to corporate social disclosures and reputation indices. As shall be 
covered in the literature these measures have their benefits and their drawbacks, 
however since none are completely adequate, a combination of these measures may be 
needed to perform a reasonable analysis of CSR.  
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Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Co., Inc.1 (KLD) is a firm in the United States that 
assesses the social performance of the Fortune 500 based on set social criteria, where 
these ratings have been consistently applied over many years, and over a reasonable 
period of time (this will be discussed in section 1.2 of this chapter). The problem is that 
in South Africa this relatively infant topic does not have such extensive experience in 
measuring and reporting social performance from the company perspective. 
Fortunately, in 2004 the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) launched their SRI index 
in response to the increasing debate around sustainability and particular in South Africa. 
An important step in this direction also resulted from the King reports on governance, in 
that as corporate governance is an integral aspect of social responsibility, the King 
reports have slowly brought more attention to the question of sustainability. This has 
developed to such a degree that the King committee now advocates many of the core 
CSR principles. Part of the JSE’s listing requirements necessitates compliance with 
these reports, and thus some degree of social responsibility is required if a firm wants to 
list on the local bourse. This has also helped drive attention toward CSR and SRI, as all 
listed companies have now started paying attention to their social performance. One 
important aspect of the SRI index is its creation, since due to the lack of social 
performance information, the JSE used a research organisation that specialised in this 
area to examine companies on the exchange, and assess whether they passed certain 
CSR criteria.  
 
The organisation used was the Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS) as it is a 
global provider of independent investment research into the environmental, social, 
governance and ethical performance of companies. Their analysis used methods 
common to many earlier academic papers, such as content analysis, where the research 
methodology was described in the 2009 background and criteria document as “scrutiny 
of the most recent publicly available material” and “feedback to preliminary profiles by 
the company and/or completion of surveys where necessary to clarify research and 
gather non-public information” (SRI Index, 2009b). The criteria document stated that 
for inclusion a company must meet the required number of indicators as set out in each 
individual area of measurement, where the indicators are divided into core and 
desirable. ‘Core’ indicators reflect elements that should be in place at a minimum 
                                                 
1 The firm has since changed its name to KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. 
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whereas ‘desirable’ guide companies to identify all relevant issues. The main areas of 
measurement are aligned with the three pillars of sustainability; being Environmental, 
Society and Governance (ESG), where these issues and related sustainability concerns 
are the key themes analysed. A brief summary of important issues under each category 
follows (SRI Index, 2009b, p. 4):  
Environment: Companies should improve environmental performance by working to reduce and 
control its direct negative environmental impacts; promote awareness of its significant direct and 
indirect impacts; aim to use resources in a sustainable manner; commit to risk reduction, reporting and 
auditing. 
Society: Companies should demonstrate a commitment to social sustainability and good stakeholder 
relationships by treating all stakeholders with dignity, fairness and respect; actively promote the 
development of employees and the community; ensure core labour standards; promote health and 
safety of employees. 
Governance and Sustainability: Companies should uphold good corporate governance practices; 
work towards long-term growth and sustainability; identify and manage the broader impact of the 
company’s sphere of influence from social, environmental, ethical and economic perspectives.  
The aggregation by an independent and respected organisation in conjunction with 
Africa’s largest exchange lends some credibility to the analysis of these companies. In 
light of the lack of research in the South African context of social responsibility, 
thoroughness of the SRI index motivates the use of the index as a proxy for CSP until 
something more comprehensive can be used.  
  
To gauge the interest in socially responsible funds, an indication of the growth can be 
seen in the Social Investment Forum (SIF)’s 2007 Report showing trends in the United 
States where SRI assets rose over 324% from $639 billion in 1995 (the year of the SIF’s 
first report) to $2.71 trillion in 2007. Interestingly, during the same period the broader 
universe of assets only grew by 260% from $7 trillion to $25.1 trillion. The report also 
noted that around 11% of assets under professional management in the U.S. are now 
involved in SRI - that is, nearly one in nine dollars. Similar trends can be seen 
elsewhere, and some figures taken from the EIRIS website indicate that in the UK, the 
pooled SRI fund size increased from 199 million pounds in July 1989 to around 8 881 
million pounds by December 2007 (EIRIS, 2009). However, the size of the pooled 
funds decreased in December 2008 to 6 794 million pounds, but it soon reclaimed 
ground and increased to 9 521 million pounds by December 2009. The sheer size of 
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these figures indicates how investors are paying more attention to SRI practices with 
their minds, as well as their wallets.  
 
An important distinction in the area of SRI is the method one uses, and there exist 
numerous techniques as described in Viviers, Bosch, Smit and Buijs (2008):  
Negative screening:   Investors refrain from investing in undesirable  
companies. 
Positive screening:   Investors include securities which they perceive to 
be reputable as good corporate citizens. 
Best-of-sector screening:   Investors combine positive and negative screens in 
that whole sectors are not excluded but businesses 
are included that try to improve their ESG 
performance.  
Shareholder activism:  Shareholders actively engage with management 
boards on ESG considerations. 
Cause-based investing:   Investors support particular causes by investing 
therein. These investments often deal with 
development of social infrastructure such as roads, 
school and health-care facilities. 
For the purposes of this study, best-of sector and positive screening (social tilting) are 
essentially equivalent and are also the main method employed by the SRI index to 
evaluate potential constituents; thus social screening as well as social tilting shall be the 
chief focuses. In terms of the social screens, companies that do not meet predefined 
criteria, usually related to their social performance, are excluded from any investment 
opportunities. In this way the investor is incorporating his ethical beliefs into the 
investment decision-making process, resulting in socially responsible investments. 
Social tilting, or positive social tilting, is when investors do not explicitly exclude any 
companies from their investment choices; however they prefer to ‘tilt’ towards those 
firms with more impressive CSP. Thus, companies that improve their CSR position are 
favoured by these investors who wish to be socially responsible. This is important since 
(as shall be discussed in the literature review) each of these methods affects the socially 
responsible portfolio in a fundamental way. The characteristics of the firms being 
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included or excluded vary, and thus the method used will determine the portfolio 
characteristics. That being said, the SRI index’s method of research for the constituents 
entails a list of criteria which if met results in the firm being included in the index. 
Generally these are positive statements, thus as opposed to screening out firms from the 
SRI index; it tilts towards the firms that are viewed as being more favourably disposed 
to CSR. The reasoning was that this method is preferred as it helps engage with the 
firms so that they may improve their position, as opposed to ignoring them due to their 
past performance. As stated by the acting head of the index in 2008 “we believe it 
makes sense to engage with companies on their impact on the environment and society, 
and to assess how they are dealing with those impacts, rather than to exclude them 
upfront” (Masie, 2008). 
 
It is the aim of this study to use the SRI index as the main proxy for social performance 
in the South African context, and using regression analysis as well as other financial 
techniques to assess whether the experience of SRI in South Africa follows that of other 
countries. Although there are many limitations to the proposed method, particularly the 
use of the SRI index as a proxy for CSR, as it stands there are no better measures, 
especially in South Africa. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) performed a test on one of 
the proposed regression models and used a similar proxy for their CSP measure in that 
they used a dummy variable which represented whether the firm was in the Domini 
Social Index (which shall be examined later) in the given period. Therefore, it is not 
such a stretch to extend this analysis to a South African perspective.  
 
In terms of the King reports, King I initially focused on corporate governance issues in 
South Africa, and King II added onto these ideas. More recently however, King III has 
moved from corporate governance towards a stronger position on sustainability in 
business which is one of the main tenets of the triple bottom line and CSR. This 
thinking has slowly become more conventional and is evident in the billions of rand 
invested around the world in social funds. A local example can be seen with the 
Government Employee Pension fund (GEPF) as it was a founding signatory of the 
United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment. These principles were set out 
with the belief that ESG issues can affect the performance of investments and thus to 
act in the best long-term interests of their fiduciaries, these institutional investors 
committed themselves to the following principles (United Nations, 2009):  
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1. We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making 
processes. 
2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and 
practices. 
3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. 
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment 
industry. 
5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles 
6. We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles 
As can be seen from the principles, the aim of the signatories is to improve on the 
situation regarding social responsibility by encouraging a movement towards improved 
disclosure, and increased efforts in the social arena. The sheer size of these funds 
automatically gives the movement to SRI greater pull, as an example the GEPF was 
ranked the 7th largest retirement fund in the world in 2006, and in efforts to attract 
mandates from the GEPF a host of asset managers became signatories of the principles 
shortly afterwards (Masie, 2008). The fund recognises its influence and power inherent 
in its size, and has undertaken to use its role as an active investor to hold the companies 
it invests in accountable for their ESG practices. Thus, through ownership rights and 
privileges, the GEPF can signal concerns and encourage change where necessary 
(Government Employees Pension Fund, 2009, p. 6); and use its leverage to influence 
the companies it interacts with. The GEPF has stated that its strategy is to integrate ESG 
issues into investment decisions and ownership practices, and one of its core objectives 
is to protect and enhance the long-term value of the GEPF’s investments. A secondary 
objective is to fulfil the responsibilities to society by encouraging investment that 
addresses socioeconomic imbalances (Government Employees Pension Fund, 2009, p. 
7). This movement away from the outskirts of the investment community is again 
evident when the head of investment and actuarial at the GEPF noted that SRI investing 
should become mainstream rather than a fringe investment (FANews, 2009). 
 
In terms of the research methodology, there have been many varying approaches 
examined in the literature and a few of these shall be adapted for this study. Again, one 
of the major issues is the measurement of CSP, thus these methods will involve 
examining the selected proxy, the SRI index. It has been hypothesised that the 
  7
relationship between CSP and CFP (if it exists) may only persist in the long-term, and 
that generally accounting returns are best able to capture the firm’s unique 
characteristics and internal efficiencies as opposed to the general performance measure 
of market return. On the other hand, market returns may encompass investors’ 
perceptions about the future of companies, and in efficient markets this may be 
sufficient to indicate a relationship between social performance and financial 
performance. One caveat however, is that due to the nature of efficient markets firm 
prices are hypothesised to adjust instantaneously to any new information that was 
previously unknown, that was unexpected and which would have a material impact on 
the stock. Thus, by its very nature using the market returns (and stock prices) 
necessitates looking at this relationship in the short-run. It can be seen that there are two 
distinct methods of examining the CFP-CSP relationship: regression analysis using 
financial ratios (accounting returns) for the long-run; and an event study, focusing on 
stock price adjustments in the short-run. Both of these methods shall be thoroughly 
examined in the empirical section of this study. One thing to note, however, is that both 
of these methods examine the CFP-CSP relationship which can be thought of as social 
responsibility from the firm’s perspective. In other words, through the firm’s 
participation in social activities it involves bearing costs and the relationship looks at 
the benefits that may or may not accrue through these CSR initiatives. Therefore, if 
being socially responsible does produce tangible financial benefits for the firm, these 
could outweigh the costs and result in a positive relationship being found. Conversely, 
if there are no financial benefits (or not large enough benefits) the costs are likely to 
cause the firm to underperform and a negative relationship will be seen.  
 
In addition to firm-side consequences, CSR can be examined from a different 
perspective in that SRI allows for common people to “make a difference” by choosing 
how they invest their funds. Thus, the focus of SRI is to see how these ethical choices 
affect investment decision-making, and ultimately investment performance. For this 
section there again exist varying methodologies to test for differences, but some of the 
most popular entail comparing socially responsible firms with conventional entities and 
assessing if there are any significant differences. Some academics have argued that SRI 
is the most widely accepted expression of support from the markets for good CSR 
practices, and that it is through accepting SRI that investors can encourage and promote 
growth in CSR. Firms that invest in socially responsible activities have the special class 
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of investor (the socially responsible or ethical investor) who rewards the firm by 
patronage in terms of buying the firm’s stock or purchasing the firm’s goods. 
Sometimes this can extend to other stakeholders, such as bankers viewing the firm on 
more favourable terms which results in improved access to capital. By lowering the cost 
of capital for a firm this improves the valuation of the firm; and this can be seen as 
another positive spin-off of CSR.  
 
In terms of the previous literature, results have ranged from insignificant findings, to 
significant relationships between social and financial performance, in positive as well as 
negative directions. For the purposes of this research, only explicit negative findings are 
taken as evidence against the movement of SRI for the reason that it directly shows how 
being socially responsible results in excessive costs. The alternatives are significant 
positive relationships (furthering the cause of the SRI ideal) or insignificant 
relationships. In the case of no significance, this is seen as a positive in light of the 
externalities generated under CSR projects. From the firm’s perspective, if being 
socially responsible does not affect performance, then the costs undertaken by the firm 
are offset by financial benefits that accrue. However, simultaneously the firm is 
generating benefits for society through its CSR initiative, and thus overall society may 
be deriving additional benefit. From the investor perspective, as Statman (2000) 
suggested, asset pricing models should include behavioural aspects too; and ultimately 
utilitarian and value-expressive characteristics be included in decision-making. Looking 
at a purely profit driven orientation, the majority of the literature on SRI has found no 
significant difference in performance between SRI and conventional funds; thus, as 
with the CSR perspective, socially responsible investors bear no additional costs. The 
key here is that investors are able to derive additional value-expressive benefit through 
their social participation that was previously lacking when their investment decisions 
were driven purely by profit. In this model, investors are able to attain competitive 
returns while simultaneously investing with their ethics and morals.  
 
CSR refers to these perceived responsibilities the firm owes to society in terms of 
ensuring its activities do not have any detrimental effects to the environment or the 
surrounding community. This segment of the topic is generally related to the 
relationships between the firm’s social performance and financial performance. SRI 
looks at the investment performance of responsible portfolios so that investors can 
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assess whether they can attain good returns while investing according to their beliefs, 
whereas the analysis of CSR is there to discern whether being a good corporate citizen 
has any affect (positive or negative) on the financial performance of these corporations. 
The literature shall be divided into papers that look at the general theory behind CSR, 
examine the relationships between firm-level social performance and financial 
performance, and the papers that examine the role of SRI on investors. 
 
The rest of Chapter 1 will give some background to the ideas inherent in CSR while 
Chapters 2 and 3 will look at the literature and examine their results in depth, as well as 
look at CSR in everyday life and its impact on investors’ decisions and opinions. 
Chapter 4 will thoroughly examine the research methodology and explain the various 
tools used to analyse CSR in this study. Chapters 5 and 6 follow on the discussion of 
the results, specifically in light of the previous studies and conclude the ideas of this 
study.  
 
1.1 A Brief History of Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Socially Responsible Investing 
 
The origins of SRI can be traced far back through human history where in early biblical 
times Jewish law laid down directives on how to invest ethically, while in the mid 
1700s “the founder of Methodism, John Wesley, noted that the use of money was the 
second most important subject of New Testament teachings” (Schueth, 2003, p. 189). 
The 18th century religious institutions brought the concept of SRI to the new world with 
the Quakers avoiding companies related to war and slavery, while the Methodists 
managed their funds using social screens for over two centuries. The religious origins of 
SRI can be seen in the widespread avoidance of “sin stocks” – companies in the 
alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries - by socially conscious investors in the U.S. The 
modern foundations of social investing can be traced to the political climate of the 
1960s where issues ranging from the Vietnam War, movements for civil rights, 
concerns about the cold war and equality for women escalated sensitivities to issues of 
social responsibility. These movements broadened to include management, labour 
issues and anti-nuclear sentiment during the 1970s. The 1980s once again saw a 
dramatic increase in the number of socially responsible investors as more investment 
strategies were focused on pressuring the minority government of South Africa to 
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dismantle the apartheid system. Finally, more recent issues such as the “Chernobyl and 
Exxon Valdez incidents, and vast amounts of new information about global warming 
and ozone depletion coming to the attention of the American public” (Schueth, 2003, p. 
190) has brought environmental concerns to the attention of socially aware investors. 
Essentially these were the beginnings of what is seen to be CSR, as the public as well as 
investors started imposing responsibilities on corporations other than their central task 
of maximising profit.  
 
In terms of the difference between CSR and SRI, these terms may be thought of as 
being from the different perspectives of the firm and the investor respectively. Socially 
responsible investors have expanded the traditional criteria used in their investment 
decision-making processes and included newer, and sometimes less tangible, factors 
when making these important decisions. These can include environmental aspects, 
ensuring the company has good corporate governance or only investing in companies 
with equitable hiring practices. One important theme to note here is that this extension 
of investment criteria can be associated with the idea of stakeholders becoming the 
focus of corporate behaviour, instead of only shareholders as it was in the past. 
Stakeholders were defined as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organisation’s objectives (Freeman, 1984, p. 46; cited in 
Lankoski, 2009). These stakeholders can potentially have claims against the 
corporation; therefore firms who anticipate these needs are able to behave accordingly, 
and it is this behaviour which society deems indicative of better CSP. For investors, 
being socially responsible would entail finding investments which comply with their 
expanded social criteria and generally these investments are found in firms with high 
CSP.  
 
The actual mechanics of SRI can be introduced through a look at social screening as 
given by Kinder and Domini (1997). As mentioned, the movement started through 
investors using their religious and ethical beliefs as guides when investing their funds 
and the authors stated that the impulse behind screening is the same, however, in a 
different context. Simple desires to avoid what they do not like have evolved into 
complex assessments of the relationships between corporations and the societies in 
which they operate. A screen is defined as “a criterion applied to a universe of potential 
investments that helps winnow the candidates” (Kinder & Domini, 1997, p. 12) and a 
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social screen is “a non-financial criterion applied in the investment decision-making 
process” (Kinder & Domini, 1997, p. 12). Specifically, a social screen entails the 
expression of an investor’s social, ethical or religious concerns such that an investment 
manager can apply it in the investment decision-making process. The types of screens 
that can be applied vary, but generally they can be separated into exclusionary screens 
and qualitative screens with the exclusionary ones being far easier to implement. 
Figure 1 lists the main exclusionary screens as given by Kinder and Domini (1997): 
 
Figure 1 - Exclusionary Screens (Kinder & Domini, 1997, p. 13) 
Qualitative screens are generally more complicated in that there is no clear-cut method 
for screening and they tend to look for a pattern in company actions that indicate an 
overall attitude (positive or negative) for example, towards the environment. The 
authors listed the principal qualitative screens at the time and these are given in Figure 
2. Kinder and Domini (1997) examined the historic progression of exclusionary 
screening, and as social screens initially barred weapons, alcohol and tobacco products, 
the religious and secular beliefs evolved to include nuclear and gaming (gambling) 
exclusions. The benefit of these types of screens is their definiteness as they are easy to 
classify, and it is also easy to identify which companies fail the screens.  
 
Kinder and Domini (1997) also examined how the South Africa screen emerged, with 
the idea that it would illuminate the process by which new exclusionary screens will 
emerge in the future. South Africa marked the movement from divesting sin to 
    EXCLUSIONARY SCREENS 
 
    Alcohol        Gambling    Tobacco 
       Substantial Involvement           Substantial Involvement          Substantial Involvement 
       Minor Involvement                 Minor Involvement       Minor Involvement 
Military Contracting 
 
Substantial Involvement 
Minor Involvement 
Major Supplies 
 Nuclear Power 
 
 Derives Electricity 
 Design 
 Fuel Cycle / Key Parts 
For many social investors, the exclusionary screens are absolute. For others, however, there may be gradations, 
which these bellwethers attempt to accommodate. 
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investing for social change, and between 1969 and 1994 “South Africa catalyzed a 
change among social investors from an inward-focused desire for consistency between 
one’s values and one’s investments to an outward-oriented expression of how society 
should work” (Kinder & Domini, 1997, p. 16). 
 
Figure 2 - Qualitative Screens (Kinder & Domini, 1997, p. 15) 
QUALITATIVE SCREENS 
 
Screen     Strengths    Concerns 
Community    Generous Giving   Negative Economic Impact 
     Innovative Giving   Investment Controversies 
     Support for Housing 
     Support for Education  
 
Diversity    CEO     Controversies 
     Promotion    Non-Representation 
     Board of Directors 
     Family Benefits 
     Woman/Minority Contracting 
     Employment of the Disabled 
     Progressive Gay/Lesbian Policies 
 
Employee Relations   Strong Union Relations   Poor Union Relations 
     Cash Profit Sharing   Safety Controversies 
     Employee Involvement   Workforce Reductions 
     Strong Retirement Benefits  Pension/Benefits Concern 
 
Environment    Beneficial Products and Services Hazardous Waste 
     Pollution Prevention   Regulatory Problems 
     Recycling    Ozone Depleting Chemicals 
     Alternative Fuels   Substantial Emissions 
     Communications   Agricultural Chemicals 
 
Non-U.S. Operations   General Non-U.S. Operations  Burma 
     Community    Mexico 
          General Non-U.S. Operations 
 
Product    Quality     Major Product Safety 
     R&D/Innovation   Product Safety 
Benefits to Economically   Marketing/Contracting  
     Disadvantaged        Controversies 
          Antitrust Disputes 
 
Other     Limited Compensation   High Compensation 
     Ownership    Tax Disputes 
          Ownership 
 
Qualitative screens depend on bellwethers, since it would be impossible to analyze the social records of even a small NYSE 
company with some sense of completeness.  
  13
The racist policies of apartheid in South Africa became a public issue in the U.S. and by 
1974 Leon Sullivan helped articulate standards to which companies with operations in 
South Africa would be held (known as the Sullivan Principles and discussed in detail in 
the next section). Investors began setting minimum performance requirements in terms 
of the Sullivan ratings, and failure to subscribe to these principles became an 
exclusionary screen from the start. Due to the ineffectiveness of the principles, 
divestiture became the key mode of action, with it resulting in the divestiture of U.S. 
corporate holdings in South Africa, as well as the divestiture of investments in 
companies that declined to leave South Africa. The SRI perspective is that of the 
socially conscious investor not wanting to support the racist regime of South Africa, 
thus divesting from companies still involved in the country. At the same time, the social 
responsibility of the firm was to adhere to the public’s call for divestiture, and make 
attempts to rectify the social imbalances – either through “constructive engagement”, or 
through exiting the country. Constructive engagement referred to the act of companies 
trying to influence South Africa for the good of the community by staying behind and 
setting an example. By 1987, divestiture was the screen most commonly applied, and 
over a period of thirteen years the South African screen had evolved from a system of 
gradations to an absolute.  
 
This qualitative evaluation of the signatories’ performance illuminated the fact that it is 
much harder to determine if a company is making progress in areas such as “non-
segregation of the races at the workplace” than to determine if the company is in the 
gaming business. The authors stated that a criticism of the Sullivan ratings was that 
“complex questions should produce nuanced answers” (Kinder & Domini, 1997, p. 17) 
unlike the simple answers giving by Sullivan raters, and this is a common criticism of 
qualitative screens. Another complaint was that screens of this kind rely on data that are 
not comparable, for example when analysing environmental impacts “good progress” 
for a mining company would be entirely different from “good progress” for a financial 
institution or soft drink manufacturer. Today’s qualitative screens are descendants of 
the South Africa screening, and although they arise in part from a desire for consistency 
of purpose, they represent an assertion of what the proper role of corporations in society 
should be. The earliest non-South Africa qualitative screen in the view of Kinder and 
Domini (1997) was the environment, and it has evolved over time. Initially list-driven 
negative screens gave the starting point where in the 1970s and 1980s environmental 
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screening looked to lists like Environmental Action’s “Filthy Five” or the National 
Clean Air Coalition’s list of the fifty top emitters of toxic pollutants (Kinder & Domini, 
1997, p. 17). These lists focused on negatives and could not account for nuances that 
would affect their relative and absolute performance, nor could they compensate for the 
comparison of different industries. More recent screens attempt to capture detailed 
views of corporate performance, negative and positive, and in doing so they express 
expectations inconceivable in social investing before South Africa.  
 
An important aspect of qualitative screens is that they rely on ‘bellwethers’ which are 
“indicators from which broad conclusions about a company may be drawn” (Kinder & 
Domini, 1997, p. 17). They point to areas of strength or concern in companies; 
however, they lack the simplicity of list-driven screens in that someone needs to make a 
judgement about the company’s history and its record. A list of bellwethers associated 
with the contemporary qualitative screens is also included in Figure 2, and it is noted 
that each reflects a particular characteristic of the company from which a broader 
conclusion can be drawn, and where verifiable information is readily available from 
public or company sources. Kinder and Domini (1997) stated that predicting the screens 
of tomorrow would be difficult; however a few main themes seemed imminent:  
o The range of current qualitative screens will expand - the number of screens, as 
well as the number of bellwethers under each screen will increase 
o Global issues will become standard screens – due to the globalisation of 
business, and the increasing popularity of mutual funds with global exposure 
o Unpredictable events will shape SRI’s future - since SRI is born of the 
confluence of movements of the 1960s, with no single parent or focus it is hard 
to predict which screens will emerge or come to dominate. Investment managers 
have learned to cope with social screening, and have become sensitive to the 
multiple bottom lines their clients consider. “They have learned to be flexible in 
the face of client concerns about social issues. The one safe prediction about the 
future of social screening is that investment managers will never be permitted to 
forget that lesson” (Kinder & Domini, 1997, p. 18) 
o Conventional securities analysis will incorporate some of today’s social screens. 
This last point of social screens becoming mainstream is what the authors noted as the 
safest prediction, as with all these environmental and diversity issues coming to the fore 
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analysts are reminded that the criteria for fundamental analysis have to be expanded for 
the 21st century. Regarding this change in focus, the securities industry is behind the 
companies it analyzes as the authors stated: “where companies go, analysts will surely 
follow” (Kinder & Domini, 1997, p. 19), and all that is required is a cursory glance at 
any financial publication today to see that the authors were not far off in their 
prediction. 
 
1.2 The Sullivan Principles 
 
In 1977 the Sullivan code of conduct was developed to monitor progress made by U.S. 
companies with subsidiaries in South Africa. The code was drafted by Reverend Leon 
Sullivan, a Baptist minister and member of the board of directors of General Motors. 
The code initially had six principles which became known as the Sullivan Principles 
and called for the “desegregation of the workplace, fair employment practices for all 
employees, equal pay for equal work, job training and advancement of Blacks, 
increasing the number of Blacks in management, and the improvement of the quality of 
workers’ lives outside of the workplace (Mangaliso, 1997, p. 228).  In 1984 the code 
was amplified to include the use of influence to support the unrestricted rights of Black 
business to locate in the urban areas, influence other companies in SA to follow similar 
principles and support the ending of all apartheid laws.  
 
These principles were controversial from the beginning, and later additions urged 
companies that had signed the principles to challenge the apartheid government. They 
called for signatory companies to practice corporate civil disobedience against all 
apartheid laws and to use the companies’ financial and legal resources to assist Blacks 
in the equal use of public and private amenities. Critics charged that by putting a stamp 
of virtue on U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa, the principles stalled 
rather than accelerated progress to end apartheid and “that they were an IOU without a 
due date” (Mangaliso, 1997, p. 228). This was put to the test when Sullivan issued an 
ultimatum in 1985 that he would call for the withdrawal of U.S. corporations if 
apartheid was not abolished by 1987. When the two-year period elapsed, Sullivan called 
upon all U.S. companies to pull out of South Africa admitting that although the 
principles had made life better for some Blacks in South Africa, they had failed to 
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produce changes at a fast enough pace. In 1987 after Sullivan called for the withdrawal 
of U.S. multinationals as they had failed to bring down apartheid, the codes were 
renamed the Statement of Principles and continued to be used as guidelines for 
corporations in South Africa. As a result many corporations began to withdraw from 
South Africa heeding Sullivan’s call, some citing the weakening economy of South 
Africa; while others remained and continued to use the Statement of Principles as their 
guideline (as mentioned in Kinder and Domini, 1997). As shall be covered in the 
literature review, the investor boycotts of South Africa sometimes included a complete 
divestment strategy where any corporation with ties to South Africa would be excluded 
from the investment universe; alternatively another strategy used for divestment was to 
exclude companies that did not comply with the Sullivan principles, thus these 
principles did have some influence. Whether or not these principles had the desired 
effect, the fact that more attention was brought to this cause led divestment from South 
Africa to be one of the most popular tools of SRI during the time, as well as the social 
screen that ultimately would help qualitative screens evolve into what we use today. 
 
1.3 The Triple Bottom Line 
 
Another integral part of SRI lies in what has come to be known as the Triple Bottom 
Line (3BL) which is essentially where managers and investors look beyond the original 
motivation of a firm: to make profit. This is also known as the bottom line as it is a 
reference to the bottom line of the income statement where the profitability of a firm 
can be seen once all income and expenses have been accounted for. By going beyond 
profit, managers look towards social, economic and environmental pillars to create the 
3BL - a more encompassing set of criteria with which to run a company, as well as to 
use in investment decisions. Norman and MacDonald (2003) noted that the idea of 3BL 
accounting has become popular in management, consulting and investing circles over 
the past few years. As mentioned previously, the main idea behind this 3BL paradigm is 
that a corporation’s ultimate success should be measured not just by the traditional 
financial bottom line, but also by its social/ethical and environmental performance. It 
has been accepted by many in the corporate world that firms have a variety of 
obligations to stakeholders, and firms cannot be successful in the long run if they 
consistently disregard the interests of key stakeholders. According to Norman and 
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MacDonald (2003) the novelty of the 3BL lies in the contention of its supporters that 
the overall fulfilment of obligations to communities, employees, customers etc. should 
be measured, calculated, audited and reported – treatment identical to that of the firm’s 
financial performance. The authors found this an exciting promise as “one of the more 
enduring clichés of modern management is that ‘if you can’t measure it, you can’t 
manage it’” (Norman & MacDonald, 2003, p. 243). If ethical business practices and 
social responsibility are believed to be important functions of corporate governance and 
management, then tools need to be developed that make transparent just how well firms 
are doing in this regard.  
 
The authors assumed without argument the desirability of many socially responsible 
business practices and the potential usefulness of tools that allows performance along 
these dimensions to be measures and reported. They also noted that at the time these 
assumptions were not very controversial. The authors cited a poll conducted for 
Business Week in 2000 where 95% of the respondents agreed with the claim that U.S. 
corporations should have more than one purpose (they owe something to their workers 
and the communities they operate in) while only 4% agreed with Friedman (1970)’s 
assertion that U.S. corporations should only strive to make the most profit for their 
shareholders (Norman and MacDonald, 2003, p. 257-258). Most large corporations at 
least pay lip service to social responsibility, and Enron was cited as an example as they 
had an exhaustive code of ethics and principles and yet the corporate governance failure 
at the company was monumental and has become a lesson in how things can go very 
wrong. On top of this, a substantial proportion of the major firms are issuing annual 
reports on social and environmental performance, and Norman and MacDonald (2003) 
did not find controversy in the assumptions about the desirability and usefulness of 
these tools; but rather in the promises suggested by the 3BL idea.  
 
The term “Triple Bottom Line” can be dated to the mid 1990s, and the authors noted 
that in recent history the term has grown in popularity, with an informal search in 
Google returning 25,200 web pages mentioning the term. A similar search for using 
Google resulted in over 1 420 000 web pages as of 10 March 2010, showing just how 
much this topic has grown. Regarding the use of the term; numerous articles have been 
devoted to this topic, significant companies are using the terminology in their annual 
reports, and auditors are offering services to assist in the measurement and reporting of 
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these two additional “bottom lines”. Similarly, there exists a sizeable portion of the 
investment industry devoted to screening companies on the basis of their social and 
environmental performance. Due to the extensive interest of these multiple constituents 
and the lack of academic literature (specific to 3BL) the authors proposed to begin the 
task of filling this academic void and started by seeking answers to a number of 
questions, namely:  
 Is the intent of the 3BL movement really to bring accounting paradigms to bear 
in the social and environmental domains? 
 Is doing so a practical possibility? 
 Will doing so achieve the goals intended by the promoters of the 3BL? 
 Is the idea of a “bottom line” in these other domains a mere metaphor? 
 If it is a metaphor, is it a useful one? 
 Is this a form of jargon we should embrace and encourage? 
The conclusions of the authors were largely critical of this paradigm and although they 
were supportive of some of the aspirations behind the 3BL movement, they argued on 
conceptual and practical grounds that the language of the 3BL promises more than it 
can ever deliver.  
 
Norman and MacDonald (2003) noted that although most of the documents are written 
to introduce readers to the concept and sell it to them, it is difficult to find anything that 
looks like a careful definition of the concept - let alone a methodology or formula 
similar to the calculations on financial statements for working out one of these 
additional bottom lines. Instead of definitions one usually finds vague claims about the 
aims of the 3BL approach, where many quotations about the topic suggested little more 
than that the concept is “an important milestone in our journey toward sustainability” 
(Norman & MacDonald, 2003, p. 245) or that an approach that places emphasis on 
social and environmental aspects of the firm (along with economic aspects) should 
move to the top of executives’ agendas.  
 
Norman and MacDonald (2003) distilled two sets of more concrete propositions about 
the meaning of these additional bottom lines, and why it supposed to be important to 
measure and report on them. For brevity, the authors focused on the social/ethical 
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bottom line, however most of the conceptual issues they explored apply equally to the 
environmental bottom line: 
What does it mean to say there are additional bottom lines? (Norman & 
MacDonald, 2003, p. 246) 
Measurement Claim: The components of social performance can be measured in 
relatively objective ways on the basis of standard indicators, and these data can 
then be audited and reported. 
Aggregation claim: A social bottom line – analogous to a net social “profit/loss” 
– can be calculated using the data from these indicators and a relatively 
uncontroversial formula that could be used for any firm. 
Why should firms measure, calculate and possibly report their additional bottom 
lines? (Norman & MacDonald, 2003, p. 246) 
Convergence Claim: Measuring social performance helps improve social 
performance and firms with better social performance tend to be more profitable 
in the long run. 
Strong Social-obligation Claim: Firms have an obligation to improve (or 
maximise) their social bottom line and accurate measurement is necessary to 
judge how well they have fulfilled this obligation. 
Transparency Claim: The firms have obligations to stakeholders to disclose 
information about how well it performs with respect to all stakeholders. 
3BL advocates believe that social (and environmental) performance can be measured in 
objective ways, and that firms should use these results to improve their performance. 
Additionally, these results should be reported as a matter of principle and by using and 
reporting these additional bottom lines, firms can expect to do better financially in the 
long run. Instead of examining each of these claims in isolation, the authors focused on 
the deeper criticisms of the 3BL movement and found that generally these claims need 
to be formulated vaguely, so that they are plausible, and that many of these claims are 
salvaged at the expense of their power. Regarding the Transparency Claim, it is 
accepted that there are obligations (or good reasons at least) to report some information 
to various stakeholders. The question becomes what information do stakeholders 
actually have a right to, and how does one justify such claims. Another question raised 
  20
was when is it legitimate to keep secrets from outsiders, including competitors, and the 
literature offered no answers. The authors also turned to the Aggregation Claim which 
is the most distinctive and novel aspect of the 3BL and they argued that this claim 
which is essential to the very concept of a bottom line is untenable. Their view is 
summed up with the slogan “what is sound about the 3BL project is not novel, and what 
is novel is not sound” (Norman & MacDonald, 2003, p. 247). 
 
If there is something distinctive about the 3BL ideal, it cannot be primarily that it calls 
on firms to focus on things other than the traditional bottom line, as it has never been 
possible to do well without paying attention elsewhere - especially to groups like 
employees, customers, suppliers and governments. Johnson & Johnson was cited as a 
company that performs as well as any other profit maximizing company but who 
established a code six decades ago announcing that its primary stakeholders were its 
customers, employees and the communities it operated in. Norman and MacDonald 
(2003) did not claim that most corporations are already functioning in the way 3BL 
proposes, however their point was that once the 3BL principles are formulated in a way 
that makes them plausible, they become vague enough that many executives would not 
find them controversial - or very useful. Advocates of the 3BL approach want 
corporations to report more of the data they collect on stakeholder relations, but even 
here there is nothing distinctive to 3BL about the call to audit and report social 
performance. If there are good justifications for firms to report, these will be 
independent of the distinctive feature of the 3BL: namely the Aggregation Claim – 
which was the idea that it is possible to quantify a firm’s social performance in a way 
that arrives at some kind of “bottom line”. 
 
Supporters of 3BL tend to insist that firms have social and environmental bottom lines 
in just the same way that they have economic bottom lines. Norman and MacDonald 
(2003) posited that the only way to make sense of this claim was by formulating it in 
the way that they had with the Aggregation Claim. In other words, the authors could not 
see how it made sense to “talk about a bottom line analogous to the bottom line of the 
income statement unless there is an agreed-upon methodology that allows us, at least in 
principle, to add and subtract various data until we arrive at a net sum” (Norman & 
MacDonald, 2003, p. 249). Interestingly, the authors noted that none of the advocates of 
3BL accounting ever actually proposed a methodology of the sort implied by the 
  21
Aggregation Claim. For all the talk of taking the three “bottom lines” seriously (and the 
novelty of the idea) nobody had proposed a way to use the data on social performance 
to calculate some kind of a net social bottom line. Norman and MacDonald (2003) 
suggested that this may be because the advocates of the concept were hoping that 
progress on a methodology will come once the idea has gained acceptance, however 
they believe that this is a vain hope. If it makes sense to say that there is a bottom line 
for performance in some domain, that is directly analogous to the financial bottom line, 
then it makes sense to ask what a firm’s bottom line in this domain is; and there should 
be a relatively simple answer. The problem is, since it is not known what the answer 
should look like, some type of answer expressed in monetary units does not seem right. 
If a firm was asked about its social or environmental bottom line and the reply were 42 
or 42,000,000 this does not mean much as nobody knows how to calculate monetary 
equivalents of social and environmental benefits. The authors reflected on what would 
look like a plausible answer to the question of what some particular firm’s social 
bottom line is; and there are good grounds for thinking that one firm’s social 
performance is better than another’s or that a given firm’s social or ethical performance 
improved or declined over a certain period. The judgements in these cases would be 
based on the kind of indicators that proposed social standards highlight including 
charitable donations, measures of employee satisfaction, perceptions in the community 
etc. This is still, however, a far cry from saying that there exists a systematic way of 
adding up the social pros and cons, or of arriving at some universal figure for a firm’s 
social performance.  
 
The problem with this alleged analogy runs even further as with the traditional bottom 
line it is the last line of the income statement expressing net income after subtracting 
expenses occurred from the income earned. Norman and MacDonald (2003) were 
unsure of what the social equivalent should look like or even in what units it should be 
measured. Additionally, the conceptual analogies above the line are puzzling as what 
are the ethical/social analogues of revenue, expenses, assets, liabilities etc. The data that 
3BL proposes to collect as indications of social performance do not fit into general 
categories that allow for a straightforward subtraction of the bad from the good to get 
some net social result. Some possibilities of social accounting may include:  
 20% of its directors were woman 
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 7% of its senior management were members of “visible” minorities 
 It donated 1.2% of its profits to charity 
Without knowing the size of the firm, its location, and the industry averages it is hard to 
say how good or bad these figures are. With regard to each indicator, it is easy to have a 
sense of whether a higher or lower number is better from the ethical/social performance 
perspective but these are not the type of data that can be fed into calculations to produce 
a final net sum. Some figures are presented in percentages which cannot be added or 
subtracted if they refer to different figures. Although Norman and MacDonald (2003) 
did not dispute that these are relevant considerations in the evaluation of a firm’s social 
responsibility “it does not seem at all helpful to think of this evaluation as in any way 
analogous to the methodology of adding and subtracting used in financial accounting” 
(Norman & MacDonald, 2003, p. 251). The authors argued that it is impossible to 
develop a sound methodology for arriving at a meaningful social bottom line for a firm 
since it is impossible to find a common scale to weigh all of the social “goods” and 
“bads” caused by the firm and from a practical perspective, there will never be 
consensus for any such proposed common scale - especially to the level of agreement 
about accounting standards. The authors expressed this “impossibility” argument in 
terms of accountancy definitions and one of the three basic assumptions underlying the 
methodologies of the standard financial statement is the “unit of measure” assumption 
which states that all measures for revenue, expenses, assets and so on are reducible to a 
common unit of currency. The other two assumptions are the “separate identity” 
assumption which is that the economic events measured can be identified as happening 
to the entity in question (separable from other individuals for accounting purposes) and 
the “time-period” assumption which assumes that the economic events measured occur 
within a well-defined period of time.  
 
The social and environmental realms lack an obvious and measurable common 
“currency” (whether it is monetary or non-monetary) for expressing the magnitude of 
all good and bad produced by the firm and affecting individuals in the different 
stakeholder groups. Part of the problem is that it is difficult to make quantitative 
assessments of how good or bad some action is, and partly it is that there seems to be 
qualitative as well as quantitative distinctions when evaluating the social impact of 
corporate activities. The nature of these activities means that although there are many 
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relevant and objective facts that can be reported and audited any attempt to weigh them 
up will “necessarily involve subjective value judgments, about which reasonable people 
can and will legitimately disagree” (Norman & MacDonald, 2003, p.252). This 
argument does not rest on acceptance of any philosophical view about whether all value 
judgments are subjective or objective; it relies only on the fact that the various values 
involved in evaluations of corporate behaviour are not comparable; and reasonable and 
well informed people will weigh them and trade them off in different ways. This means 
that there is no formula that can be appealed to in order to justify all the trade-offs, e.g. 
to decide what the net social impact is for any pair of social indicators. In short, 
whatever is going on in this sort of evaluation “it would seem to be about as far as you 
could get from the paradigm of the accountant performing calculations on the basis of 
verifiable figures and widely accepted accounting principles” (Norman & MacDonald, 
2003, p. 253).  
 
Norman and MacDonald (2003) questioned whether the use and propagation of this 
3BL jargon is concerning as it is inherently misleading. From an abstract point of view 
the answer is yes, as if the jargon of 3BL implies that there exists a sound methodology 
for calculating a meaningful and comparable social bottom line, as can be done with 
financial statements, then it is misleading. The authors had a problem with this because 
even if advocates issue disclaimers to this effect and admit it is just a slogan to get 
social and environmental concerns taken seriously “the concept of a Triple Bottom Line 
in fact turns out to be a ‘Good old-fashioned Single Bottom Line plus Vague 
Commitments to Social and Environmental Concerns’” (Norman & MacDonald, 2003, 
p. 256). These ideals are easy for almost any firm to embrace and by committing 
themselves to the principles of 3BL it sounds like companies are making a more 
concrete commitment to CSR, but it allows them to make almost no commitment 
whatsoever.  This lack of real social and environmental bottom lines means firms need 
not worry about comparing these bottom lines with other firms, nor do they need to 
worry about the firm being seen to have declining social and environmental bottom 
lines over the years. The authors stated that, at best, a commitment to the 3BL requires 
that the firm report a number of data points of its own choosing that are potentially 
relevant to different stakeholders, typically in the form of a glossy report full of photos 
of happy people and colourful flora. Over time some results will improve, and some 
will decline, comparability over time for one firm is likely to be difficult, and 
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comparability across firms and sectors will often be impossible. In short, the “inherent 
emptiness and vagueness, of the 3BL paradigm makes it as easy as possible for a 
cynical firm to appear to be committed to social responsibility and ecological 
sustainability” (Norman & MacDonald, 2003, p. 256-257). Being vague about this 
commitment is hardly risky when the main advocates of the idea are themselves just as 
vague.  
 
It is believed that the future of firms deciding voluntarily to report on their social 
performance will look much like the history of firms deciding to bind themselves to a 
corporate code of ethics. On one side, the social report or code of ethics tells little about 
a firm’s actual commitment to the principles, and it is relatively costless to produce 
these documents - with the added benefit that their vagueness results in firms not being 
opened up to any risks. The other side is that these types of documents play critical 
roles in a firm’s strategy to improve its ethical and social performance, and to integrate 
this goal into its corporate culture. Norman and MacDonald (2003) believed that clear 
and meaningful principles are most likely to serve firms of the latter type, and that 
vague and meaningless principles (like those implied with the 3BL) are best only for 
facilitating hypocrisy. The previous section covered 3BL in some depth, mainly due to 
the fact that the idea of 3BL accounting and social accounting is one of the underlying 
principles of CSR. Although there are many flaws which exist and have been pointed 
out, it is important to understand that the idea of SRI does not need to be flawless for it 
to possess some credibility. 
 
1.4 Corporate Governance 
 
The final key area of discussion is corporate governance as it constitutes one of the 
pillars of the ESG movement. As the social and environmental pillars look after 
stakeholders related to the communities and the environment where companies work, 
respectively; the governance pillar can be seen to look after the shareholders of the 
company. Due to the prominence of the shareholders in companies, the fact that they 
have far more power and visibility than representatives of the community of the 
environment, means that when things go wrong for these stakeholders far more 
attention can be directed to the problem. Related to this is the fact that generally a firms 
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responsibilities to the shareholders are far more defined and legally enforced, thus if 
something does happen to go wrong there tends to be something illegal occurring as 
opposed to immoral. The reason for this is again the defined role of shareholders and 
the firm’s responsibilities towards them. Their performance measures are relatively 
straight-forward and so if management is not meeting the targets they should be; there 
is recourse for the shareholders. In contrast, however, the other less influential 
stakeholders tend to have less defined responsibilities; for example the environment, 
and in this case how does one judge the firm’s performance, and what action can be 
taken to remedy any issues. Recent times have seen a global push towards tighter 
regulation specifically in terms of governance, and the failure of big corporations (such 
as Enron, Adelphia, Worldcom etc.) have provided spectacular evidence of why these 
steps are necessary to protect the owners of these firms. This problem essentially arose 
out of agency theory, when there became a separation of the ownership of the firm from 
the control of the firm, and where the responsibility for control shifted away from 
owners towards directors. The issue here is that the managers (or directors) could abuse 
their functions for their own ends and to the detriment of the owners. As a result 
corporate governance was introduced to ensure that managers act in ways that serve the 
interests of the shareholders. In South Africa, the King Committee has been dedicated 
to corporate governance and produced reports to the effect of highlighting key issues 
and the appropriated measures firms need to put in place.  
 
Rossouw, van der Watt and Malan (2001), henceforth Rossouw et al., noted that the 
King Committee was specifically requested to make recommendations on a code of 
practice regarding the financial aspects of corporate governance in South Africa. Some 
of the key principles regard the board composition and other traditionally sound 
governance practices such as separating the position of CEO from the chairman of the 
board, or the existence of audit committees in the board. In addition to the governance 
aspects, the King Committee was also required to lay down guidelines for ethical 
practices in business and from the reports it was evident that “ethics is regarded as 
essential for the operation of business, as business activity is premised upon ‘enterprise 
and integrity’” (Rossouw et al., 2001, p. 297). It was also noted that the King Report 
was the first report on corporate governance that embraced the concepts of stakeholder 
engagement, ethics and environmental management and encouraged an inclusive 
approach to these issues (Rossouw et al., 2001, p. 300). The authors pointed out that the 
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original report was revised with attention paid to social and ethical reporting (social 
accounting) and thus the step towards a more ‘sustainability focused’ report was already 
evident. The King Committee also expressed a view that an inclusive approach is 
fundamental to long-term success; however the notion of being accountable to all was 
rejected because it would result in accountability to none. As already mentioned, this 
thinking has become so mainstream that for participation on the JSE, any firms 
attempting to list need to comply with the King II report which gives an indication of 
the importance of governance to the business industry today. With the publication of 
King III it seems likely that the JSE will require compliance with the latest report from 
the King Committee. 
 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)’s paper examined the relationship between the 
corporate governance ratings of firms and their equity prices. Their findings were 
interesting in that the firms with the best governance ratings attained 9.3% higher return 
as opposed to the firms with the worst ratings. This difference in returns was explained 
using Carhart’s four-factor model which is an extension of the Three Factor Model, and 
includes an additional momentum factor. The authors found that by buying the 
Democracy portfolio (the best performers) and short selling the Dictatorship portfolio 
(the worst performers) an alpha of 71 basis points per month (8.5% per year) was 
attained. Thus, what was found was that firms with good governance practices in place 
tended to perform well, whereas firms with poor governance indicated a level of 
underperformance so much so that significant abnormal returns were possible. The 
authors also found that firms with the best governance ratings had higher firm value, 
higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures and made fewer 
acquisitions. Extending these findings to this dissertation, as part of good CSR, having 
good governance practices in place may in fact help firms attain better financial 
performance. Thus, it is possible that one of the motivators for a positive correlation 
between good social performance and firm financial performance is the underlying 
driver of corporate governance which has already been demonstrated to be positively 
correlated with positive abnormal returns. It can be seen that what started as a push 
towards better corporate governance practices, has slowly led to increased attention to 
ethical behaviours, and an improved framework for social accounting. Ultimately, the 
improving environment is conducive to more responsible firms that make the changes 
voluntarily and occasionally (in the case of the JSE) with a little assistance.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The literature is presented in three categories: firstly the general theory around CSR; 
secondly a focus on the relationships between CSR and other firm aspects such as 
performance or social disclosures and the final category examined the literature 
surrounding SRI, and its impact on the investor. In each category a chronological 
overview of the surrounding literature was examined. This was done so that a thorough 
background was supplied and the logical evolution of ideas and theories could be 
understood and followed to their present-day conclusions; on which the empirical 
aspects of this study were based. 
 
2.1 General Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Two of the earliest formalized articles concerning CSR and which had influence on 
later academics were Milton Friedman’s 1970 article “The Social Responsibility of 
business is to Increase its Profits” and Milton Moskowitz’ 1972 paper “Choosing 
Socially Responsible Stocks”. Although earlier works may have hinted at this concept, 
these two articles were the beginning of a polarisation of views which established two 
opposing schools of thought. On one hand the belief that social responsibility is 
inevitable for a well-functioning community, and on the other the belief that imposing a 
social responsibility on a corporation is wrong in the sense that the only responsibility a 
business has is to make profits for its shareholders. 
 
Friedman (1970) stated that businessmen who talk about “promoting desirable social 
ends” and that “business has a social conscience” were preaching unadulterated 
socialism2 and undermining the basis of free society (Friedman, 1970, para. 1). He 
believed that discussions of social responsibility were notable for their analytical 
looseness and lack of rigour especially since only people can have responsibilities – a 
business cannot. In a free enterprise system corporate executives are the employees of 
the owners and their responsibility is to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the law, as well as ethical customs. In this role as agent of the owner, the 
                                                 
2 Socialism is defined as a political system which advocates the communal ownership, usually through 
the state, of production, distribution and exchange. (Taken from the Collins English Dictionary)  
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responsibility is to the principal and although the executive’s performance may not be 
easily judged, the criterion of performance is straightforward. Friedman (1970) extends 
this to say that an executive in his own right may exercise social responsibilities but he 
does this as a person and a principal, as opposed to an agent; and it is his own time and 
money being spent to achieve these purposes.  
 
In this framework social responsibility necessitates that the executive does not act in the 
interest of his employer as he would be spending someone else’s money for the general 
social interest (Friedman, 1970, para. 9). Stockholders, customers and employees can 
spend their own money if they wish and therefore if the executive spends money 
differently, he is imposing a tax as well as deciding how to spend it. This raises political 
questions in terms of principle and consequences; as on principle this taxation without 
representation calls the selection of executives by shareholders into question. 
Additionally, how the taxes are spent raises even more issues. This difficulty of 
exercising social responsibility illustrates the virtue of private enterprise in that people 
are responsible for their own actions, and it is difficult to exploit other people for selfish 
or unselfish purposes - “they can do good - but only at their own expense” (Friedman, 
1970, para. 19). It was noted that social responsibility is frequently a cloak for actions 
justified on other grounds and therefore companies generate goodwill as a by-product of 
justified expenditures which in his mind approaches fraud. Friedman (1970) argued that 
there are no social responsibilities in any sense other than the shared values and 
responsibilities of individuals; as society is a collection of individuals, and of the groups 
they form. In Friedman’s book Capitalism and Freedom (1962; cited in Friedman, 1970, 
para.33) he called social responsibility in a free society a “fundamentally subversive 
doctrine” and that in such a free society, there is only one social responsibility of 
business: “to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game”. 
 
In 1986 Thomas Mulligan critiqued Friedman (1970)’s essay and called into question 
the main claims made against CSR. Mulligan (1986) asserted that the key arguments of 
Friedman (1970)’s essay were unsuccessful and he failed to prove that the exercise of 
social responsibility in business is by its nature unfair and socialist. The main issue 
Mulligan (1986) had with Friedman (1970)’s argument was that it was based on a faulty 
premise – that social responsibility is unfair because it constitutes taxation without 
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representation; due to executives behaving like lone rangers without the participation of 
stakeholders. He offered a different paradigm where executives do not have to behave 
in this way, and where CSR suffers no diminishment in meaning and merit if the 
executive and his employers understand their interest in a proactive social role. The 
path towards socially responsible action is the same for all other business decisions, and 
if CSR is on the company’s agenda; the company’s mission, objectives and goals gave 
the executives license to put it there. 
 
Friedman (1970) argued that executives cannot know the future consequences of their 
actions, however since action in the absence of certainty is commonplace in the 
business world, business people have a bias towards action and therefore a 
businessperson has less cause than most moral agents to abstain from social 
responsibility - as they are more practiced in this regard. The final issue was Friedman 
(1970)’s conclusion that social responsibility is essentially socialism, and Mulligan 
(1986) argued that as this was based on a weak premise, there had been no definition of 
socialism and the imposition of taxes is not intrinsic to social responsibility; one cannot 
maintain this point of view. Friedman (1970)’s objections to CSR were based on an 
inaccurate paradigm and although he was right to point out these exercises cost money, 
these ‘costs’ are not necessarily imposed by one stakeholder on others. Socially 
responsible actions can be pursued without objectionable results, and the next step is to 
produce positive arguments as to why people should pursue such a course.  
 
In response to this critique Bill Shaw (1988) suggested that although Mulligan (1986) 
misses the point of Friedman’s essay, he does agree with the general idea that social 
responsibility is important, and that the correct question is why people should pursue 
such a course. Although it is the “role of our democratic institutions to deal with 
national agenda issues” (Shaw, 1988, p. 537), the author believed that corporations and 
individuals have a role to play in improving the quality of the human environment. 
Shaw (1988) argued that Mulligan (1986)’s counter paradigm of moving the executive 
into a consultative role with shareholders reduces but does not eliminate the 
arbitrariness of the imposition of taxes. Another issue was Mulligan (1986)’s idea that 
because executives are biased towards action they are able to handle social issues such 
as inflation and unemployment; as this implies they should do something, even if it is 
wrong. Shaw (1988) noted Friedman (1970)’s paper will survive until an alternative 
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argument is presented with equal clarity, thus he turned to the core issues of social 
responsibility where he concluded in favour of CSR. Shaw (1988) discussed the profit 
only motives of Friedman (1970)’s case and although it is unrealistic to expect 
executives to solve the social evils while making a profit, the claim that executives who 
talk up the social side of business endeavours (that include a profit motivation) are 
characterized by fraud is incorrect. Socially responsible activities may be reduced to 
economic terms and evaluated on the basis of returns to shareholders but however the 
calculations are done; it does not make the projects any less socially responsible. 
“Advocates of social responsibility are not supporters of corporate waste as Friedman 
would have one believe; neither are they so narrow as to deny legitimacy to the moral 
content of projects that have a multiple base that includes economic considerations” 
(Shaw, 1988, p. 540).  
 
Shaw (1988) stated that where a social need is pronounced and the corporation is 
capable of responding in a manner commensurate with the task, there are some 
principles that can bring direction to corporate social policy: Need; Ability (guided by 
experience and competence, corporations can participate without sacrificing their 
principal economic function), Proximity, and Last Resort (action may be more 
appropriate for some other social institution, and as the government cannot be expected 
to do everything this amounts to “doing the right thing when the job needs to be done 
and nobody else is doing it” [Shaw, 1988, p. 541]). A single firm can attempt to solve 
problems like inflation and unemployment forever without making headway. 
Additionally, the existence of “free riders” (firms who are less socially responsible and 
cut into the responsible firms’ profits) means either the government must uniformly 
compel specific behaviour, or induce this with incentives. Corporate programs that lose 
touch with their economic mission while trying to achieve social objectives may be 
counter-productive and are likely to harm the concept of CSR, as it is more a matter of 
“targeting ‘do-able’ projects and of bringing wisdom, coherence, and discipline to the 
sensitive proposition of redistributing corporate wealth toward the solution of problems 
that the corporation did not cause” (Shaw, 1988, p. 541). Shaw concluded that it is past 
time asking whether corporations have a responsibility, and it is now time to spell out 
what the responsibilities are.  
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As the arguments for CSR evolved from an opposing viewpoint, one of the initial 
papers supportive of this behaviour came when Moskowitz formalized the idea that 
socially responsible stocks may perform better in his 1972 article dedicated to 
highlighting social performers in the business place. Moskowitz stated that “socially 
sound investments need not, of course, be unsound financially” (Moskowitz, 1972, p. 
71) and he noted that some argue the socially aware corporation possesses the special 
sensitivity that will enable it to surpass competitors. He noted that it is extremely 
difficult to construct standards by which a company’s social performance can be 
accurately measured however after four years of observation he presented fourteen 
companies whose names kept coming up with regard to positive and constructive 
responses to social problems. Moskowitz added that the data in his paper was 
inadequate for an investment decision based on the usual financial considerations, and 
that while many of his choices probably make good sense considered from a profit-
oriented standpoint, the securities were being suggested on the basis of corporate 
behaviour.  
 
In addition to the relationships, the theory around CSR is important. Fitch (1976) 
looked at how CSR was defined, as well as how social problems were distinguished 
from non-social problems. The author used the definition of a problem as the difference 
between an existing situation and a desired situation; where one important criterion is 
that there must be a large group of people who are aware of this gap between the 
relevant reality and the desired condition. Fitch (1976) defined the desired state of 
affairs, with the focus on three principles:  
 Humanitarian / sentimental - where pain and suffering are bad and therefore any 
situation causing them would constitute a social problem. 
 Utilitarian – this concerns the impact pain and suffering have on society as 
“individual human suffering is considered to be a social problem… because the 
sufferer inevitably imposes costs on non-sufferers” (Fitch, 1976, p. 40) and thus 
the reduction of “neighbourhood costs” is the desired state of affairs.  
 Dysfunctionality – anything which threatens the survival or well-being of a 
society is dysfunctional to that society and constitutes a social problem 
(however, in the long-run it is hard to know whether a particular class of 
behaviours is going to be harmful or helpful to the well-being of a society). 
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A corporation desiring to achieve a minimal level of CSR will accept the utilitarian 
principle; to achieve more than a minimal level it may go well beyond the utilitarian 
principle and consider the humanitarian principle.  
 
Fitch (1976) covered decision criteria which apply to the question of which social 
problems should be tackled and which should be ignored by the corporation, where two 
important motivations were: avoiding neighbourhood costs (e.g. polluted water) and 
enlightened self-interest (solving problems in which the corporation is a contributing 
factor). The enlightened self-interest criterion also suggested that the corporation looks 
for ways to increase profit by applying its expertise to the solution of social problems 
whether or not it is a contributing factor. After a company has decided that it wants to 
achieve CSR, has chosen a principle to guide its statements of what constitutes a desired 
state of affairs and has decided which problems are the most relevant; it can compare 
these desired states to existing realities and invoke the corporate problem-solving 
mechanisms to reduce or eliminate the gap between the desired state and the existing 
one.  
 
Ultimately “corporations can achieve corporate social responsibility if they attempt to 
identify and solve those social problems in which they are intimately involved, and 
when the possibility of profit is available as an incentive” (Fitch, 1976, p. 45). Through 
goal setting in the areas of their broader responsibility to society and by careful analysis 
of the consequences of their social responsibility goals, companies may be able to 
prevent future social problems. Effective rationales for the achievement of CSR exist, 
as do theories and an emerging technology for application of the theories to the 
definition, identification and solution of social problems. “Corporations are perhaps the 
most effective problem-solving organisations in a capitalist society” (Fitch, 1976, p. 45) 
and it seems likely that they will have to take on the additional burden of applying their 
problem solving capabilities to the broader social problems of society. Fitch (1976) 
noted, however, that when this responsibility is not voluntarily accepted it is likely to be 
forced upon the corporation through the extra-organisational model of government 
regulation.  
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Another paper attempting to formally define CSR came when Carroll (1979) proposed a 
conceptual model that described the aspects of CSP. The three aspects of the model 
addressed questions such as:  
 What is included in CSR? 
 What are the social issues the organisation must address? 
 What is the organisation’s philosophy or mode of social responsiveness? 
An important facet of analysing this topic is to define what is meant by “social 
responsibility”. Carroll (1979) examined various definitions and found that they vary 
from Friedman (1970)’s “profit making only” definition to others where there is a need 
to go beyond economic and legal requirements. Carroll (1979) focused on a social 
performance model as shown in Figure 3 where he stated that “the social 
responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary 
expectations that society has of organisations at a given point in time” (Carroll, 1979, p. 
500).  
 
Figure 3 - Social Responsibility Categories (Carroll, 1979, p. 499) 
The economic responsibilities came first and foremost due to the business institution 
being the basic economic unit in society. Legal responsibilities play a part insofar as 
while society permits businesses to assume the productive role, it has laid down the 
Discretionary 
Responsibilities
Ethical 
Responsibilities
Economic 
Responsibilities
Legal 
Responsibilities
 
 
TOTAL 
SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
  34
laws and regulations under which business is expected to operate. Carroll (1979) noted 
that although there may be four kinds of responsibilities, these must be met 
simultaneously as is the case with economic and legal responsibilities. Although the 
economic and legal responsibilities embody ethical norms, there are additional 
behaviours that are not necessarily codified into law but expected of business 
nonetheless. These ethical responsibilities are ill-defined and are among the most 
difficult for businesses to deal with; thus, although the debate continues as to what is 
and is not ethical, ethical responsibilities have clearly been stressed. The final 
responsibility is discretionary and these are where society has no clear-cut message for 
business, and they are left up to individual judgement and choice. Although these are at 
the business’s discretion and therefore might not be accurately called a responsibility, 
societal expectations do exist for businesses to assume social roles over and above those 
described. Although the definition does not specify the degree of responsibility in each 
category, it provides a classification scheme for the kinds of responsibilities a business 
has and “this definition is designed to bring into the fold those who have argued against 
social responsibility by presuming an economic emphasis to be separate and apart from 
a social emphasis” (Carroll, 1979, p. 500).  
 
Carroll (1979) discussed the social issues related to CSR however the problem was that 
these issues change over time and differ between industries. For this reason the ‘issues’ 
approach to examining business and society relationships gave way to “managerial 
approaches that are concerned with developing or specifying generalized modes of 
response to all social issues that become significant to a firm” (Carroll, 1979, p. 501). 
According to survey results from Holmes (1976; cited in Carroll, 1979), when managers 
were asked what factors were prominent in selecting areas of social involvement by 
their firms the top five factors were: 
 Matching a social need to corporate need or ability 
 Seriousness of social need 
 Interest of top executives 
 PR value of social action 
 Government pressure 
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Carroll (1979) concluded that although there is recognition that social issues must be 
identified as an important aspect of CSP, there is no agreement as to what these issues 
should be. The final aspect of the model addressed the strategy behind business 
responses to social issues and was described as ‘social responsiveness’. This can range 
on a continuum from no response to a proactive response where the underlying 
assumption is that businesses have a social responsibility and that the focus is not on 
management accepting a moral obligation but on the degree of managerial action. 
Carroll (1979) looked at some authors who provided conceptual schemes that described 
the responsiveness continuum and these are summarised in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4 - Social Responsiveness Categories (Carroll, 1979, p. 502) 
Corporate social responsiveness is the action phase of management’s response to social 
issues where being responsive enables firms to act on their social responsibilities 
without getting stuck with the definitional problems that can occur if organisations try 
to get a precise fix on what their responsibilities are before acting. CSR has ethical and 
moral threads running through it and is therefore problematic; whereas corporate social 
responsiveness is concerned only with the managerial processes of response. These 
would include planning and social forecasting, organising for social response, 
controlling social activities, social decision-making, and corporate social policy. 
Figure 5 combines the three aspects into a conceptual social performance model. The 
issues identified are illustrative only and “each organisation should carefully assess 
which social issues it must address as it plans for corporate social performance” 
(Carroll, 1979, p. 502).  
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Figure 5 - The Corporate Social Performance Model (Carroll, 1979, p. 503) 
What have previously been regarded as separate definitions of social responsibility are 
treated here as three separate issues pertaining to CSP. The first aspect pertains to the 
definition of social responsibility, the second aspect concerns the range of social issues 
(consumerism, environment etc.) and the final aspect is the social responsiveness 
continuum.  Although some stress that social responsiveness is the preferable focus, 
Carroll (1979) believed it was but one facet to be addressed if CSP is to be accepted, 
and the three aspects together force people to think through the dominant questions that 
must be faced when analyzing social performance. This conceptual model can help 
managers understand that social responsibility is not separate and distinct from 
economic performance, but a part of the total social responsibility of business as “the 
model integrates economic concerns into a social performance framework. In addition, 
it places ethical and discretionary expectations into a rational economic and legal 
framework” (Carroll, 1979, p.503). The model does not provide an answer as to how far 
the firm should go; however, this conceptualisation may lead to a better managed social 
performance program. Carroll (1979) concluded that CSP requires that a firm’s social 
responsibilities be assessed, the social issues identified and a response philosophy 
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chosen. Furthermore, the ethical and discretionary ideas are presented in a context that 
is more palatable to those who think economic considerations have disappeared in 
discussions of social responsibility.  
 
Fry, Keim and Meiners (1982), henceforth Fry et al. (1982), focused on the motivation 
underlying corporate philanthropy and noted that the existing literature centred on three 
main rationales: through-the-firm giving, corporate statesmanship and profit-motivated 
giving. The profit motivation argument was examined by determining the relationship 
between giving and advertising expenditures and the results indicated that contributions 
were motivated by profit considerations that influence both advertising expenditures 
and corporate giving. As giving may be closely related to stockholders’ interests, 
corporate giving could be a profit motivated activity, or it could be a way of satisfying 
non-profit interests of shareholders (through-the-firm giving). Alternatively corporate 
philanthropy could result from managerial decisions that are not necessarily in the 
interests of shareholders (an executive perquisite), or managers may have embraced a 
“modern managerial social responsibility ideology” (Fry et al., 1982, p. 95). Fry et al. 
(1982) detailed the different rationales for corporate giving: 
 Profit Motivated – Oligopolistic industries are more likely to seek a competitive 
advantage over each other by means that competitive firms cannot, and 
monopolistic firms need not. Firms in very competitive and very noncompetitive 
industries should have low contribution ratios since in a competitive industry a 
firm would not survive if it was making contributions alone. Similarly, profit 
maximizing monopolistic firms would have little incentive to make 
contributions. 
 Through-the-Firm Giving – If the firms tax rate was higher than the owner or 
manager’s tax rate it might prompt efforts to pursue the lower cost alternative of 
giving through-the-firm. From the owner perspective it is easier to find a 
controlling interest in small firms, thus small firms should give more than large 
firms. From the manager’s perspective, as the benefits are not aligned with 
owners’ interests, the monitoring of the managers will influence the amount of 
giving. The larger a firm is the greater the costs associated with monitoring 
managers is, and thus the level of giving is higher than smaller firms. 
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 Result of Corporate Statesmanship – The separation of ownership and control in 
large firms empower managers with the opportunity and responsibility to serve 
the broad interests of the many publics of the corporation. Followers of Berle 
(1962; cited in Fry et al., 1982) contend that the doctrine of CSR has evolved 
from a changing managerial philosophy that explicitly recognises the obligations 
of the firm to society, and avoids the narrow goal of simply increasing profits. 
The authors argued that “business decision-making today is a mixture of 
altruism, self-interest, and good citizenship. Managers do take actions which are 
in the social interest even though there is a cost involved and the connection 
with long run profits is quite remote” (Fry et al., 1982, p. 99). 
 Advertising – Firms may use philanthropy as a means to gain name recognition, 
therefore philanthropy may be a form of advertising and consequently profit 
motivated. 
Fry et al. (1982) examined the relationship that giving is a function of advertising and 
the results indicated that advertising expenses were positively and significantly related 
to corporate giving. Marginal expenditures on advertising and contributions moved 
almost identically therefore executives tended to rate the relative values of these 
expenditures the same over time. The analysis also indicated that there were different 
relationships between advertising and income for industries with differing levels of 
public contact. Similarly, the results showed that firms with higher levels of public 
contact spend more on contributions than do firms with little public contact, which was 
consistent with the notion that contributions are profit motivated expenditures. Finally 
there were highly significant correlations between annual changes in contributions and 
annual changes in all of the business expenses usually accepted as being profit 
motivated, with the highest correlations between contributions and advertising, and 
between contributions and compensation to officers. The relationship with 
compensation would seem to support the idea that contributions may be in part a 
perquisite and thus a form of compensation for executives. The authors concluded that 
corporate philanthropy provides direct benefits for the contributor as well as for 
individuals, organisations, and communities in the external environment of business; 
and ultimately corporate giving seemed to be a profit motivated expense.  
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McWilliams and Siegel (2001) offered a framework to think about social responsibility 
by outlining a supply and demand model of CSR. The authors defined CSR as actions 
that appear to further some social good beyond the interests of the firm, while 
specifically going beyond obeying the law. Their analysis was limited to satisfying the 
demand for CSR through the creation of product attributes that support social 
responsibility directly or that signal a firm’s commitment to CSR. While some 
managers recognise multiple stakeholder interests, others avoid CSR as it is viewed as 
at odds with profit maximisation, and this discrepancy in views has stimulated debate 
and raised two important questions: Firstly, do socially responsible firms outperform or 
underperform other companies that do not meet the same social criteria? Secondly, 
precisely how much should a firm spend on CSR? While much research devoted to the 
first question has resulted in mixed findings, the second question had not been directly 
examined in the previous literature, and based on a theory of the firm perspective, 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) proposed a methodology for firms to determine their 
optimal level of CSR investment. The perspective presumes that managers of publicly 
held firms attempt to maximise shareholder wealth, with the market for corporate 
control as the main control mechanism (from Jensen, 1988; cited in McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001); thus, the framework applies to publicly held firms but not necessarily to 
private companies. Based on this framework, hypotheses regarding the supply and 
demand of CSR were derived and conclusions drawn. Freeman (1984; cited in 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) asserted that firms have relationships with many 
constituent groups and that these stakeholders affect and are affected by the actions of 
the firm – and this is the dominant paradigm in CSR.  
 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) related CSR to a theory of the firm where managers are 
assumed to maximise profits and based on this, CSR is viewed as an investment. In this 
context there are CSR “resources” and “outputs”, and a firm can create a certain level of 
CSR by imbuing its products with CSR attributes or using CSR-related resources in its 
production process. The authors hypothesised that there are two main sources of 
demand for CSR: consumer demand; and demand from other stakeholders (investors, 
employees, the community). Their analysis of the markets for CSR resulted in a variety 
of hypotheses (listed in Figure 6 along with their justifications) and some key findings 
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were that CSR allows managers to satisfy personal interests and to achieve product 
differentiation.  
 
Figure 6 - Supply and Demand Model (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001, p. 120-124) 3 
Differentiation through CSR resources may include investment in Research and 
Development (R&D) which results in both CSR process and product innovations, each 
valued by some customers. For CSR differentiation to be successful, customers must be 
aware of the CSR characteristics. Advertising that gives information about CSR 
attributes can build reputation for quality, reliability or honesty and this advertising 
fosters product differentiation – allowing the firm to charge a premium price. In terms 
of consumer demand, income is a determinant as affluent customers can afford the 
                                                 
3 For Hypothesis (9) the authors noted that a firm may fundamentally change its production process in 
response to a CSR concern. Thus it is possible that a CSR oriented process innovation results in the 
creation of a CSR characteristic at the same (or lower) level of cost. 
Supply and Demand Model Hypotheses 
1: There is a positive correlation between the level of product differentiation (a proxy for 
which is the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales) and the provision of CSR attributes.  
 
2:  Because consumers rely more on firm reputation when pur-chasing experience goods than 
when purchasing search goods, CSR at-tributes are more likely to be associated with 
experience than with search goods.  
 
3: Because consumers must be made aware of the existence of CSR attributes, there will be a 
positive correlation between the intensity of advertising in an industry (a proxy for which is 
the ratio of advertising to sales) and the provision of CSR. 
 
4: Because CSR attributes are normal goods, there will be a positive correlation between 
consumer income and the provision of CSR attributes. 
 
5: There is a positive correlation between the price of substitute goods and the demand for 
goods with CSR attributes. 
 
6: There is a positive correlation between unionization of the workforce and the provision of 
CSR; that is, in industries that are highly unionized, there will be more CSR provided.  
 
7: There is a positive relationship between the shortage of skilled workers in an industry and 
the provision of CSR; that is, in industries with shortages of skilled labor, more CSR will be 
provided.  
 
8: There is a positive correlation between government contracts and the provision of CSR. 
 
9: Firms that provide CSR attributes will have higher costs than firms in the same industry 
that do not provide CSR attributes.  
 
10: The presence of scale economies in the provision of CSR at-tributes results in a positive 
correlation between firm size and the provision of CSR attributes.  
 
11: The presence of scope economies in the provision of CSR at-tributes results in a positive 
correlation between the level of diversification of a firm and the provision of CSR attributes. 
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higher price of goods with CSR attributes and other determinants include tastes, 
preferences, demographics and the price of substitutes. 
Figure 7 shows what happens to demand for CSR when the determinants are 
increased. The demand from all stakeholders can be summed to arrive at the overall 
demand for products with CSR attributes, and recognising the demand for CSR allows 
managers to make decisions on the number and level of CSR attributes, as well as how 
to produce them. 
 
Figure 7 - Determinants of Consumer Demand for CSR Attributes (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001, p. 121) 
As the supply and demand framework implies some optimal level of CSR attributes for 
firms to provide, to determine the appropriate level of investment managers must 
consider the various firm characteristics and the effect on supply and demand, as well as 
the costs of generating the CSR attributes. Thus, through cost-benefit analysis the ideal 
level of CSR can be determined, and ultimately managers should treat CSR decisions in 
the same way they treat all investment decisions. This allows the firm to meet the 
demands of relevant stakeholders – those demanding CSR (consumers, employees etc.), 
and those that “own” the firm (shareholders). CSR attributes are like any other attribute 
a firm offers, and the firm chooses the level of the attribute that maximises firm 
performance, given the demand for the attribute and the cost of providing the attribute. 
As a result, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) predicted a neutral relationship between 
CSR activity and firm financial performance – which may also explain the inconsistent 
evidence regarding this relationship. 
 
Friedman (1970) declared that the sole business of the managers of a public corporation 
was to maximise the value of outstanding shares, and any effort to use corporate 
resources for altruistic purposes was equated to socialism. Manne (2006) pointed out 
Determinants of Consumer Demand for CSR Attributes 
     Hypothesized Effect 
Determinant    on Demand 
Price of goods with CSR attributes Negative 
Advertising    Positive 
Income    Positive 
Tastes     Indeterminate 
Demographics    Indeterminate 
Price of substitute goods  Positive 
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that during a conference 34 years prior he argued that the vast part of apparently non-
profit oriented behaviour by management was really (and necessarily) a profit 
maximising response to business, social and political pressures dressed up to look like 
something else. While Friedman agreed with Manne, he still equated CSR to socialism. 
Manne (2006) stated that he should have known Friedman was correct about the 
significance of proposals for socially responsible corporate behaviour - whether they 
emanated from within or outside the firm - as they reflect the inability of people to 
distinguish between private and public property, or between a free enterprise system 
and socialism.  
 
Manne (2006) questioned how a large business success resulting in a publicly held 
company transformed the nature of numerous individuals’ private investments into 
assets affected with a public interest. Once these corporations are affected with a public 
interest, they must either be regulated or act as though they are owned by the public. An 
important part of the idea of public utility regulation required that the corporation be (or 
act like) a monopoly in order to be affected with a public interest. Today however, there 
is no such requirement and “no arguments… about natural monopoly, market failure, 
government creation of corporations or the alleged governmental gifts of limited 
liability and perpetual existence, are required to justify the demands now regularly 
placed on business entities” (Manne, 2006, para. 6). Any large enterprise, regardless of 
industry competitiveness and how successfully it is fulfilling the public’s desires has a 
social responsibility - a term which makes mockery of the idea of individual 
responsibility - to use some if its resources for public endeavours. At the time, Manne 
(2006) stated that the more common causes were environmental protection, employee 
health, sales of goods at below-market prices, weather modification, community 
development, private enforcement of government regulations and support of cultural, 
educational and medical facilities (Manne, 2006, para. 6). 
 
Manne (2006) questioned how the transformation from private to public responsibility 
occurred. Even the largest corporation started out as an idea in somebody’s head, where 
initially this person hires employees, borrows capital, produces goods and markets a 
product. All of these purely private and benign arrangements suggest nothing about a 
public interest in the outcome. However as the business grows, stock holdings become 
more diffused, additional capital is required and the result is another publicly held 
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corporation – another American success story. The question is what has happened to 
implicate public involvement in the management or governance of these enterprises as 
they grew from mere ideas. Manne (2006) argued nothing, and if that nothing is 
multiplied by tens or hundreds or thousands, the product is still nothing. Where along 
the line to massive size has the public-private nexus necessarily changed? “True, there 
are now a large number of complex and specialized private contracts, but every single 
one of these transactions is based on private property, freedom of contract, and 
individual risk and reward. If one apple is a fruit, even a billion apples do not become 
meat” (Manne, 2006, para. 8).  
 
For proponents of CSR their arguments require that private corporations be viewed as 
public in nature which means that the public (termed stakeholders) has a pseudo-
ownership interest in every large corporation, and without this dimension in their 
argument, free market logic would prevail (Manne, 2006, para. 9). Different factors 
such as the illusion of power or the superficial attractiveness of the notion have made 
this fallacy a part of the modern corporate culture. Manne (2006) discussed how no 
responsible business official would contradict the notion publicly for fear of financial 
ruin, even though the practice continues to cost shareholders and society enormous 
amounts, and this is especially true of corporations that are highly vulnerable to 
organised public criticism; such as Wal-Mart, Coca-Cola and BP. “Our laws against 
extortion do not function effectively when it comes to corporations. And so to some 
extent these private entities have indeed, via the social responsibility notion, been 
converted into crypto-public enterprises that are the essence of socialism. Milton 
Friedman was right again” (Manne, 2006, para. 10). While Manne (2006) raised some 
valid points, large corporations inherently affect many stakeholders and it is through 
stakeholder theory that proponents of CSR maintain its importance. 
 
Porter and Kramer (2006) suggested an alternative view of social responsibility when 
they discussed the link between competitive advantage and CSR and looked at why it 
makes business sense for companies to use CSR as an opportunity for success. 
Although companies have done much to improve the social and environmental aspects 
of their operations, Porter and Kramer (2006) believed that their productivity had been 
limited by the approach taken. Business is pitted against society when they are clearly 
interdependent, and these approaches pressurise “companies to think of corporate social 
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responsibility in generic ways instead of the way most appropriate to each firm’s 
strategy” (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 1). The current approaches to CSR are 
disconnected from business and strategy and as a result they obscure the greatest 
opportunities for companies to benefit society.  If firms analyze prospects for social 
responsibility in the same way that they do their core business choices “they would 
discover that CSR can be much more than a cost, a constraint or a charitable deed, - it 
can be a source of opportunity, innovation, and competitive advantage” (Porter & 
Kramer, 2006, p. 1). 
 
Although companies have awakened to these responsibilities, what needs to be done 
about them is a lot less clear. Porter and Kramer (2006) suggested that the most 
common corporate response has been neither strategic nor operational but cosmetic – 
focusing on PR and media campaigns centred on CSR reports that showcase the firms’ 
social and environmental good deeds. Of the largest 250 multinational corporations, 
64% published CSR reports in 2005. According to Porter and Kramer (2006) supporters 
of CSR have made four arguments to support their case; however none offer enough 
guidance for the difficult choices corporate leaders must make:  
Moral obligation: Companies have a duty to be good citizens and do the right thing. - 
Limitation: Most corporate social choices involve balancing competing values, 
interests and costs and there is as of yet no method of weighing the social benefits 
against the financial costs. 
Sustainability: This emphasises that corporations pay attention to environmental and 
community issues and Porter and Kramer (2006) gave a definition of sustainability as: 
“Meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”4 - Limitation: The sustainability principle 
raises questions about these trade-offs without offering a framework to answer them 
License to operate: This derives from the fact that all companies need explicit (or 
implicit) permission from governments, communities and various other stakeholders 
to do business. - Limitation: By viewing CSR as a way to appease pressure groups, 
companies will often find that its approach delves into short-term defensive reactions 
that ultimately have minimal value to society and no strategic benefit for the business.   
                                                 
4 This definition is attributed to the former Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland; and is 
used by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 3). 
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Reputation: This suggests that companies justify CSR initiatives on the grounds that 
they will improve their company image, strengthen the brand, increase morale and 
possibly increase the value of its stock. - Limitation: This risks confusing PR with 
social and business results and having no way to quantify the benefits puts such CSR 
programs on shaky ground liable to be dislodged by a change of management or a 
swing in the business cycle.  
All of these arguments share the same weakness in that they focus on the tension 
between business and society, instead of on their interdependence. Each creates a 
rationale not tied to the strategy and operations of any specific company or the places in 
which it operates; and as a result none of them are sufficient to help companies identify 
and address the social issues that matter most, or the ones where they can make the 
biggest impact. The result is a combination of uncoordinated CSR activities 
disconnected from the company’s strategy that makes no meaningful social impact and 
does not strengthen the firm’s long-term competitiveness. Internally CSR practices are 
isolated from operating units, and externally the company’s social impact is diffused 
among many unrelated efforts each responding to a different stakeholder group. The 
consequence of this fragmentation is a lost opportunity, with the power of corporations 
to create social benefit being dissipated, along with the potential of companies to take 
actions that would support their communities and their business goals. 
 
One of Porter and Kramer (2006)’s key points was that to further the idea of CSR it 
must be based in an understanding of the interrelationship between a corporation and 
society, while anchoring it in the strategies of specific companies. Society and business 
need each other and examples of this are: successful corporations need a healthy society 
in that education, health care and equal opportunity are essential to a productive 
workforce; efficient use of land and energy makes business more productive; good 
government, rule of law and property rights are key for innovation and efficiency. It is 
this truth that will help corporations move past their ineffectual thinking about CSR. 
Leaders of business and society have looked too much at the friction between them 
instead of the points of intersection. The fact that there exists a mutual dependence of 
corporations and society means that business decisions as well as social policy need to 
follow the principle of shared value which states that choices should benefit both sides. 
Problems will occur if business or society pursues policies that benefits its interests at 
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the others expense, as “a temporary gain to one will undermine the long-term prosperity 
of both” (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 7).  
 
To put these ideas into practice companies need to integrate a social perspective into the 
frameworks they use to understand competition and guide its strategy. There are various 
important steps that arise in this process:  
Identifying the points of intersection: There are two forms of interdependence 
between a company and society: when a company imposes upon society through its 
operations in the normal course of business (inside-out linkages) and when external 
social conditions influence corporations (outside-in linkages). Every firm operates in 
a competitive context which affects its ability to carry out its strategy in the long run 
(where social conditions form a key part of this context) and many aspects of this 
context can be opportunities for CSR initiatives. 
Choosing which social issues to address: Since no business can solve all of society’s 
ills or bear the cost of doing so, each company must select issues which intersect with 
its specific business. “The essential test that should guide CSR is not whether a cause 
is worthy but whether it presents an opportunity to create shared value – that is, a 
meaningful benefit for society that is also valuable for business” (Porter & Kramer, 
2006, p. 8)  
Creating a corporate social agenda: By categorising and ranking social issues, 
companies can create an explicit and affirmative corporate social agenda which looks 
past community expectations to opportunities to achieve social and economic benefits 
simultaneously. For this agenda, CSR can fall under Responsive (being a good 
corporate citizen; minimising the harm from value chain activities) and Strategic 
(choosing a unique position to differentiate from competitors; involving strategic 
linkages to implement initiatives). Strategic CSR also unlocks shared value by 
investing in social aspects of context that strengthen company competitiveness. The 
success of the company and the success of the community become mutually 
reinforcing where “the more closely tied a social issue is to the company’s business, 
the greater the opportunity to leverage the firm’s resources and capabilities, and 
benefit society” (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 10). The authors gave as an example 
Microsoft’s partnership with colleges in filling the void of IT workers through 
contributing money and products as well as employee volunteers. As the staff were 
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able to use their core skills for a social need this is a far cry from typical volunteer 
programs, and Microsoft achieved results that benefitted many communities while 
having a direct impact on the company. 
Integrating inside-out and outside-in practices: Value chain innovations and 
addressing social constraints to competitiveness are useful for creating economic and 
social value, however the impact is greater if they work together. Activities in the 
value chain can be performed in ways that reinforce improvements in the social 
dimensions of context, and investments in competitive context have the potential to 
reduce constraints on a company’s value chain activities. Marriott International 
provides 180 hours of paid classroom and on the job training for unemployed 
candidates, which is combined with support for community service organisations that 
screen and refer the candidates to Marriott. The result is a benefit to communities as 
well as a reduction in Marriott’s cost of recruiting entry-level employees. 90% of 
those in the training programs take jobs with Marriott and after one year 65% are still 
in their jobs, which is substantially higher than the normal retention rate. Once these 
two tools are integrated, CSR becomes hard to distinguish from the day-to-day 
business of the company. Porter and Kramer (2006) cited Nestle which works with 
small farmers in developing countries to source the basic commodities on which its 
business depends. The company’s investment in infrastructure as well as its transfer 
of knowledge and technology has produced massive social benefits through improved 
health care, better education and economic development, while Nestle receives direct 
and reliable access to the commodities it needs - thus its distinctive strategy is 
inseparable from its social impact.  
Creating a social dimension to the value proposition: The centre of any strategy is a 
unique value proposition which is a set of needs the company can meet for its 
customers that others cannot, and “the most strategic CSR occurs when a company 
adds a social dimension to its value proposition, making social impact integral to the 
overall strategy” (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 12).  
Porter and Kramer (2006) noted that more important than measuring stakeholder 
satisfaction is measuring social impact and managers must understand the importance of 
the outside-in influence of competitive context. Those in charge of CSR initiatives need 
a complete understanding of the value chain - and success in CSR depends on the 
choices made by the company in terms of the social issues focused on. Since companies 
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face short-term performance pressures there cannot be indiscriminate investments in 
social value creation, instead creating shared value should be viewed as a long-term 
investment in the company’s future competitiveness. Efforts to find shared value in 
operating practices as well as in the social dimensions of competitive context can foster 
economic and social development, and change the way companies and society think 
about each other. Governments and businesses must stop thinking in terms of social 
responsibility, and start thinking in terms of social integration. Although thinking of 
social responsibility as building shared value instead of damage control or a PR 
campaign requires drastically different thinking in business, the authors believed “that 
CSR will become increasingly important to competitive success” (Porter & Kramer, 
2006, p. 13). Corporations are not responsible for the world’s problems and they do not 
have the resources to solve them all; but each company can identify the set of society’s 
problems it is best equipped to resolve and from which it can gain the greatest 
competitive benefit. Addressing social issues by creating shared value will lead to self-
sustaining solutions that don’t depend on private or government subsidies, and when a 
well-run business applies its resources, expertise and management talent to problems 
that it understands (and has a stake in) it can have a greater impact on social good than 
any other institution or philanthropic organisation.  
 
2.2 Analysing the Relationships between Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Corporate Social Disclosure and Firm 
Performance 
 
This section of the literature examines the relationships that exist between CSR and 
other aspects of the firm such as financial performance and corporate social disclosures. 
These questions are ultimately the most important in that although the theory behind the 
CSR research needs to be laid down, once this foundation has been set, a proper attempt 
at researching the relationships may occur and with knowledge of these relationships 
managers can then make fully informed decisions regarding the behaviour of the firm in 
terms of their social responsibilities. Although it is not covered in this paper, 
Moskowitz (1972) followed up his proposal in a later issue of the Business and Society 
Review by analysing his sample of fourteen firms and comparing their performance 
with that of the Dow-Jones Industrials, and the New York Stock Exchange Composite 
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Index – both of which underperformed his sample. This is one of the earliest instances 
where an academic examined the relationship between CSR and firm performance 
albeit the measures used for CSP and CFP were simplistic.  
 
Vance (1975) looked at Moskowitz (1972) as well as his follow up research regarding 
the performance of the socially aware firms. According to Moskowitz his sample of 
companies performed well after being selected using good social responsibility 
credentials (the 14 stocks were up 7.28% in the first six months, versus 4.4% for the 
Dow Jones Industrials, 5.1% for the NYSE Composite index and 6.4% for the S&P 
Industrials). Vance contended that by updating the records comparing the 1975 stock 
prices with the 1972 data, all but one of the 14 firms had records considerably worse 
than that of the Dow Jones Industrials, NYSE Composite, and S&P Industrials. Vance 
also looked at the relationship between the rankings of socially responsible firms 
(according to the Business and Society Review surveys, polling businessmen and 
students) and their change in value during the 1974 market. The findings indicated that 
a firm with no interest in social responsibility showed hypothetical gains of 37% in 
value based on the businessmen’s survey (18.2% based on the students) and for every 
1.0 increase in its corporate responsibility rating, a firm’s price would decline by 23% 
for the businessmen’s survey (18.03% for the students). In the 1974 marketplace, a 
businessman favouring only common stocks of companies ranked in the upper half of 
the socially responsible firm rankings would have lost 43.9% of his investment. 
Investing $1 000 in each of the top 22, his $22 000 investment would have shrunk to 
$12 342, whereas a portfolio consisting of only the firms ranked low in social 
responsiveness would have ended on $17 798. Although these results are in direct 
contradiction to Moskowitz findings, both studies are limited, and it is interesting to 
note the different arguments as the rest of the literature is discussed.  
 
Parket and Eilbirt (1975) looked at the underlying factors of social responsibility by 
studying the actions of 96 major corporations with regards to corporate social 
initiatives. Their initial survey led to a number of conclusions:  
 Corporations involved in social responsibility activities are interested in making 
them widely known.  
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 Specific organisational positions have appeared as a functional specialisation in 
this area. 
 Those holding such positions have attained higher educational levels and are 
older than the general run of executives. 
 The usual activities of this group are voluntary. 
 Company size is associated with social responsibility efforts.  
The authors acknowledged the problem of measurement as “to be sure, the scope of 
endeavour categorized by the term social responsibility cannot be analyzed on the order 
of a balance sheet or profit-and-loss statement. There are, as yet, no accounting 
techniques, analytical tools or statistical methods which will objectively differentiate 
companies that are socially responsible from those that are not” (Parket & Eilbirt, 1975, 
p. 6). This is common in much of the literature, and Parket and Eilbirt (1975) stated that 
trying to measure degrees of social responsibility would be an even more ethereal task. 
To aid in their analysis they used only two classifications for companies: those 
companies who are more socially involved, and those who are less involved.  
 
The authors suggested variables which may account for differences in CSR activities, 
such as payoff and self-defence. The payoff idea is that these activities are undertaken 
because of an expected payoff, with the inputs being correlated with advantages to the 
firm (higher morale, larger labour pool etc). The self-defence motive suggests that 
activities are reactions to criticism the companies’ face with regards to social issues – 
however these ideas do not explain why not all firms undertake such functions. The 
authors suggested that social responsibility may be a fad but due to the differentiation 
among firms it appeared that the personality of the companies affected how firms 
reacted to the issue of CSR. Parket and Eilbirt (1975) conjectured that much of this 
personality would depend on top management and on the CEO and they suggested that 
when an executive believes social responsibilities are important the probability is high 
that activities of this type will be undertaken. Thus, whatever the motivation, executive 
leadership is crucial in explaining the differences in social performance among 
companies.  
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Parket and Eilbirt (1975) analysed the relationship between profits and CSR activities 
as they believed it may be a potentially inhibiting factor, and “corporate efforts in this 
area will expand within the limits made possible by profitability” (Parket & Eilbirt, 
1975, p. 7). They defined profitability using four measures: dollar net income (NI), NI 
as a percentage of sales, NI as a percentage of shareholder equity and earnings per 
share. The authors used a sample of 80 firms (who responded to their survey and were 
in the Fortune Top 500 industrials list) as well as 420 who were in the list but had not 
been surveyed. For each metric the sample of 80 respondents outperformed the 420 
companies as well as the combined Fortune 500 list, thus the tests showed a positive 
relationship between higher profits and greater effort in terms of CSR. From the tests, 
the authors inferred three conclusions: the existence of supernormal profits is not only a 
necessary condition for engaging in CSR, but may be a stimulant; profit represents a 
reward for virtue (whether it is improved public relations value or better internal 
relationships which result in cost/productivity advantages); and it may be argued that 
the reason for both greater profit and social responsibility may be a more efficient 
management. Although CSR initiatives may be useful for PR as well as contribute to 
social welfare it seems that they are more likely to be undertaken “when there is some 
‘fat’ in the company’s financial structure” (Parket & Eilbirt, 1975, p. 9). The authors 
concluded this thinking with the assumption that more profitable corporations are more 
involved in corporate responsibility activities; thus, measures which reduce size or 
diminish profits may lower the potential for corporate responsibility action.  
 
In 1975 Fogler and Nutt wrote their paper “A Note on Social Responsibility and Stock 
Valuation” in the midst of a period of increasing attention to the relationships between 
social responsibility, pollution control and corporate action. This attention led to 
changing actions regarding investments and the authors believed that social 
consciousness might be expected to reduce the demand (and the price) for stocks of 
socially irresponsible companies. Their study looked at the valuations of nine paper 
companies after details regarding their pollution tendencies were announced. Cross-
section valuation models were prepared for four quarters beginning just prior to the 
publicity, and both the institutional purchases and price changes were analyzed to 
determine the impact of the undesirable publicity. Fogler and Nutt (1975) hypothesized 
that if investors were becoming more socially conscious, companies with better 
pollution ratings would be capitalized more favourably than companies with lower 
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ratings – which they tested using a company’s price earnings ratio. Their analysis 
showed that the trend was actually just the reverse (although not statistically 
significant): the P/E ratio of less responsible companies increased. The authors stated 
that these results could be explained by the fact that the earnings of the less socially 
responsible declined by more than did those of the other companies at a time when the 
earnings of most paper companies declined. The authors then looked to the relationship 
between relative price changes and institutional purchase patterns and again there 
appeared to be little relationship between the pollution ratings and mutual fund 
purchases.  
 
In light of no long-run price impacts, the authors believed that it may be reasonable to 
hypothesize that a short-run price break might occur near the date of the initial 
publicity. Examining daily stock prices around announcement dates, the authors found 
that pollution information had no discernible impact on the market during the period 
under study. Therefore this may indicate that the market had already considered the 
effect of stricter pollution control legislation and its impact on company earnings. In 
conclusion, there was no evidence of temporary sell-offs following unfavourable 
company news. In an efficient capital market composed of a majority of return 
conscious investors, when socially conscious investors sell the shares of less socially 
responsible companies the sales would be viewed as bargains by the return conscious, 
and thus the shares would change hands and the price would tend toward the original 
risk-return valuation price. This process would continue until the majority of investors 
become socially conscious and although the authors believed this event may occur, it 
did not appear to exist at the time.  
 
One of the more popular methods of measuring CSP was content analysis which 
measured CSR reporting in various firm activities; and one of the earliest papers to 
examine this was Bowman and Haire (1975). The authors described three issues 
surrounding the topic of Corporate Citizenship (CC) or CSR: 
 The myth that activities in this area conflict with the interests of the investor 
(resources used come out of the equity holders pocket.) 
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 Motivation for these activities lies only in a sense of “noblesse oblige5” on the 
part of management, and this is not in the interest of the equity holder. 
 If the corporate strategist is committed to CSR activities, how much is enough? 
(The relationship between cost and benefit is difficult to determine.) 
One of the difficult tasks in raising the empirical issue of the relationship between CSR 
and profits is the construction of a scale to measure the social performance of these 
activities. Such a scale should allow the measurement of the amount and worth of an 
activity, as the marginal costs and benefits of such activities are hard to find. The 
authors’ chosen measure for activities in the area of CC was the proportion of lines of 
prose in the annual report devoted to social responsibility as “the annual report is a kind 
of projective test that allows a firm to express its goals and motives” (Bowman & Haire, 
1975, p. 50).  The authors noted that the annual report is essentially addressed to 
stockholders and one might expect this to damp out puffery about activities that seem to 
run contrary to their interests. Thus they chose to monitor this behaviour as a “tentative 
surrogate for the difficult to obtain measure of all things the firm may be doing in the 
area of social responsibility” (Bowman & Haire, 1975, p. 50).  
 
The authors tested the efficacy of this instrument using the firms identified by 
Moskowitz (1973; cited in Bowman & Haire, 1975) and the results showed that firms 
which behaved responsibly reflected this in their annual reports, whereas a matched 
sample of conventional firms did so far less (the median percent of lines devoted to 
CSR was 4.25% for the responsible group versus 0.30% for the conventional group). 
Eighty-two annual reports of food-processing firms were analyzed and the prose was 
coded in order to identify discussed efforts to either increase positive potential 
externalities or decrease negative potential externalities (increase social benefits or 
decrease social costs) where externalities were defined to be “those costs and benefits 
which will not ever be captured in a company’s books of accounts” (Bowman & Haire, 
1975, p. 52).  
 
                                                 
5 Directly translated from French it means “nobility obliges”. According to the Collins Pocket Reference 
English Dictionary, this refers to the supposed obligation of nobility to be honourable and generous. 
According to Wikipedia, noblesse oblige is generally used to imply that with wealth, power and prestige 
come responsibilities. 
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Their initial analysis looked at the relationship between the degree of discussion of 
corporate responsibility and the mean return on equity (ROE), defined by the authors to 
be the last five year’s ROE. The degree of discussion was classified into low mention, 
medium mention and high mention, where the median ROE was 10.2%, 16.1% and 
12.3% respectively. This inverted U-shape indicated medium mention was associated 
with the highest profitability, and the fact that the left hand tail was lower than the right 
was similar to the results found when the authors performed an analysis on the sample 
of firms in the pulp and paper industry used by Bragdon and Marlin (1972; cited in 
Bowman & Haire, 1975). Bowman and Haire (1975) argued that CSR is a signal of a 
management style that extends across the entire business and leads to a more profitable 
operation and they concluded that the “presence of a discussion of corporate 
responsibility, or indeed, the activity itself, is not a cause of higher profits” (Bowman & 
Haire, 1975, p. 57). Instead it indicates the presence of some underlying factor that 
results in sensitivity to a variety of external factors, of which pollution control or 
affirmative action are only a part. Socially responsible behaviour, not by itself and not 
uniquely, is a signal of good, sensitive, informed, balanced, and modern management. 
For many issues it is best to neither under nor over respond; thus, the idea of 
diminishing returns was applied to externalities where average behaviour appeared to be 
optimal.  
 
As suggested in Parket and Eilbirt (1975) management is an important factor when 
looking at CSR; whether it is an underlying element of its existence or whether it 
permits its continuation through the control of company policy. Sturdivant and Ginter 
(1977) looked at management attitudes and associated economic performance; and 
stated that for CSR to be achieved there must be some movement in the sphere of 
company policy. The authors explored the relationship between CSP, and the values 
and attitudes of top management; and a few underlying assumptions were made 
(Sturdivant & Ginter, 1977, p. 30): 
 Corporate policies and practices tend to have social consequences. 
 While those consequences may range from minor to highly significant, their 
observation over time by the corporation’s various constituents leads to the 
shaping of an image related to social responsiveness. 
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 Corporate policies and practices reflect the values and attitudes of the top 
management group. 
Following from these assumptions, if management believes the role of business in 
society is a narrow one, one would expect its policies and practices to reflect this belief 
and such a company may be perceived as not being socially responsive since it can be 
argued that “corporations have personalities which reflect the conscious and 
unconscious values of the corporate hierarchy” (Sturdivant & Ginter, 1977, p. 30).   
 
The authors looked at sixty seven firms rated by Milton Moskowitz as showing 
exceptional social responsiveness and which were categorised as ‘best’, ‘honourable 
mention’ and ‘worst’. The authors suggested that when a business organisation buys a 
man’s talents it also purchases the individuals values which shape the direction those 
talents will be expressed. Thus an instrument was developed which would determine the 
profile of a top management group’s attitudes on socially sensitive issues. Generally a 
clear pattern of differences emerged between the best and worst groups which were 
especially prominent regarding racial attitudes and perceptions of the poor. Another 
important finding was the difference in attitudes concerning centrality of profits to the 
business system, and overall it seemed that “the best managers reflect a greater concern 
for individual rights and a greater responsiveness to demands for change in the social 
and economic system” (Sturdivant & Ginter, 1977, p. 36). The authors examined the 
relationship between perceived corporate social responsiveness and long-run economic 
performance as the conventional rationale for social responsiveness is that the serving 
of the wider needs of society will contribute to the firm’s long-run profitability.  
 
Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) again looked to Moskowitz’ list and the sixty seven 
companies were grouped on the basis of reasonable homogeneity; where the long-term 
indicator of economic performance felt to reflect of quality of management was 
earnings per share (EPS). The results of their analysis indicated that the best and 
honourable mention firms outperformed their worst industry counterparts. Average 
economic performance relative to industry was 1.18, 1.26 and 0.69 for the Best, 
Honourable Mention and Worst groups, respectively. This inverted U-shape was 
reminiscent of the results obtained by Bowman and Haire (1975). Although the findings 
did not support the argument that socially responsive companies will always outperform 
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less responsive firms in the long-run, it appeared that the responsively managed firms 
enjoyed better economic performance. It is too simplistic to argue a one-on-one cause-
effect relationship but “a case can be made for an association between responsiveness to 
social issues and the ability to respond effectively to traditional business challenges” 
(Sturdivant & Ginter, 1977, p. 38). The authors concluded that major policies and 
practices of corporations are shaped by the top managers and a management group that 
reflects narrow and rigid views of social change and rising expectations might also be 
expected to respond less creatively and effectively in the traditional and dynamic arenas 
in which business functions. As a result there is the stronger economic performance of 
the best and honourable mention firms. Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) noted that perhaps 
the experience of these firms is the strongest argument to date that executives can 
recognise and act on the broader social dimensions of managing an enterprise without 
losing sight of their basic economic mission.  
 
Following on from Moskowitz (1972) and Vance (1975); Alexander and Buchholz 
(1978) attempted to look at the relationship between the market performance of a firm’s 
stock and its social responsibility using improved methodology. This question has been 
subject to contradictory views in the past and one view is that “socially aware and 
concerned management will also possess the requisite skills to run a superior company 
in the traditional sense of financial performance, thus making the firm an attractive 
investment” (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978, p. 469). The authors noted that both Vance 
(1975) and Moskowitz (1972) had empirical deficiencies (used short time periods and 
ignored risk) and correcting for these short-comings allowed for “a more definitive 
statement to be made regarding the relationship between social responsibility and stock 
market performance” (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978, p. 480). Since securities are 
generally described in terms of return and risk it was necessary to incorporate both of 
these factors into the analysis. The model used for measuring security performance on a 
risk-adjusted basis took the form:  
Rjt – RFt = αj + βj [ RMt – RFt] + εjt (1) 
Rjt denoted the rate of return on security j at time t; RFt the risk free rate of return and 
RMt the rate of return on the market. The intercept αj can be interpreted as a measure of 
risk-adjusted stock market performance, and is frequently called the differential return 
(or Jensen’s alpha). For their CSP measure, Alexander and Buchholz (1978) used the 
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same social responsibility rankings as those used in Vance (1975) - four firms from the 
two surveys were eliminated as they were mutual life insurance companies without 
common stock - and returns were determined using the formula:  
Rjt = (Pjt - Pjt-1 + Djt) / Pjt-1  (2) 
Pjt denoted the price of security j at the end of month t and Djt denoted all dividends 
received during month t. The results showed that over the sample period few securities 
had differential returns significantly different from zero, which lead to the conclusion 
that there was no significant effect of social responsibility on stock market performance.  
 
Alexander and Buchholz (1978) concluded that from their analysis the degree of social 
responsibility as measured by the rankings of businessmen and students bears no 
significant relationship to stock market performance. Furthermore, there seemed to be 
no significant relationship between stock risk levels and degree of social responsibility; 
thus these findings suggested that both the interpretations of Moskowitz (1972) and 
Vance (1975) were invalid. The authors proposed a third possible view on the 
relationship between stock market performance and social responsibility, which was 
consistent with the findings of their study. This view assumes that stock markets are 
efficient, and that in this efficient stock market any new information relevant to the 
earnings outlook of a firm is immediately reflected on the current price. Thus any 
positive or negative effects associated with the degree of social responsibility of a firm 
are reflected immediately in its stock price. Since a large majority of the firms sampled 
had returns which were no different from the market on a risk adjusted basis, the effects 
of social responsibility on stock prices were either non-existent, or had occurred prior to 
1970. 
 
Spicer (1978) aimed to provide empirical evidence relevant to the social performance 
disclosure question. His investigation concentrated on the validity of the view that a 
moderate to strong association exists between the investment value of a company’s 
shares and its social performance. At the time, society was paying greater attention to 
the wider social and environmental consequences of corporate activity, and 
subsequently put larger pressures on managements to become aware of these 
consequences. With this arises the need for better methods of measuring, assessing and 
controlling the social performance of private enterprise with respect to these social 
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concerns. Implicit in these efforts is whether corporations should be required to disclose 
more information with respect to these social concerns, and while the developments in 
social accounting provided motivation for the research, the objective was to provide 
some empirical evidence relevant to the social performance disclosure question. Spicer 
(1978) attempted to find if a strong association existed between a company’s 
investment value and its social performance; where this evidence may strengthen the 
position of those seeking increased disclosure by corporations of their performance with 
respect to key social and environmental issues.  
 
Increased concern over environmental and social consequences leads to new sanctions 
against activities deemed socially undesirable, and these sanctions include legislative 
enactments, government regulation, judicial decisions and consumer retaliation. The 
expected economic impact on the affected corporation may be enough to induce a direct 
relationship between its social performance and the worth of its securities; therefore 
under these conditions it would not be surprising to find investors considering social 
performance while making their investment decisions. Additionally, in a society where 
there is an ever-rising environmental awareness and expectation of firms, there exists 
potential legal and economic risks to which the capital market is becoming increasingly 
sensitive. Failure to respond to these expectations in a socially responsible manner may 
induce the capital market to perceive lower expected earnings, and imply higher risk 
factors - resulting in lower firm valuations. Spicer (1978) hypothesized that companies 
with better pollution-control records have higher profitability, larger asset size, lower 
total risk, lower systematic risk and higher P/E ratios. Since any complete measure of 
CSP would require the specification of the factors included as part of the social 
performance, the measurement of performance with respect to each of these factors and 
the summarisation of these measures into one overall index; only one performance area 
was used to assess the firms’ CSP. Pollution control was chosen because of a strong a 
priori argument that it was a major social issue for certain classes of corporations and 
the sample looked at consisted of eighteen firms in the pulp and paper industry where 
pollution was a major social concern. Spicer (1978) concluded from the results that the 
larger more profitable firms tended to have the best pollution control records and that 
these companies were in general judged by investors to be less risky in terms of total 
and systematic risk. These companies were also awarded higher P/E ratios than 
companies with poorer pollution-control records. The analysis using two sub-periods 
  59
indicated, however, that such associations may be relatively short-lived phenomena 
under circumstances where public pressure results in legislation. While generalisation 
of these results beyond the pulp and paper industry required further research, the 
findings were consistent with stated investor perceptions, and this supported the belief 
that social accounting may have some potential. 
 
In a related paper, Abbott and Monsen (1979) looked at self-reported disclosures as a 
method of measuring corporate social involvement. A corporate social involvement 
disclosure scale was developed based on the content analysis of the annual reports of 
the Fortune 500. According to Abbott and Monsen (1979) the two basic difficulties in 
measuring corporate social involvement were: The unavailability of information in 
quantitative terms of the social activities that have relevance and the lack of a 
methodology to measure the full impact of known corporate activities on society. An 
adequate measure of corporate social activities required the investigator to have 
unrestricted access to data on the full range of activities of the firm. Three types of 
research attempted to derive useable measures:   
 Social accounting  - categories pertaining to the social impact of the firm 
are added into the firm’s formalized accounting system; this suffered 
from an absence of reliable data on aggregate social costs and benefits of 
business 
 Reputational scales - researchers obtain the response of a public to a 
social phenomenon, with responses being registered on a scale for 
example from 1 to 5, as used by Vance (1975). These surveys are used to 
create indexes by which the firms can be ranked.  
 Content analysis of corporate publications.  
The reputational method has a fundamental difficulty since the respondents providing 
the ratings must be in a position to have detailed information about the corporations in 
the sample. What lands up being studied is the image of the corporation which is 
influenced by the corporation’s size, age, access to the mass media, as well as by the 
experience of the respondent. Additionally the time required for this method limits the 
number of firms that are rated. Bowman and Haire (1975) used content analysis for 
their research, and while this measure is limited “the scale used has the value of 
  60
indicating an aggregate measure of concern with corporate responsibilities” (Abbott & 
Monsen, 1979, p. 504). The authors constructed a quantitative scale: Social 
Involvement Disclosure (SID), obtained from a content analysis of the annual reports of 
the firms. By analysing more than one category the authors achieved a more complex 
measurement and Figure 8 lists the different content areas examined: 
 
Figure 8- Breakdown of Content Areas and Location of Social Responsibility 
Disclosures (Abbott & Monsen, 1975, p. 505) 
Ernst & Ernst     Disclosure 
        Code      (percent)a 
 
1973 1974  1973  1974  Change Issue Areas and Indicators 
Environment 
1. Pollution control     01 01 32.5 35.8 3.3 
2. Product improvement    02 02 3.8 4.0 0.2 
3. Repair of environment    04 03 4.0 3.6 -0.4 
4. Recycling of waste materials   03 04 7.3 15.9 8.6 
5. Other environmental disclosures   05 05 8.3 30.6 22.3 
Equal Opportunity 
6. Minority employment    10 06 17.7 15.9 -1.8 
7. Advancement of minorities    - 07   - 12.3  - 
8. Employment of women    09 08 14.3 14.1 -0.2 
9. Advancement of women     - 09  - 12.9  - 
10. Minority business    08 10 4.6 5.8 1.2 
11. Other disadvantaged groups    - 11  - 2.6  - 
12. Other statements on equal opportunity  11 12 14.5 21.1 6.6 
13. Advancement of racial minorities or women  07  - 10.9  -  - 
14. Hardcore racial minority employment  06  - 0.8  -  - 
Personnel 
15. Employee health and safety    - 13  - 13.3  - 
16. Training      14 14 13.3 16.1 2.8 
17. Other disclosures     15 15 10.5 12.1 1.6 
18. Personnel counseling    12  - 0.4  -  - 
19. Assist displaced employees locate new work  13  - 1.0  -  - 
Community Involvement 
20. Community activities    16 16 14.3 18.4 4.0 
21. Public Health     17 17 4.2 5.8 1.6 
22. Education or the arts    18 18 12.9 15.9 3.0 
23. Other community activity disclosures  19 19 8.1 10.5 2.4 
Products 
24. Safety      20 20 1.8 3.6 1.8 
25. Quality      21 21 1.2 4.4 3.2 
26. Other product-related disclosures   22 22 2.6 6.0 3.4 
Other 
27. Other disclosures     23 23 9.7 5.6 -4.1 
28. Additional information     - 24  - 3.6  - 
Location of Disclosures 
1. Letter to stockholders     -  - 21.0 22.5 1.5 
2. Separate section of annual report    -  - 24.6 29.2 4.6 
3. Other section of annual report    -  - 30.6 52.1 21.5 
4. Separate booklet with annual report    -  - 1.2 1.2 0.0 
 
a Indicator percentages are based on 496 firms in 1973 and 497 firms in 1974. 
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The main issue areas (environment, equal opportunity, product quality etc.) represent 
the criticisms that were being faced by the modern corporation at the time, and were 
also the targets of government regulation. To use the data, a set of categories needed to 
be formulated and the data coded in terms of the categories, however, two errors that 
may occur are when the formulation of categories does not reflect all important issues, 
and when the coding is inaccurate. The issue with content analysis as a source of social 
information is whether “the reported variation in social activities among firms is a 
reflection of real activities or is only an index of company policies on communicating 
activities to shareholders” (Abbott & Monsen, 1979, p. 506). 
 
Abbott and Monsen (1979) argued in favour of their SID, as the ready availability of 
annual reports makes it possible to derive social involvement scores for a large number 
of firms. The research costs are low, and these reports are public eliminating the need 
for cooperation from firms (response rates in voluntary business surveys often are 
extremely low) and making it possible to replicate the results easily - unlike reputational 
scales. Their results indicated that firms reporting one or more items in the social 
involvement index increased from 51.4% to 85.7% during the sample period as 
corporations came under pressure from the public and the state. Environmental matters 
constituted the most frequently mentioned area in the annual reports and Abbott and 
Monsen (1979) noted that environmental matters appeared to be of greatest concern to 
corporate thinking, and should remain so in the near future mainly because of the threat 
of political repercussion. To test the relationship between the SID scale and the total 
return to investors, the firms were separated into a low involvement group and a high 
involvement group where the firms averaged 2.32% and 2.58% return respectively. The 
difference of 0.26% indicated that there appeared to be no significant effect of social 
involvement for sample firms. Being socially involved did not appear to increase 
investors’ total rate of return, nor did it appear that being socially involved was 
dysfunctional for the investor and “perhaps it is the latter finding that has greater 
significance for decision making purposes, particularly given current political and social 
pressures” (Abbott & Monsen, 1979, p. 514). 
 
Arlow and Gannon (1982) summarized the literature looking at corporate social 
responsiveness and its relationship to economic performance. Murphy (1978; cited in 
Arlow and Gannon, 1982) defined social responsiveness as “a more positive and 
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accurate term than social responsibility…. Many corporations have already recognized 
their responsibility to society and now are reacting to these demands in diverse ways” 
(Arlow & Gannon, 1982, p. 235). Interestingly this definition was very similar to 
Carroll (1979) where he defined social responsiveness as the third component of his 
conceptual model, based on the assumption that business has a responsibility and the 
focus is not on management accepting a moral obligation but rather on the degree and 
type of managerial action. The period beginning in 1974 was the Era of Corporate 
Social Responsiveness as it was marked by corporations reacting to concerns about 
their role in society; and their paper focused on the relationship between responsiveness 
and corporate goals, as well as the relationship between responsiveness and economic 
performance. 
 
Regarding the business response to social responsibility, Arlow and Gannon (1982) 
found many executives viewed social involvement as necessary even if this resulted in a 
reduction of short run profits. There appeared to be greater consensus about the positive 
outcomes of involvement and positive views towards social responsibility reflected 
government pressure as well as long-run self interest (in the case of avoiding future 
regulation). One of the most frequently cited reasons for responding to social demands 
is matching a social need to a corporation’s ability to deal with a problem. This is 
reminiscent of Fitch (1976)’s idea of corporations being society’s most efficient 
problem solving organisation and Porter and Kramer (2006)’s idea of finding the points 
of intersection between social need and business objectives. Other reasons include the 
seriousness of a social need and top executives’ interest in a problem - profitability was 
the least cited reason for selecting an area of social involvement. These reasons 
supported a contingency perspective where the firm responds to issues based on the 
relevance of the issue, and the firm’s resources and skills. Inter-industry differences in 
areas of social involvement indicated that some social specialisation may be “motivated 
either by an industry’s unique competence or by its role in creating the problem, thereby 
inviting external pressures” (Arlow & Gannon, 1982, p. 236). Due to the importance of 
social responsibility to business, the authors expected it to be incorporated into 
corporate goals and organisational structures.  
 
The relationship between social responsiveness and corporate goals was looked at, and 
it was found that in earlier surveys social responsibility was rarely chosen as one of the 
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top four corporate goals; and in cases where social goals were cited as important they 
were subordinate to economic goals. Overall the studies showed financial goals 
dominated social goals, and in terms of priority there existed inter-industry and size 
differences possibly explained by visibility, government pressure and the consumer 
oriented nature of the firms. The authors noted that previous studies could not 
conclusively explain the relationship between social responsibility and economic 
performance. The authors observed limitations with the earlier studies as varying 
sample periods were used, as well as different measures of financial and social 
performance. Such approaches may have clouded any comparisons to be made between 
the different research results.  In terms of methodologies, surveys of individuals were 
regarded as suspect as it was doubtful the respondents possessed sufficient information 
regarding the firm, and annual reports were questioned as they may have more 
accurately reflected PR efforts. In conclusion, Arlow and Gannon (1982)’s analysis 
showed that business has recognized the importance of social responsiveness; however 
it is subordinate to corporate goals that are primarily economic in nature. Although 
firms seemed committed to socially responsible actions, empirical studies had not 
provided strong support for a positive relationship between social responsiveness and 
economic performance. The authors tentatively concluded that economic performance 
(in the short run) was not directly linked in either a positive or a negative way to social 
responsiveness.  
 
Cochran and Wood (1984) similarly pointed out that the previous literature could not 
reach a conclusion on whether a relationship existed between a firm’s CSR and its 
financial performance. Before causation can be addressed, the question of whether CSP 
and CFP are related needs to be answered. The authors explicitly controlling for factors 
omitted in previous studies and used improved financial performance measures as well 
as additional variables. The authors also enhanced the sample by utilizing a large 
industry-specific control group as well as using two test intervals. Although Cochran 
and Wood (1984)’s analysis of previous research paralleled Arlow and Gannon (1982) 
they examined a larger number of studies and their literature review provided the 
rationale for a new and more extensive empirical test of this topic. Cochran and Wood 
(1984) examined the common methods of measuring CSR and their analysis is 
summarised in Figure 9. The authors noted that “neither content analysis nor 
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reputation indexes can be considered wholly adequate measures of CSR” (Cochran & 
Wood, 1984, p. 44). The problem of measuring the social responsibility of firms needed 
considerably more attention in the literature; however at the time there were no better 
measures available.  
 
Figure 9 - Measurement of Corporate Social Responsibility (Cochran and Wood, 
1984, p. 43-44) 
In terms of measuring CFP, Cochran and Wood (1984) noted that most measures fall 
into two categories: either investor returns or accounting returns. Investor returns are 
looked at from the shareholder perspective, and early studies to use this were 
Moskowitz (1972) and Vance (1975). Their use of changes in share price flawed since 
Methods of Measuring CSR 
 
Reputation Index: 
 
Advantages       Drawbacks: 
- Internally consistent     - Highly subjective 
- Can summarize perceptions of    - Varies between observers 
   key constituencies     - Small sample sizes 
 
Common Indexes:     Used by: 
- Council on Economic Priorities (CEP)   - Spicer (1978) 
       - Fogler & Nutt (1975) 
        
 
- Moskowitz Lists (Moskowitz, 1972, 1975)  - Moskowitz (1972) 
       - Sturdivant & Ginter (1977) 
 
- National Association of Concerned    - Vance (1975) 
     Business Students     - Alexander & Buchholz (1978) 
 
Content Analysis: 
 
Advantages       Drawbacks: 
- Reasonably objective     - Choice of variables is subjective 
- Independent of the particular research   - Indication of what firms say they are 
- Firms aware of issues will act        doing 
       - Firms doing poorly may publicize 
           their efforts 
 
Methods:      Used by: 
- Number of lines devoted to CSR   - Bowman & Haire (1975) 
 
- Beresford Studies (1973, 1975 and 1976)  - Abbott & Monsen (1979) 
    *cited in Cochran & Wood (1984)    
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they ignored dividend income, and this improved measure was used by Abbott and 
Monsen (1979). Another missing dimension was risk, which may explain the 
contradictory results of Moskowitz (1972) and Vance (1975).  In finance theory, the 
risk of holding assets is measured by the covariance of the return on the asset with that 
of the market (called beta) and is obtained by regressing the stocks’ realized returns on 
those of a broad based market index. An average beta is 1, where a stock with a beta 
above 1 is considered aggressive because it will move faster (up or down) than the 
market (Cochran & Wood, 1984, p. 45). An analysis of Moskowitz’ high CSR firms 
indicated that they had a beta of 1.56, thus in the period examined (the first half of 
1972) it was a bull market and the shares outperformed the market. The period Vance 
(1975) looked at was a bear market, and thus the stocks performed worse than the 
market. 
 
Alexander and Buchholz (1978) used risk adjusted measures, however due to the 
efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), even if CSR leads to improved performance, the 
stock price will be immediately altered to reflect changes in CSR ratings. Thus, to use 
investor returns properly researchers must conduct an event study. Accounting returns 
are the other primary method of measuring CFP and the idea is to focus on how 
earnings respond to differing managerial policies. A summary of the most common 
accounting measures is provided in Figure 10 where the authors noted “accounting 
returns may be the best proxy for financial performance. However the particular 
measures used in previous studies have serious defects” (Cochran & Wood, 1984, p. 
47).  
 
Figure 10 - Measurement of Financial Performance (Cochran and Wood, 1984, p. 44-47) 
Throughout the literature most of the samples were too small to generalise results where 
several papers had less than 30 firms in their samples and in all but four studies control 
   Measurement of Financial Performance: Accounting Returns 
 
Measure:   Drawbacks:      Used by: 
- EPS   - Influenced by the rate of growth  - Bragdon & Marlin (1972; cited 
   in Cochran & Wood, 1984) 
 
- P/E    - Influenced by accounting practices  - Bowman & Haire (1975) 
   - Cannot be compared without    - Fogler & Nutt (1975) 
   considering leverage and risk - Spicer (1978) 
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groups smaller than 100 firms were employed. To overcome this researchers compared 
samples to market averages, however although it is an improvement comparison to 
industry control groups remains superior due to the homogeneity in accounting 
practices, operating leverage and other influential variables within industries. 
Additionally, many sample periods were too short with only five studies using periods 
greater than or equal to five years. Taking into account the questionable sample sizes 
and measures of CFP and CSP, the various results from earlier papers need to be 
viewed with suspicion. The authors used the combined Moskowitz list (from Sturdivant 
& Ginter, 1977) however to avoid the problems of inadequate samples each firm in the 
list was independently compared to its industry group. The authors also followed the 
precedent of most of the previous studies and used accounting data to measure financial 
performance, as summarised in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 - Measures of Financial Performance Employed (Cochran and Wood, 
1984, p. 48-50) 
The use of accounting data raised the possibility of distortions from inflation 
differences across firms as well as different applications of accounting principles. These 
         Measures of Financial Performance Employed 
 
Strengths:        Weaknesses: 
 
Ratio of Operating Earnings to Assets: 
 
- Measures relative efficiency of asset utilization - Distorted by inflation and  
- Free from effects of differences in capital structure      depreciation  
 
Ratio of Operating Earnings to Sales: 
 
- Free from leverage differences - Subject to depreciation 
 - Fails to capture relative effectiveness  
    of the use of assets by competitors 
 
Excess Market Valuation (EV)*: 
 
- Measures premiums and discounts accorded by market.  - Subject to inflation distortion 
     If CSR is correlated with future prospects it will be  
     correlated with EV. 
 
- Reflects market evaluation of the firm 
 
 
*EV is defined as the difference between total firm market value and the book value of assets, normalized by sales:  
EV = (Market Value of Equity and Book Value of Debt – Total Assets) / Sales 
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distortions were controlled for insofar as possible. Cochran and Wood (1984) evaluated 
the relationship between CSR and financial performance through analysis of covariance 
to see if CSR was significantly correlated with either superior or inferior financial 
performance within industry groups. The results showed significance where Operating 
Earnings / Sales had the firms with ‘Best’ ratings outperform ‘Honourable Mention’ 
firms which in turn outperformed ‘Worst’ firms; the pattern was repeated for EV (with 
a slight reversal between ‘Worst’ and ‘Honourable Mention’ categories in one of the 
intervals). The pattern differed for Operating Earnings / Assets, as all statistical 
significance was lost, and ‘Honourable Mention’ firms appeared slightly superior to 
‘Best’ firms. This result (also in Bowman & Haire, 1975) raised questions concerning 
the nature of the assets, or their use by these firms. Perhaps there are differences in the 
effectiveness of the use of assets, or differences in asset age between CSR groups. To 
explore these differences, Asset Turnover (the ratio of Sales to Assets) and Asset Age 
(the ratio of Net Fixed Assets to Gross Fixed Assets) were included in the regressions 
and it was found that asset age was strongly and significantly negatively correlated with 
the ‘Worst’ CSR firms.   
 
The variables employed appeared to be significantly related to CSR although the 
relative strength of each was not yet clear – EV had the highest t-statistic (4.03) and 
asset turnover had the highest coefficient of multiple determination (0.76). Due to 
interaction between the variables, a logit analysis was performed with the model being 
estimated as: 
CSR = a0 +a1OES +a2AGE +a3TURN +a4EV +ε, 
This statistical technique provided an appropriate test procedure by which the 
underlying assumptions of the model were met by the data. In this model OES 
represented Operating Earnings / Sales, AGE was Asset Age, TURN was Asset 
Turnover and EV was Excess Market Valuation. The results indicated that asset age 
was significant in predicting whether or not an observation would be in the Best versus 
Worst distinction or Honourable Mention versus Worst distinction in both time periods 
(no variables significantly classified firms between the Best and Honourable Mention 
categories). Operating Earnings / Sales was only significant during one time period thus 
“the evidence strongly suggests that the financial variable most significantly associated 
with CSR is asset age – specifically, firms with older assets have lower CSR ratings” 
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(Cochran & Wood, 1984, p. 54). The association was strongest with the Best/Worst 
comparison and this was understandable, however the association of CSR and financial 
performance was still marginally significant.  
 
In conclusion the authors noted that within industry groups the financial variable most 
strongly correlated with CSR was Asset Age and that omission of this variable results in 
a spurious correlation of CSR and financial performance. It is possible that older firms 
may possess less flexibility in adapting to social change or management of older firms 
may simply be less responsive in both business and social dimensions than management 
of ‘younger’ firms. Alternatively, the type of managers that old firms attract may differ 
from those attracted by young firms (found in Sturdivant and Ginter, 1977). After 
controlling for Asset Age and using a large sample as well as industry control groups 
there was still weak support for a link between CSR and financial performance and the 
authors reiterated Abbott and Monsen (1979)’s findings that being socially involved is 
not dysfunctional to the investor. It is this finding that has greater significance for 
decision-making purposes given current social pressures.  
 
Another paper summarising the previous literature was Ullmann (1985) which 
concluded that the “situation pertaining to the relationships among social performance, 
social disclosure, and economic performance can best be characterized at this time as 
empirical data in search of an adequate theory” (Ullmann, 1985, p. 555). A table 
summarising some of the literature has been recreated in Appendix 8.1. One problem 
with the literature concerned the conceptualisation and operationalisation of key terms, 
with different dimensions of performance being looked at in different papers. The 
majority of studies reviewed by Ullmann (1985) addressed neither the variety of the 
underlying models nor the validity of the measurement procedures used, but a closer 
look at the criteria used for assessing economic and social performance as well as social 
disclosure illustrated the conceptual variety. Figure 12 summarizes the principal 
findings of the studies included in Ullmann (1985) regarding the relationship between 
social disclosure, social performance and economic performance. Interestingly some of 
the conflicting results were reported in cases based on the same sample of firms, and 
was perhaps “inevitable, given the studies’ conflicting hypotheses, as well as 
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differences in the models, methods, measurements and time periods considered” 
(Ullmann, 1985, p. 543). 
 
 
Figure 12 - Major Results by Data Basis (Ullmann, 1985, p. 542) 
 
Social Disclosure and Social Performance: 
Social performance refers to the extent to which an organisation meets the needs, 
expectations and demands of external constituencies beyond those directly linked to the 
company’s products and markets. Measuring CSP in this context implies creating a list 
of the external constituents, measuring the constituent satisfaction and developing an 
overall index so that firms can be ranked in terms of their overall performance. As 
mentioned in Abbott and Monsen (1979), there are potential reasons for companies to 
under-report (costs of initiatives to shareholders) the activities as well as to over-report 
(to create an impression of sensitivity to nonmarket influences), however some critics 
    Major Results by Data Basis 
 
         Data Base 
 
     Relationship  Moskowitz           BSRI Surveys                       CEP             Ernst & Ernst          Other 
 
 
      Social Disclosure  Bowman & Haire        Abbott & Monsen               Abbott & Monsen   
        (1975): +            (1979): +                (1979): +      
 -                    
                  
      Social Performance 
      
                          Abbott & Monsen  Bowman & Haire 
       Social Disclosure          (1979): 0           (1975): + 
             -                    
   Economic Performance                         
    
Cochran & Wood           Alexander &             Bowman & Haire   Parket & Eilbirt 
     Social Performance        (1984): +        Buchholz  (1978): 0           (1975): +         (1975): + 
   Moskowitz (1972): +       Vance (1975): -         Fogler & Nutt     
 -  Sturdivant & Ginter     (1975): 0               
          (1977): +               Spicer (1978): + 
  Economic Performance   Vance (1975): -                                
   
 
Note:  + positive correlation; - negative correlation; 0 no correlation 
 
* This table was reproduced from Ullmann (1985), however studies reviewed that were not included in this paper have been left out of the table. 
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argued that social disclosures are nothing but public relations gestures, and thus are 
more linked to variables such as company size, visibility and external pressure as 
opposed to performance. Although the more elaborate studies converged on the 
conclusion that no relationship exists between social disclosure and performance, it was 
not well established given the limitations regarding the sample sizes and depth, the 
weakness in the methods used as well as the periods surveyed. The studies analysed 
relied on content analysis to measure the quantity and quality of social disclosure 
however there existed differences in the level of sophistication in the application of the 
methodology (some used lines of prose devoted to social responsibility, while others 
differentiated among various levels of information quality, disclosure categories, and 
industry differences). Ullmann (1985) concluded that studies of the relationship 
between social performance and economic performance are highly questionable when 
social disclosure is used as a proxy for social performance. 
 
Social Performance and Economic Performance: 
Alexander and Buchholz (1978) argued that socially aware management also possess 
the skills needed to run a superior company in the sense of financial performance. 
Consequently, socially responsible firms should outperform less responsive companies 
in terms of accounting variables. Better economic performance should also be reflected 
in the firm’s stock price and attached risk.  Importantly, other variables such as the 
social beliefs of the firm’s decision-makers and visibility of the firm need to be 
controlled for. Since shareholders differ in their expectations of future returns as well is 
in their interpretative skills, “Friedman-type” investors could view social performance 
as detrimental to economic performance resulting in a negative or inverted U-shaped 
correlation between social and economic performance. Overall, no clear tendencies 
could be discerned from the literature and Ullmann (1985) stated that the more 
elaborate studies seemed to converge towards rejecting any relationship between social 
performance and economic success, but it was by no means conclusive.  
 
Social Disclosure and Economic Performance: 
Here, the information content of social disclosures was questioned, since if Friedman-
type investors place a negative premium on CSR activities social disclosures could 
lower the price of a security (conversely ethical investors may bid the price up). Social 
disclosures may depend on other variables such as firm size, industry and company 
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visibility, external pressures, and executive values which need to be controlled for when 
investigating the relationship. The studies using accounting variables for economic 
performance converged on weak positive correlations whereas those using investor 
reaction were more ambiguous.  
 
Ullmann (1985) argued that questions about the correlations among the three concepts 
were pseudo-problems and rather what should be looked for is the missing element that 
explains the relationships: strategy. Bowman and Haire (1975)’s findings suggested that 
managers are confronted with a problem when deciding how to allocate resources 
optimally between various dimensions for coping with the environment. Organisations 
are selective with regard to the stakeholders they take into consideration as well as the 
actions they undertake to achieve an optimal relationship with them, and it is posited 
that the stakeholders’ importance derives from their power to control resources required 
by the organisation. For providing the resources, the external groups may demand 
certain actions in return and since different strategies can be observed as attempts to 
fulfil these external demands, social performance is viewed as a result of the strategy 
for dealing with stakeholder demands. The author suggested a framework where social 
performance and social disclosure are used to manage dependence relationships. The 
three dimensions of the framework are: Stakeholder power; Strategic posture (mode of 
response of management toward social demands - e.g. formulating CSR programs etc.); 
and the firm’s economic performance (the financial situation determines the importance 
of social programs, and the degree of the response). It was noted that for more 
consistent results, improved methodologies and frameworks need to be examined. 
 
One attempt at these improvements came when Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985), 
henceforth Aupperle et al. (1985), examined the relationship between CSR and 
profitability. They noted that much of the actual empirical research designed to test the 
definitions, concepts and theories had been scarce, and that a great deal of the research 
had been incomplete and simplistic in methodology. Many of the issues in studying 
CSR stemmed from the nature of the subject, as the concepts were value laden and 
susceptible to varying interpretations. Once again, the most noticeable constraint was 
the difficulty of developing a valid measure of CSR and the problem with assessing 
levels of CSR is determining appropriate criteria and standards of corporate 
performance. Additionally, there is the lack of effort to empirically test definitions and 
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propositions, where researchers have instead tended to create their own measures rather 
than to use one of the many pre-existing definitions in the literature. Aupperle et al. 
(1985) noted this has hindered inter-study comparisons, and has limited development of 
a research base in the social issues area. The initial purpose of the paper was to develop 
an instrument to measure the degree of orientation to social responsibility based on a 
model defining CSR that has appeared in the literature. Another related purpose was to 
assess how CEOs viewed their firm’s social responsibilities and ultimately to 
investigate the relationship between profitability and orientation toward CSR.  
 
Aupperle et al. (1985) noted similar shortcomings in the previous literature as found by 
Cochran and Wood (1984) and Ullmann (1985) (summarised in Appendix 8.1); where 
many researchers did not perform significance tests, or adjust performance for risk. It 
was noted that the performance criterion of investor’s yield is not necessarily an 
adequate proxy for profitability as yield is a function of capital gains and dividends, 
neither of which need be tied directly to profitability. Aupperle et al. (1985) also 
pointed out that in Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) their sample was derived from a single 
source that classified the firms in terms of orientation to CSR, and no criteria were 
offered for this classification. Additionally the final sample of firms was small, there 
was no adjustment for risk and the performance measure of growth in earnings per 
share was not definitive.  
 
These studies reflected varying methodologies and different degrees of rigour and 
although reputational surveys and content analysis of annual reports provide useful 
beginning points, other methods also exist. The two studies employing the most rigour 
(Abbott & Monsen,1979; Alexander & Buchholz, 1978) found no relationship between 
CSR and financial performance; however two studies employing different 
methodologies (Bowman & Haire, 1975; and Sturdivant & Ginter, 1977) found a 
curvilinear relationship between CSR and financial performance, with moderately 
socially responsible firms performing the best. To avoid the problems of previous 
studies, Aupperle et al. (1985) developed a survey instrument capable of assessing a 
corporate respondent’s social-responsibility orientation. The design and validation of 
the survey instrument drew on Carroll (1979)’s CSR construct as the attractive feature 
of this construct was its definition of CSR through four components. As mentioned 
previously, the four components of the defining model were economic, legal, ethical 
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and discretionary concerns. With this construct, Aupperle et al. (1985) could assess 
corporate executives’ orientations toward social responsibility, as well as use the 
construct to determine whether or not four separate components of CSR exist, and if 
they do whether they exist in the proportions implied by Carroll (1979). The graphic 
representation of the four-part construct suggested a weighting of 4-3-2-1 for the 
economic, legal, ethical and discretionary components respectively (as seen in Figure 
3).  
 
Aupperle et al. (1985) performed a factor analysis and found a clear inverse relationship 
between the economic and ethical dimensions which implied that an emphasis on one of 
these two components was at the expense of the other. This was surprising given the 
amount of support for ethical behaviour by business leaders and social critics alike. The 
strongest correlation was between the economic and ethical components as the 
economic factor correlated negatively with all three of its non-economic counterparts. 
Aupperle et al. (1985) noted that their analysis supported the existence of four distinct 
but related components, and the relative weights implicitly depicted by Carroll (1979) 
approximated the relative degrees of importance the executives placed on the four 
components. The mean scores for the components were: economic = 3.50, legal = 2.54, 
ethical = 2.22 and discretionary = 1.3. For the purposes of later analysis the four 
components were rearranged into two categories - as social responsibility often includes 
legal and ethical issues - with the non-economic factors (legal, ethical and 
discretionary) denoted as “a concern for society” and the economic component denoted 
as “a concern for economic performance”. The social orientation of a firm can be 
appropriately assessed through the importance it places on the non-economic 
components compared to the economic. Aupperle et al. (1985) used return on assets 
(ROA) as the profitability indicator, employing both one year and five year measures, 
which had to be adjusted for risk propensities typical of various firms and industries so 
that the firms could be compared with one another. The exact method of standardizing 
the ROA can be found in Aupperle et al. (1985, p. 458-459). 
 
The results from the analysis showed no statistically significant relationships between a 
strong orientation toward social responsibility and financial performance (regardless of 
risk-adjustment and ROA measure). Aupperle et al. (1985) concluded that it was not 
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possible to support the notion of a positive or negative relationship between profitability 
and an orientation toward CSR, which was consistent with the conclusion of Arlow and 
Gannon (1982). Although respondents placed more emphasis on the economic 
component, the non-economic component means taken together (6.06) were of much 
greater weight than the mean for the economic component (3.50) and “perhaps this 
suggests the corporate community is more responsive to socials issues than has been 
suspected” (Aupperle et al., 1985, p. 461). The study was unable to confirm the claims 
of either advocates or critics as to the value social responsibility may have for firms, 
however, Aupperle et al. (1985) stated that the findings of this study were limited in 
part to the perceptions on CSR of CEOs. “Perhaps its merits simply do not show up on 
the ‘bottom line’; perhaps superior methodologies or new qualitative approaches are 
required” (Aupperle et al., 1985, 462). The authors suggested that maybe “the 
intangible benefits of corporate social responsibility tend to evade scientific inquiry” 
(Aupperle et al., 1985, 462) and possibly this issue of whether or not CSR is related to 
profitability will never be completely resolved.  
 
Moving from management’s perceptions, McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988), 
henceforth McGuire et al., used Fortune magazine’s ratings of corporate reputations to 
analyze the relationships between perceptions of a firm’s CSR and their financial 
performance. Different arguments exist regarding this relationship, where some believe 
firms face a trade-off between social responsibility and financial performance. 
Proponents of this view contest that socially responsible actions put firms at an 
economic disadvantage through additional costs and missed strategic opportunities. 
Another viewpoint is that the explicit costs of CSR are minimal and that firms may 
actually benefit from socially responsible actions in terms of employee morale and 
productivity. A firm perceived as high in social responsibility may face fewer labour 
problems, and customers may be favourably disposed to its products. Socially 
responsible actions may also improve a firm’s standing with important constituencies 
such as bankers, and Spicer (1978) found that banks and other investors have reported 
social considerations to be a factor in their investment decisions - therefore high CSR 
may improve a firm’s access to sources of capital.  
 
A third alternative suggests that the costs of socially responsible actions are significant 
but offset by a reduction in other firm costs, since a firm must satisfy not only 
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stockholders and bondholders but also those with less explicit (implicit) claims. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that implicit claims like product quality are less costly than 
explicit claims like wage contracts or stockholder or bondholder demands. Low social 
responsibility may result in some stakeholders doubting the ability of a firm to honour 
implicit claims, and may increase the number of a firm’s explicit claims. Thus, if a firm 
does not act responsibly parties to implicit contracts concerning the social responsibility 
of the firm may attempt to transform these implicit agreements into more costly explicit 
agreements. For example, if a firm fails to meet promises to government officials with 
regards to the environment, government agencies may need to pass more stringent 
regulations (constituting explicit contracts) to force the firm to act in a socially 
responsible manner. Bowman and Haire (1975) and Alexander and Buchholz (1978) 
suggested that stakeholders and stock- and bond-holders may see CSR as indicating 
management skill and “in short, a firm has an investment in reputation, including its 
reputation for being socially responsible” (McGuire et al., 1988, p. 855). An increase in 
perceived social responsibility may improve the image of the firm’s management and 
permit it to exchange costly explicit claims for less costly implicit charges. 
 
Although research has focused on financial performance, arguments can be made for a 
relationship between social responsibility and measures of financial risk. Low levels of 
CSR may increase a firm’s risk as investors view management skills in the firm to be 
low. In contrast a high degree of CSR may result in low financial risk as a result of the 
stable relations with government and the financial community. A firm with high 
responsibility may also have a low total debt to assets ratio, as a low total debt ensures 
that a firm can easily continue to satisfy implicit claims. The impact of social 
responsibility on measures of a firm’s systematic risk may be minimal since most 
events affecting a firm’s level of social responsibility do not systematically affect all 
other firms in the marketplace. CSR may be related to subsequent financial performance 
as the benefits cited earlier may carry over into later periods, and it may also be linked 
to past firm performance, as its financial performance may influence a firm’s evolving 
social policy and actions. “Policies and expenditures, particularly in discretionary areas 
such as social programs, may be especially sensitive to the existence of slack resources” 
(McGuire et al., 1988, p. 857) and if CSR is viewed as a significant cost, firms with 
relatively high past financial performance may be more willing to absorb these costs in 
the future. The type of measures used by previous studies have influenced results 
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because accounting and market-based performance measures focus on different aspects 
of performance, and each is subject to particular biases, as summarised in Figure 13: 
 
Figure 13 - Accounting Based Measures of Financial Performance Versus Market 
Based Measures (McGuire et al., 1988, p. 859) 
McGuire et al. (1988) used Fortune magazine’s ratings on corporate reputations as a 
proxy for CSR; alpha (risk-adjusted return) and total return for measuring market 
performance; and ROA, total assets, sales growth, asset growth, and operating income 
growth for accounting performance. The market risk measures were beta and the 
standard deviation of total return, while the accounting-based measures of risk were the 
ratio of debt to assets, operating leverage, and the standard deviation of operating 
income. The main findings of the correlation analyses were: 
- No significant correlations between CSR and market based measures of 
performance. ROA (+), total assets (+) and operating income growth (–) were 
significantly correlated with CSR; thus through stakeholders CSR affects 
financial performance. 
- Risk measures were negatively associated with CSR.  
“This suggests that low-risk firms and firms with a high return on assets will later have 
an image of high social responsibility” (McGuire et al., 1988, p. 865). Using regressions 
with prior stock-market and accounting-based performance measures to predict social 
responsibility showed that accounting performance had a higher explanatory value than 
market performance possibly because market-based measures are related primarily to 
systematic movements among all firms whereas accounting measures are more likely to 
capture unique firm attributes. Therefore “since actions leading to high or low perceived 
corporate social responsibility may be predominately unsystematic, accounting 
         Accounting Measures versus Market Measures 
 
Accounting Based Measures: 
( - ) Tap historical aspects of performance 
( - ) Subject to bias from managerial manipulation and differences in accounting procedure 
( - ) Need to be adjusted for risk, industry characteristics and other variables 
 
Market Based Measures: 
( + ) Less susceptible to accounting procedures 
( + ) Represent investors’ evaluation of future earnings 
( - ) Imply investors’ evaluation is proper performance measure 
( - ) Due to multiple constituencies, concentration on investors may not be sufficient 
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performance may better capture social responsibility” (McGuire et al., 1988, p. 868). 
The most interesting conclusion was that prior performance was a better predictor of 
CSR than subsequent performance, therefore associations found between concurrent 
social responsibility and performance may partially be artefacts of previous high 
financial performance. Links between responsibility and subsequent financial 
performance may also be artefacts of prior high performance and it was noted that 
“subsequent studies should attempt to separate the effects of prior, current and future 
firm performance on the relationship between financial performance and corporate 
social responsibility” (McGuire et al., 1988, p. 869). Although financial performance 
tended to predict CSR better than risk, measures of risk explained a significant portion 
of the variability in social responsibility across firms (highlighting the importance of 
controlling for risk), thus instead of increased profitability managers might look toward 
reduced risk as a benefit of CSR.  
 
Waddock and Graves (1994) looked at the CSP-CFP relationship in a new way when 
they examined the number of institutions holding a company’s shares as well as the 
percentage of the company held by institutions. As the stock holdings of institutional 
owners grow, managers need to take into account the concerns of these investors if their 
company’s stock is to be attractive; thus the relationship between institutional 
ownership (IO) and CSP was analyzed. According to myopic institutions theory, 
institutional owners tend to be more short-sighted than individuals because institutional 
money managers must compete for accounts and are reviewed and rewarded on the 
basis of annual or quarterly performance. It is assumed that these short time horizons 
limit their investment decisions and since investments in CSP tend to be long-term there 
may be an incompatibility between an institutional owner’s time horizon and the time 
needed to realize the benefits from commitments to CSP. Waddock and Graves (1994) 
found the main body of empirical work seemed to refute the myopic institutions 
hypothesis as with changes in the scale of institutional shareholdings, these holdings 
increased to the point that institutions could not move quickly out of a stock that was 
undesired. As they became longer-term holders by necessity, institutional investors 
became more involved with their investments and Waddock and Graves (1994) 
concluded that the argument for a short time horizon was no longer supported. 
Regarding the attitudes of institutional owners, CSP information was taken into account 
if it was quantified, focused on specific issues, and obtained from independent parties. 
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It was also suggested that institutional investors are more able (than individuals) to 
assimilate and act upon information about socially responsible corporate practices. 
 
Waddock and Graves (1994) recalled Spicer (1978)’s argument that institutional 
investors consider low-CSP firms to be riskier investments. This arises from the 
possibility of adverse legislative or regulatory actions, judicial decisions, or consumer 
retaliation. In terms of finance theory an investment in a company that is socially 
irresponsible could be inefficient since “by choosing a similar but socially responsible 
company, an investor might achieve the same return with less risk” (Waddock & 
Graves, 1994, p. 1035). Investors consider both risk and return, and since high social 
responsibility may reduce risk, this may incentivise managers to invest in positive CSP 
measures. Generalizing traditional financial risk aversion, the authors interpreted 
increased CSP as risk-reducing, and ceteris paribus, institutional investors will view 
high social performance positively. Since a rational investor choosing between two 
companies with the same return will select the one with less risk, the following 
hypothesis was posited:  
Hypothesis: Improvements in a company’s Corporate Social Performance will increase 
institutional ownership. 
To test this, the authors used IO as the dependent variable while the independent 
variables included CSP, firm profitability, size, debt level and industry as control 
variables. The authors measured CSP using an index constructed from data developed 
by KLD – a firm specializing in the assessment of CSP [covered in the appendix 
chapter 8.2 Social Screens]. This assessment rated each company on multiple attributes 
considered significant, was applied consistently and was replicable. One limitation 
noted was that the KLD attributes were given equal importance, whereas generally 
observers of CSP consider certain issues to be more important than others. To deal with 
this Waddock and Graves (1994) used weights developed by Ruf, Muralidhar and Paul 
(1993) to calculate a weighted average across the eight attributes for each company in 
the study - resulting in a single CSP value for each company, ranging from -2.0 to 
+1.66. Ruf et al. (1993) provided an objective, empirically based approach for CSP 
based on eight dimensions of social responsibility. Their multicriteria decision-making 
technique was used to access the relative importance of the eight dimensions of CSP 
used in ethical investing (Ruf et al., 1993, p. 326). Profitability was measured with 
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ROA and ROE, size was measured by total assets and total sales and debt level was 
measured as the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets. The squares of sales and 
assets were also included since the authors found that the number of institutions owning 
a company’s stock showed a quadratic relationship with company size.  
 
Waddock and Graves (1994)’s regression models using the number of institutions as the 
proxy showed significant positive relationships between CSP and IO which provided 
support for their hypothesis that high CSP values result in high levels of institutional 
ownership. This finding suggested that strong financial performance leads to increases 
in ownership with other variables held constant. Waddock and Graves (1994) concluded 
that, “institutional investors prefer firms with low debt ratios, suggesting that 
institutions are risk-averse. With respect to firm size… other things being equal, 
institutional investors prefer large firms, but that, when firms pass some size threshold, 
those investors view them less favourably” (Waddock & Graves, 1994, p. 1042). The 
models using the percentage of shares owned as the dependent variable were largely 
insignificant with only the debt-to-asset ratio being significant - again indicating risk 
aversion. The results showed that a company incurred no penalty resulting from 
improvements in CSP ratings and institutions actually responded positively to such 
improvements. Ultimately, this risk aversion was translated into a preference for strong 
CSP. From the study “managers can conclude that improving a company’s social 
performance will not depress institutional stock ownership” (Waddock & Graves, 1994, 
p. 1044) and due to the increases in SRI, and information about companies’ CSP 
records, these results suggested that institutional investors were taking this information 
into account when deciding on stock ownership. 
 
Waddock and Graves (1997) also assessed the relationship between CSP and financial 
performance where they noted the difficulty earlier studies faced when trying to 
measure CSP as it is a multidimensional construct with behaviours ranging across a 
variety of inputs, internal behaviours/processes and outputs. Additionally, CSP 
encompasses many issues, decisions and corporate behaviours and as a result there has 
been little clarity on the measurement of CSP as measures tended to be one-dimensional 
and were only applied to small samples. Each of the measurements widely used in the 
past offered some benefits however they tended to be very limited and many measures 
were “either unidimensional and may not properly reflect the overall level of a 
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company’s CSP or they are difficult to apply consistently across the range of industries 
and companies that need to be studied” (Waddock & Graves, 1997, p. 305).  
 
Waddock and Graves (1997) formulated their hypotheses with the sign of the 
relationship and the direction of causation in mind. The sign indicates a negative, 
neutral or positive relationship between CSP and financial performance; and it is 
possible that changes in CSP influence financial performance, or that changes in 
financial performance influence CSP. Summarising the relationships: 
Negative association: Responsible firms incur a competitive disadvantage as they 
sustain costs that might be avoided or should be borne by others. Furthermore, there 
are few readily measurable economic benefits to socially responsible behaviour 
whereas the costs are numerous and fall directly to the bottom line. 
Neutral association: Since there are so many intervening variables between social and 
financial performance, there is no reason to expect a relationship to exist 
(measurement problems may mask any linkages). 
Positive association: A tension exists between explicit costs (e.g. bond payments) and 
implicit costs (e.g. product quality costs or environmental costs). Thus, firms which 
lower implicit costs by socially irresponsible actions will incur higher explicit costs 
resulting in competitive disadvantage. Additionally, the costs of CSP are minimal 
whereas the benefits are potentially great (good employee relations may have a low 
cost but potentially significant gains in morale and productivity). A final view is that 
high levels of CSP are indicators of superior management skill, and this leads to lower 
explicit costs. 
 
Waddock and Graves (1997) proposed two views on causality that were contrasted and 
tested empirically: 
Slack Resources: Better financial performance results in the availability of slack 
resources, providing the opportunity to invest in social performance domains. Thus, 
financial performance would be a predictor of better CSP (as found in McGuire et al., 
1988): 
H1: Better financial performance results in improved CSP (ceteris paribus) 
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Good Management: There is a high correlation between good management practice 
and CSP because attention to CSP domains improves relationships with important 
stakeholder groups - improving overall performance. This includes managements’ 
attempts to meet stakeholder expectations before they become problematic or it may 
represent posturing on the part of companies to improve their external reputations. 
Additionally, customer perceptions about the quality of a firm’s products, 
environmental awareness and community relations are becoming bases of 
competition; thus, the lines between good management practice and social 
performance are becoming less defined: 
H2: Improved CSP leads to better financial performance (ceteris paribus) 
Based on earlier empirical evidence, the authors hypothesised that CSP is a predictor 
and consequence of firm financial performance, resulting in a simultaneous relationship 
which they termed a “virtuous circle”. Waddock and Graves (1997) constructed an 
index of CSP (proposed by Ullmann, 1985) based on the eight CSP attributes rated by 
KLD. Five of the attributes emphasise stakeholder relations that might be put forward 
as important by emerging influences on corporate strategy while the remaining three 
attributes are less directly related to stakeholder groups, but encompass areas where 
companies have received significant external pressures. The authors computed the 
relative importance and weights of each attribute to the overall index and noted that 
their index was statistically the same as that found by Ruf et al. (1993). Waddock and 
Graves (1997) controlled for size, risk and industry; while profitability was measured 
with ROA, ROE and ROS. Size may be important as when firms grow it is possible that 
they attract more attention from external constituents, and need to respond more openly 
to stakeholder demands (Burke et al., 1986; cited in Waddock & Graves, 1997).  
 
The regressions using CSP from 1990 (dependent) and financial data from 1989 
(independent) were significant at the 1% level for all models. Specifically CSP was 
related to ROA - the relationship was still strong when the measure was ROE, at the 
10% level, and ROS at the 5% level; which strongly supported H1. For the model using 
1991 financial data (dependent) and 1990 CSP data (independent) the results again 
supported their hypothesis; this time, that financial performance depended on CSP (H2). 
This provided evidence of relationships in both directions indicating a virtuous circle 
where a simultaneous and interactive impact exists and consequently where causation 
  82
runs in both directions. The findings of the study indicated that attention to CSP arenas 
did not represent a competitive disadvantage and may even be an advantage. If better 
performance along CSP dimensions allows companies to attract better employees, forgo 
costly battles with communities or avoid fines then CSP no longer “represents a 
discretionary activity on the part of management” (Waddock & Graves, 1997, p. 314) 
but is linked to management performance itself. Thus, stakeholder relations fall under 
CSP and expenditures in stakeholder domains become important elements of improved 
corporate performance as well as improved CSP. This study supported the notion that 
“it may pay to give attention to dimensions of management that are normally outside of 
strict financial, productivity and efficiency considerations” (Waddock & Graves, 1997, 
p. 315).  
 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) posited that R&D was positively correlated with 
financial performance as well as CSR, thus when it is omitted from the model 
estimating this relationship it is misspecified. Two types of studies on the relationship 
were noted, the first set used the event study methodology to assess the short-run impact 
(abnormal returns) while the second set examined the nature of the relationship between 
some measure of CSP and measures of long term CFP. The second category is where 
Aupperle et al. (1985), McGuire et al. (1988), and Waddock and Graves (1997) fall 
into. Results from both sets of studies have been mixed, with some findings indicating 
no relationship, while others have shown significant positive/negative correlations. 
According to McWilliams and Siegel (2000) the inconsistency from these studies is not 
surprising given the nature of the models forming the basis of the empirical estimation. 
Waddock and Graves (1997) used a model which set long-run economic performance as 
a function of CSP, size, risk and industry (Equation 1). McWilliams and Siegel (2000) 
hypothesised that this model was misspecified due to omitted variables like the firm’s 
rate of investment in R&D and the advertising intensity of its industry; thus the authors 
added the two new covariates (Equation 2). It was noted that excluding R&D is 
problematic due to the extensive literature linking R&D to improvements in economic 
performance- since R&D can be considered a form of investment in technical capital 
resulting in product and process innovation. “If R&D has a positive impact on firm 
performance, then the coefficient on any variable that is strongly positively correlated 
with R&D will be overestimated when R&D is omitted from the equation” 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000, p. 605) thus the authors hypothesised that R&D and CSP 
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are positively correlated since aspects of CSR create either a process innovation, 
product innovation, or both.  
 
The authors equated various CSR strategies (such as the appearance of natural food 
companies, or the use of organic farming methods) to the product innovation and 
process innovation of R&D to show why their posited relationship holds. The second 
additional covariate, industry advertising intensity, was designed to serve as a proxy for 
the extent of product differentiation at the industry level and entry barriers that may 
serve to enhance firm profitability. The positive and significant coefficient on CSP 
(reported by Waddock and Graves, 1997) could be reflecting the impact of R&D on 
firm performance as it is impossible to isolate the impact of CSP on firm performance 
in the misspecified model. This argument follows for other omitted regressors (such as 
advertising intensity) if they are also positively correlated with CSP and firm 
performance. For CSP the authors used a dummy variable which indicated whether a 
firm was included in the Domini Social Index (DSI) in a given year, having passed the 
“social screen” - the DSI was a socially responsible index constructed by KLD and shall 
be covered later in this study. Importantly the authors found that R&D, CSP and 
financial performance all appeared to be strongly positively correlated, which supported 
the hypothesis that Equation 1 was misspecified. The authors examined variants of 
Equation 2 including the rate of firm level investment in R&D and industry dummy 
variables in the model; and the results confirmed the importance of including these 
additional factors in the model. When R&D and industry factors were added, the 
magnitude of the coefficient diminished and was no longer significant, and the adjusted 
R² increased; thus the “findings underscore the importance of using the appropriate 
specification when estimating the ‘return’ on CSR investment” (McWilliams & Siegel, 
2000, p. 607). Interestingly, it was noted that the result of no financial impact from CSR 
may arise from the lack of a good measure of CSR. 
 
Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003), henceforth Orlitzky et al., performed a meta-
analysis of 52 studies regarding the relationship between CSP and CFP. A meta-
analysis combines the results of several studies that address a set of related research 
hypotheses, with the aim being to estimate the true effect size as opposed to the smaller 
effect sizes derived in the single studies under given assumptions and conditions 
(Wikipedia, 2010). This was noted to be an improvement over the “vote-counting” 
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technique that codes previous studies as showing positive, negative or insignificant 
results; and which had been proven invalid by academics. The meta-analysis allowed 
for the statistical aggregation of results across individual studies and corrected for 
statistical artefacts such as sampling error and measurement error resulting in much 
greater precision than other research reviews. From the literature the authors proposed a 
few hypotheses regarding the relationship between CSP and CFP (Orlitzky et al., 2003, 
p. 405-410): 
H1: CSP and CFP are positively related across a wide variety of industry and study 
contexts (derived from stakeholder theory, also identified as the ‘good management 
theory’) 
The authors posited that the positive correlation is a result of CSP’s influence on 
reputation building, as well as its ability to contribute to organisational knowledge and 
enhance organisational efficiency as investment in CSP may help firms develop new 
competencies, resources and capabilities manifested in a firm’s culture, technology and 
structure. This is especially so when CSP is pre-emptive as it may help build managerial 
competencies because preventive efforts necessitate significant employee involvement, 
organisation-wide coordination and forward-thinking managerial style; which increases 
the firm’s preparedness for external changes, turbulence and crises. CSP may also effect 
organisational reputation where a firm’s communication about its level of CSP may 
help build positive images with customers, investors, bankers and suppliers. This may 
facilitate access to capital, attract better employees or increase current employees’ 
goodwill which may in turn improve financial outcomes. The authors also proposed 
testing for prior CSP related to subsequent CFP, prior CFP related to subsequent CSP 
and a contemporaneous association to examine any temporal relationship which 
resulted in: 
H2: There exists bidirectional causality between CSP and CFP 
Before inclusion in the analysis, Orlitzky et al. (2003) checked each of the studies 
against the definition of CSP set out by Wood (1991; cited by Orlitzky et al., 2003, p. 
403): “a business organisation’s configuration of principles of social responsibility, 
processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs and observable outcomes as 
they relate to the firm’s societal relationships”. The meta-analytic findings supported 
hypothesis H1, in that CSP and CFP were positively correlated while their results 
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regarding the temporal sequence pointed to a virtuous circle between CSP and CFP (as 
suggested in Waddock & Graves, 1997). Additionally, the association between CSP and 
CFP depended on the firm’s operational definition of each construct. Accounting 
measures were more highly correlated with CSP than market measures and particularly 
highly correlated with CSP reputation indices. Ultimately, the findings with respect to 
CSP operationalization indicated that studies using reputation indices as proxies for 
CSP showed the highest average correlation with CFP whereas disclosure measures 
appeared to be only minimally related.  
 
Orlitzky et al. (2003) showed that there was a positive association between CSP and 
CFP across industries and study contexts and many of the negative findings in 
individual studies were artefactual allowing for a broader generalisation of the positive 
relationship. Additionally, CSP and CFP seemed to mutually affect each other in that 
financially successful companies spend more because they can afford it, but CSP also 
helps them become a bit more successful. The meta-analysis rejected the idea that CSP 
is necessarily inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximisation (Friedman, 1970) as 
organisational effectiveness may encompass both financial and social performance. It 
appeared that market forces did not penalise companies that were high in CSP, thus, 
firms can afford to be socially responsible. Their conclusion was that portraying 
managers’ choices with respect to CSP and CFP as an either/or trade off is not justified 
in light of the empirical data and ultimately “corporate virtue in the form of social and, 
to a lesser extent, environmental responsibility is rewarding in more ways than one” 
(Orlitzky et al., 2003, p. 427).  
 
Since CSP is a multidimensional construct and fundamentally different aspects may 
have diverse implications for financial performance, Brammer and Millington (2008) 
analysed the relationship between CSP and CFP within the context of one particular 
element: corporate philanthropic donations. Their two-stage empirical approach entailed 
distinguishing between the observed level of a phenomenon and a level expected based 
on various predictors (industry, size, R&D, advertising intensity etc.) and then 
separating the sample into three groups: unusually low CSP, normal CSP, and unusually 
high CSP. The second stage of the analysis examined the financial performance of the 
grouped firms to test what relationships existed. The authors noted two issues 
concerning this relationship, namely the shape and the time horizon over which the two 
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variables are related. Figure 14 shows the four possible models, based on the 
underlying assumptions: whether there are positive financial payoffs to good social 
performance; whether such payoffs derive from the absolute level of a firm’s CSP or 
from its performance relative to peers and finally whether any such payoffs are subject 
to diminishing returns.  
 
Figure 14 - Alternative Models of the Relationship Between Corporate Financial 
Performance and CSP (Brammer & Millington, 2008, p. 1328) 
Model (i) – describes a positive relationship between CSP and CFP (benefits that are 
not subject to diminishing returns) 
Model (ii) – shows a linear negative relationship between CSP and CFP based on the 
assumption that there are no financial payoffs to good social performance 
(unresponsive firms incur less costs and have a competitive advantage) 
Model (iii) – this nonlinear relationship assumes positive financial payoffs to good 
social performance that are subject to diminishing returns. This view is consistent 
with agency theory in that owners are assumed to be risk neutral (they can diversify 
their overall risk) whereas managers are risk averse (since their job security and 
income are tied to the firm). Thus, if the financial benefit of social performance is 
subject to diminishing returns but its capacity to reduce firm-specific risks is not, then 
the differences in the degree of risk aversion of principals and agents leads managers 
CSP CSP 
CSP CSP
CFP
CFP CFP
CFP 
Alternative models of the relationship between corporate financial 
performance and corporate social performance 
Model (i) Model (ii) 
Model (iii) Model (iv) 
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to overinvest in projects that reduce a firm’s financial risks at the expense of the 
higher (and riskier) level of financial performance preferred by owners. 
Model (iv) – this shows CFP highest at the extremes of CSP: since increases in CSP 
involves higher costs, competitive advantage can arise from the avoidance of these 
costs. Alternatively a firm can use social responsiveness strategically to differentiate a 
firm in the eyes of stakeholder groups. Thus “firms that make moderate levels of 
investment in social performance neither save the resources for alternative 
investments nor achieve differentiation in the eyes of stakeholders, and, in 
consequence, exhibit relatively poor financial performance” (Brammer & Millington, 
2008, p. 1329). 
The authors noted that the time horizon would depend on the relative timing of the costs 
and benefits of good social performance. Social initiatives tend to require significant 
investments in the short run whereas the size of the benefits varies across the different 
types of social performance as well as across time. Brammer and Millington (2008) 
stated that while some of the initiatives may bring financial benefits relatively quickly 
through increased revenues or reduced costs, many of the benefits resulting from being 
socially responsible are reliant on awareness of firm behaviour among the shareholder 
groups. Thus, for a firm to attract many of the benefits it has to be socially responsive 
over time and ultimately “the net benefits to financial performance accrue only over the 
long run when the costs of such initiatives are amortised and when stakeholders are 
sufficiently aware of the firm’s social performance for it to shape their decision making 
in ways that bring benefits to companies” (Brammer & Millington, 2008, p. 1330). 
 
Brammer and Millington (2008) used their model to determine the difference between 
the observed level of giving and the predicted level - given firm characteristics – where 
the residuals were used to classify the companies according to their CSP strategy. The 
authors looked at three time periods: a one-year period (short term); a five-year period 
(medium term); and a ten-year period (long term). For financial performance market-
based measures were employed as they reflected both the emphasis on the possible 
trade-offs involved in ownership of firms with different social performance 
characteristics, and the diversity of the industrial composition of the sample. To control 
for the risks associated with share ownership, the Sharpe Ratio was used. The results 
were consistent with earlier findings in that larger more profitable and more R&D and 
  88
advertising intensive firms made donations at a higher rate. Firms with more liquid cash 
reserves made a higher rate of donations, and there seemed to be some important 
industry variation. Furthermore, the authors noted that all else equal, the rate of giving 
as a proportion of sales has remained constant over time. After separating the firms into 
the three categories of social performance the authors found that in every time period 
the firms from the middle group underperformed the firms in either extreme. 
Additionally, over the short-run, firms in the bottom CSP group significantly 
outperformed other companies before and after the risk adjustment; whereas, over the 
medium- and long-term the top CSP group had the highest financial performance.  
 
The evidence indicated that firms who exhibited unusually good or bad social 
performance were predicted to have significantly higher financial performance. This 
was hypothesised in Model (iv) and suggested that high performing firms either 
differentiate themselves by investing in CSP, or choose to save the resources that would 
have been invested. Firms that give at the expected rate neither differentiate themselves 
from competitors nor do they conserve the resources; thus they may be stuck in the 
middle in the sense that neither their social nor financial performance is exceptional. 
Overall, the findings suggested that it may take time for social responsiveness to 
translate into higher returns; and it is through the “consistent application of a strategy of 
social sensitivity that ultimately pays off in financial terms” (Brammer & Millington, 
2008, p. 1340).  
 
Callan and Thomas (2009) re-examined the relationship between CSP and CFP and 
attempted to improve upon earlier studies by correcting for deficiencies such as the 
assumption of linearity and the absence of key control variables while using acceptable 
measures of financial as well as social performance. The authors noted several 
shortcomings from the established literature: many studies were dated and their CSR 
measures may not have been entirely relevant; papers presented theoretical models 
without empirical evidence, or used regression models that did not test for nonlinearity 
nor specify lags between CSP and CFP. Callan and Thomas (2009) noted that in earlier 
papers there was strong support for a positive relationship between CSP and CFP as 
well as evidence indicating that CSP predicts or helps to determine CFP (Margolis & 
Walsh, 2001; cited in Callan & Thomas, 2009) thus to test these relationships the 
authors explored corporate CSP as a determinant of CFP. The theory underlying this 
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causal direction was that the firm’s investment in socially responsible behaviour had a 
measurable effect on its financial performance. The positive relationship was based in 
stakeholder theory where firms must engage in socially responsible behaviour to 
achieve legitimacy and in so doing the socially responsible initiatives are rewarded 
through improved productivity, enhanced reputation and a larger consumer base. The 
alternate view (Friedman, 1970) argued that corporate interests should not stray from 
those of investors, and allocating resources to achieve social goals adds to costs and 
runs counter to the firm’s objective to maximise profit – suggesting a negative 
relationship between CSP and CFP. Callan and Thomas (2009) assumed that the 
stakeholder theory evidence was sufficiently strong to hypothesise a positive 
relationship, however such a theory could only be tested with proper controls for other 
determinants of financial performance (such as risk and size). Their resulting theoretical 
model was: 
CFPit = f(CSPit−1, Sizeit, Capitalit, Riskit, RDit, Advit, Zit)  
Z was a vector of variables capturing the industry in which the firm operates, and the 
other variables (R&D investment, advertising spending, capital spending etc.) were 
included as per the earlier literature. ROA, ROS, ROE and Tobin’s q were included as 
the measures of financial performance (CFP) - where Tobin’s q is a measure 
representing the market value of the company divided by the replacement cost of the 
company’s capital. The measure used for CSP was taken from KLD’s database of CSP 
assessments and it looked at two broad categories: seven Qualitative Issues Areas and 
six negative screens called Controversial Business Issues. The authors used models with 
the CSP defined as all thirteen issues, as well as separated into the two categories (the 
Qualitative issues and negative screens). The final adjustment to their models was to 
include quadratic variables to test for linearity; where total assets, net sales and number 
of employees were squared.  
 
Callan and Thomas (2009) found that with the exception of ROE, the results were 
consistent with their expectations, and the R² statistics suggested that the models 
performed well. Positive CSP-CFP relationships were seen in all equations except for 
the ROE models; and most were statistically significant which supported proponents of 
stakeholder theory and validated the majority of findings in the literature. The results 
implied that the benefits of SRI outweighed the costs. A unique finding was the fact that 
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the models specified with two separate CSP measures as opposed to one aggregated 
variable tended to be stronger overall (where the negative screens’ parameters were 
much larger in magnitude). This suggested that research using a CSP index of all KLD 
indicators - including negative screens - may be misspecified. While ROS and ROA 
showed similar significant results, ROE tended to be insignificant in many of the 
models, and the authors hypothesised ROE may be more related to CSP in the long-
term. Callan and Thomas (2009) found that in their models using ROS and ROA, Total 
Assets seemed to be quadratically related to CFP indicating a need to test for linearity in 
their models. Overall, their results regarding the CSP-CFP relationship seemed robust 
as they held across various model specifications; appeared independent of the measure 
of CFP employed; and integrated the assessments and findings from previous empirical 
studies. 
 
Lankoski (2009) looked at the economic impacts of various CSR issues. Some studies 
argued that the relationship between corporate responsibility and economic performance 
is likely to differ across issues, and thus an attempt was made to differentiate between a 
set of issues, and to test whether their impacts were statistically different. Lankoski 
(2009) noted theoretical distinctions between situations where the corporate 
responsibility outcome itself is a causal factor for economic performance and situations 
where the corporate responsibility outcome and the economic outcome arise jointly 
from some other activity. Where the outcome is a causal factor; either the outcome 
directly affects the firm’s own production process, or the outcome is linked to the firm’s 
economic performance through the stakeholders of the firm. Stakeholder theory has 
become instrumental in explaining the relationship between CSP and CFP, and 
Lankoski (2009) noted that stakeholders may have different expectations regarding 
different issues, especially since CSR can be seen to consist of actions that reduce 
negative externalities or generate positive externalities. The ethical case for responsible 
behaviour is different when the firm actually contributes to the social problem, and thus 
stakeholders may expect as a priority that a firm should take care of reducing those 
harmful externalities that it is directly causing, and as a result “taking an active stance 
in generating positive externalities would come only secondary in stakeholder 
expectations” (Lankoski, 2009, p. 209). 
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Mattingly and Berman (2006; cited in Lankoski, 2009) found that positive and negative 
social actions (defined using the KLD ratings data) were empirically and conceptually 
distinct constructs – an idea which concurred with Callan and Thomas (2009). These 
studies implied that it may be more important for a company to “do no harm” (avoiding 
punishment from stakeholders), than to “do good” (and be rewarded by stakeholders). 
Additionally, Folkes and Kamins (1999; cited in Lankoski, 2009) found that a failure to 
avoid unethical behaviour had a larger impact on consumer attitudes than did engaging 
in pro-social activity, and this led Lankoski (2009) to posit the hypothesis that:  
H1: The economic impacts of corporate responsibility are more positive for issues 
reducing negative externalities than for issues generating positive externalities.  
To assess who benefits from the CSR outcome the author separated stakeholders into 
market and nonmarket stakeholders. Market stakeholders engage in market exchanges 
with the firm (employees, consumers) whereas nonmarket stakeholders are those who 
have some interaction without engaging in market exchanges (e.g. the community). 
Previous studies found that corporate responsibility activities that were directly tied to 
primary stakeholders improved economic performance, but activities going beyond the 
direct stakeholders’ interests harmed performance, thus the second hypothesis was: 
H2: The economic impacts of corporate responsibility are more positive for issues 
benefiting market stakeholders than for issues benefiting nonmarket stakeholders.  
Lankoski (2009) employed a survey where executives assessed the potential of CSR 
issues to influence economic performance over the medium term. The reason for this is 
that there may be a temporal asymmetry in the distribution of costs and benefits with 
many corporate responsibility issues, and thus the choice of a time frame may affect the 
outcome. The results showed that there was a highly significant difference between 
reducing negative externalities and generating positive externalities; with the impacts 
being more positive for issues that reduced negative externalities thus supporting H1. 
Similarly, there was a significant difference between corporate responsibility issues 
whose outcomes benefit market versus nonmarket stakeholders, with impacts being 
more positive for issues benefiting market stakeholders – supporting H2. The key 
conclusion of this study was that “the content of corporate responsibility matters for the 
economic implications” (Lankoski, 2009, p. 218). Different issues have different 
impacts and there are patterns in these differences according to whether the issue 
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represents reducing a negative externality or generating a positive externality and 
whether the outcome benefits market or nonmarket stakeholders. 
 
The results clarified the causal link between CSP and economic performance since for 
an issue to result in economic impacts from stakeholders, it must trigger powerful 
stakeholders to act; which will happen if the stakeholders are the ones experiencing the 
outcome (self-interest) or if they decide to act on behalf of others (if the issue is worth 
defending for ethical reasons). The concept of moral intensity has been proposed to 
explain the act-provoking character of an issue, and one component of this is the social 
consensus about the importance of an issue, which tends to be more strongly present for 
reducing negative externalities than for generating positive ones. Lankoski (2009) 
questioned whether the examination of corporate responsibility should not begin to 
acknowledge the dimension of economic responsibility in addition to the environmental 
and social dimensions. “Economic responsibility is a much richer concept than simple 
economic performance” (Lankoski, 2009, p. 222) and the author noted that without due 
attention to all three responsibility dimensions, the picture on sustainable business 
remains incomplete. 
 
2.3 Socially Responsible Investing  
 
The relationship between CSP and CFP is important to SRI insofar as the direction of 
the relationship determines if socially responsive firms will do well financially, or 
suffer the costs of these social initiatives. The financial performance translates directly 
into return for the investors, and thus the sign of the relationship is paramount to SRI 
investors who wish to ‘do well while doing good’. If the CSP-CFP relationship is 
positive, investors receive an extra incentive to invest with their beliefs whereas a 
negative relationship means investors must pay to be ethical. A neutral relationship 
indicates that an investor seeking returns would be indifferent between SRI and 
conventional portfolios, thus an investor can be socially responsible without incurring a 
cost. The previous studies focused on the relationships between socially responsible 
corporations and the cost to the corporation, however the literature presented in this 
section specifically looked at what being a socially responsible investor means, and the 
subsequent benefits or costs that accrue to investors. 
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Due to the political situation in South Africa, the 1970s and 1980s saw a movement for 
the more socially aware investors to move away from investing in South Africa as a 
form of protest, and Grossman and Sharpe (1986) analysed the financial implications of 
divestment of South Africa-related stocks. The Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) provided lists of companies having direct investments in South Africa, as well 
as some banks with loans to the South African public sector and those advocating a 
“complete divestment strategy” adopted this list of companies. As the alternative, non-
compliance with the Sullivan Principles, resulted in too few firms being excluded the 
complete strategy was used. Grossman and Sharpe (1986) stated that any study of 
divestment must compare at least two security universes, one that would be utilized in 
the absence of a divestment policy and another that would be chosen if such a policy 
were adopted; thus the authors compared their South Africa-free (SAF) portfolio with 
the S&P 500 and the NYSE. Their SAF universe comprised of NYSE stocks that did 
not appear on the 1984 IRRC list and key statistics regarding the universe 
characteristics were examined; where the two universes had similar beta values, 
indicating that divestment need not significantly affect systematic risk. In contrast, the 
average SAF stock was nearly 30% smaller than that of the average NYSE firm. It was 
noted that size is an important factor affecting stock returns and the “small stock bias” 
of the SAF universe undoubtedly represented its most significant difference form the 
larger set of investable stocks.  
 
Grossman and Sharpe (1986) found that the SAF portfolio outperformed the NYSE; 
however, the standard deviation of the SAF portfolio’s excess return was also 
significantly higher. Comparing equal risk portfolios, the SAF portfolio still 
outperformed the NYSE although the difference had decreased. Grossman and Sharpe 
(1986) found that the average South Africa factor (indicating whether the firm was 
South Africa-related) was positive over the period. They also noted two key differences 
between the SAF and NYSE portfolios: since by design the SAF strategy excluded 
South Africa-related stocks this reduced the portfolios performance due to the positive 
average South Africa factor. A byproduct of this was that the SAF strategy also had 
small stock bias, increasing its returns over the sample period. This small stock effect 
was much greater than the South Africa effect causing the “equal-risk” SAF portfolio to 
outperform the NYSE, and had the South Africa factor equaled zero, the SAF strategy 
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would have performed even better relative to the NYSE. Grossman and Sharpe (1986) 
concluded that it is a “simple exercise in logic to demonstrate that any constraint placed 
upon a decision can only lower or leave unchanged the maximum utility that can be 
obtained” (Grossman & Sharpe, 1986, p. 27). The avoidance of South Africa-related 
stocks cannot improve the financial situation of an investor who has previously made an 
optimal set of investment decisions. However, some institutional investment portfolios 
appeared to be suboptimal and it may well be that the substitution of an efficient passive 
South Africa-free strategy for an inefficient active strategy may lead to an overall 
improvement (albeit smaller than one may obtain with an efficient unconstrained 
strategy).  
 
Teoh, Welch and Wazzan (1999), henceforth Teoh et al., analysed the South African 
boycott with a variety of measures to assess whether socially activist investment 
policies had any effect on the financial markets. Sanctions during the time were aimed 
at applying economic pressure, thus the authors attempted to determine the extent to 
which the financial markets bore the burden of sanctions by looking at stock prices as 
“the advantage… is that stock prices quickly impound information about investors’ 
perceptions of the consequences of these events” (Teoh et al., 1999, p. 37). The authors 
used an event-study methodology and “investigated the effect of the most important 
legislative and shareholder boycott to date: the boycott of South Africa’s apartheid 
regime” (Teoh et al., 1999, p. 79).  
 
Their analysis attempted to determine if political or social preference was an additional 
attribute of investments so that investors preference created downward sloping demand, 
i.e. “is the elasticity of demand for divesting firms’ stock low enough so that regaining 
the approval by social activists can increase the firm’s share price?” (Teoh et al., 1999, 
p. 74). Their results showed no significant return reactions, thus there was no evidence 
that firms were affected by their divestment announcement. Although there had been 
debate over divestment consequences, the authors found little empirical evidence which 
supported the perception that anti-apartheid shareholder and legislative boycotts 
affected the financial sector adversely. There was weak evidence that institutional 
shareholdings increased when corporations divested, and that firms that divested had 
their shareholders return, with a possibly more positive but insignificant valuation 
response. One reason suggested for this may be that “the boycott primarily reallocated 
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shares and operations from ‘socially responsible’ to more indifferent investors and 
countries” (Teoh et al., 1999, p. 83). Overall their evidence suggested that the South 
African boycott had little valuation effect on the financial sector despite the prominence 
and publicity of the boycott and the multitude of divesting companies. Although the 
sanctions may have raised the moral standards and public awareness of the situation in 
South Africa, it appeared that the financial markets avoided the brunt of the sanctions 
and “this may be an important point for future activists who are considering using the 
tools of the boycott for other causes” (Teoh et al., 1999, p. 83). 
 
Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993), henceforth Hamilton et al., considered the investment 
performance of socially responsible mutual funds; and at the time, the authors noted 
that socially responsible investment portfolios had reached $600 billion as of January 
1992; and the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement Equities 
Fund (TIAA-CREF) Social Choice Account had grown to $273 million as of September 
1992. The authors noted that the definition of “socially responsible” varied 
considerably, and that socially responsible investors usually used a combination of 
negative and positive investment criteria. While there was no consensus on the role of 
social responsibility in investment management, Lowry (1991; cited in Hamilton et al., 
1993) gave four goals of SRI: 
 SRI involves strategies to democratize the economy through “encouragement of 
the hiring, retention and promotion of woman and minorities and the increase of 
worker ownership in corporate America” (Hamilton et al., 1993, p. 62).  
 SRI promotes practices to humanize the workplace, recognising the human price 
that has been paid for industrial development.  
 SRI reassesses the way profits have been traditionally used and distributed.  
 SRI aims to convince the world that a corporate conscience can pay. 
In contrast, Rudd (1981; cited in Hamilton et al., 1993) contested that the difference 
between social criteria and others is that the traditional criteria have been imposed on 
managers solely by the investment considerations, and while they may be misguided the 
rationale is justifiable as they aim to protect the financial state of the beneficiaries. The 
authors proposed three hypotheses about the relative returns of socially responsibly 
portfolios:  
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1) Socially Responsible returns = Conventional returns: The social features of 
firms are not priced, and undesirable firms that are sold find sufficient 
conventional investors so that the price does not drop. Since expected returns to 
investors are also the cost of capital to the company, “this hypothesis implies 
that socially responsible investors do not reduce the relative cost of capital to 
socially responsible companies by favouring their stocks” (Hamilton et al., 
1993, p. 63). 
2) Socially Responsible returns < Conventional returns: Socially responsible 
investors impact stock prices by driving down the expected returns and the cost 
of capital for socially responsible firms thus increasing the value relative to 
conventional companies (the markets price the social features).  
3) Socially Responsible returns > Conventional returns: This is ‘doing well by 
doing good’ and may be possible “if a sufficiently large number of investors 
consistently underestimate the probability that negative information will be 
released about companies that are not socially responsible” (Hamilton et al., 
1993, p. 64). An example is when conventional investors underestimate the 
probability that oil companies will be in trouble because of oil spills. Declines in 
the price of stocks following oil spills will lower the returns of conventional 
portfolios, whereas socially responsible investors who shunned the oil stocks 
will be unaffected. This was evident with BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
where as of the 25th June 2010, BP had lost over $100 billion in market value 
(Associated Press, 2010). 
Hamilton et al. (1993) looked at the returns of all equity mutual funds over the sample 
period (including a sample of socially responsible funds). The excess returns for each 
fund was measured by Jensen’s alpha, using the NYSE as the market rate; and the 
average return for the socially responsible funds was around -6 basis points per month. 
The authors then constructed a mutual fund benchmark by excluding all socially 
responsible funds from their list of funds. The average differences between the socially 
responsible funds and their conventional counterparts were not statistically different 
from zero, which indicated that the market did not price social responsibility 
characteristics. Investors can expect to lose nothing by investing in socially responsible 
mutual funds, as social factors do not affect returns or cost of capital. These results may 
“disappoint socially responsible investors who hope to do well while doing good. They 
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might also disappoint socially responsible investors who are willing to receive low 
returns as fair exchange for changing the world. But not all socially responsible 
investors attempt to change the world” (Hamilton et al., 1993, p. 66).  
 
Diltz (1995) looked at the private cost of SRI by analyzing the effect of ethical screens 
on a sample of common stock portfolios. Although conventional wisdom held that 
investors should not mix money and morality, the fact that by 1991 the total asset value 
of ethically screened funds exceeded $625 billion suggested that times were changing. 
The theory of market efficiency suggests that as all securities are priced to reflect public 
information, investors should not be able to earn abnormal returns by screening firms 
for ethical behaviour. One view suggests that firms displaying commendable ethical 
behaviour may earn greater long-run returns by avoiding litigation and damages 
resulting from ethically negligent behaviour. Alternatively, social screening may 
impose an additional set of constraints to the optimisation problem faced by wealth 
maximising investors and thus the question becomes: are these constraints binding?  
 
As a result of the subjective nature of ethical evaluation, Diltz (1995) examined data on 
individual firms, constructing portfolios rather than analysing data for investment 
companies that sell shares in screened portfolios. There existed a large amount of 
variability between investment funds regarding the types of screens employed and the 
degree to which firms were screened; and examination of these funds may have 
prevented observation of contrasts between screened and unscreened portfolios. The 
most comprehensive and consistent ratings applied to firms were compiled by the 
Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) and a summary of the CEP rating system can be 
found in the appendix chapter 8.2 Social Screens. Criteria such as nuclear involvement 
and South African operations were easily quantified, whereas other criteria like 
environmental performance and community outreach were subjective in nature and 
were more difficult to evaluate. For all but three of the criteria, they were rated as 
either: good, fair or poor. South African involvement and nuclear involvement were 
binary, while charitable giving had four categories. 
 
The author constructed fourteen portfolio pairs, where one portfolio in each pair 
consisted of all firms receiving the highest rating for a particular ethical screen, and the 
other consisted of all firms receiving the lowest rating. Eleven of the pairs were 
  98
designed to analyse single ethical screens, while a combination of screens was 
examined in three of the pairs. Diltz (1995) compared estimated market model alphas 
for the portfolios to determine whether significant differences in unexpected returns 
existed (controlling for systematic risk). Following Jensen (1968; cited in Diltz 1995) 
significant differences in mean alpha were taken to represent a corresponding difference 
in portfolio performance with higher mean alpha indicative of better performance.  Out 
of the fourteen pairs of portfolios, there were statistically significant differences in three 
of the pairs. Interestingly, the portfolio of firms with good environmental records 
displayed a significantly higher alpha at the five percent level. Similar findings occurred 
in the portfolios concerning defence and non-nuclear firms and these results may not be 
surprising given world political developments. 
 
The second analysis consisted of an examination of excess returns for the fourteen 
portfolio pairs using cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs). Out of the 168 
statistics for the CAAR analysis, only nineteen were statistically significant; and of 
these seven were positive and twelve were negative. The CAAR analyses indicated that 
depending on the circumstances social screens may either enhance or hinder portfolio 
performance. The screens which may enhance performance come from the environment 
and charitable giving screens, while negative effects may result from the family benefits 
screen (interestingly the South Africa screen yielded ambiguous results). Ultimately, 
Diltz (1995) interpreted the findings “to be most consistent with the overall notion that 
ethical screening of portfolios neither helps nor hinders portfolio performance” (Diltz, 
1995, p. 76). This was good news for individuals and institutions concerned with 
ownership in good corporate citizens – particularly if one views the research and its 
findings as an empirical test of the binding constraint issue mentioned previously. The 
relevant empirical question was “Are the additional ethical constraints binding, in the 
context of maximising portfolio return for a given systematic risk?” and it appeared that 
this was not the case. 
  
Guerard (2001) investigated the cost of being socially responsible by examining the 
returns of an unscreened universe versus those of a screened universe. In 1990, KLD 
developed the Domini Social Index (DSI) by excluding the S&P 500 companies that did 
not pass certain screens (South Africa, product, environmental, military, nuclear power 
and employee relations) and including 50 Non-S&P 500 stocks with good records on 
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corporate citizenship, product quality and board presentation of woman and minorities. 
Luck and Pilotte (1993; cited in Guerard, 2001) found that the DSI outperformed the 
S&P 500 due to higher growth sensitivity; and out of an annualized active return of 233 
basis points, 199 was due to specific asset selection providing evidence of a “green 
effect”. It was noted that the period examined was characterized by positive growth 
factors and size returns meaning that smaller stocks performed better than large stocks. 
The literature on the impact of social screening gave mixed conclusions and at a 
minimum it suggested that it does not cost investors to invest socially. Guerard (2001, 
p. 604) noted “that it is not ‘dumb’ to be a socially conscious investor” and it is how a 
manager implements the investment process that impacts returns as opposed to the 
social screening itself. Guerard (2001) examined the returns of Vantage’s 1300 stock 
unscreened universe and a 950 stock screened universe to determine if the returns were 
different at the 5% level. The author found no significant difference between the 
average monthly returns of the screened and unscreened universes during the sample 
period (less than a 15 basis point differential), thus an investment process that adds 
value using an unscreened universe is not impacted by social screening.  
 
Guerard (2001) stated that “if there is no long-term return difference, short-term 
variations are due to style and size biases of a screened portfolio” (Guerard, 2001, p. 
604). After examining the characteristics of the unscreened and screened universes, it 
was found that the unscreened universe had lower growth, higher market capitalisation 
and higher book-to-price sensitivities. Additionally, the socially screened out stocks had 
higher market capitalisations and were more value-oriented than the unscreened 
universe. There was a statistically significant difference between the unscreened 
universes lower price-to-book ratio, and the screened portfolios higher price-to-book-
ratio and in the very long run this represented a risk exposure to the socially responsible 
investor. The screened universe was also more sensitive to the growth factor (as 
measured by the book-to-price ratio), which helps relative performance for socially 
responsible investors when the growth factor return outperforms the value factor return. 
In conclusion, Guerard (2001) noted that there was no statistically significant difference 
between the average returns of a socially-screened and unscreened universe during the 
sample period and “performance can vary dramatically across managers, but should not 
vary due to social screening over the long term” (Guerard, 2001, p. 606). 
 
  100
Kurtz (1997) analysed various studies to determine if SRI had no effect, or no net 
effect. The author noted that the theoretical problems raised by SRI are non-trivial, and 
can include questions of market efficiency, arbitrage pricing theory and the size effect. 
After the South Africa boycott ended, there were still in excess of 800 money managers 
who handled $150 billion using social screens which highlighted the importance of SRI. 
During the analysis, three apparent contradictions were noted: despite unavoidable 
diversification costs SRI stocks did not appear to have systematically underperformed 
the market; some studies found that factors monitored by social investors could be 
associated with positive abnormal returns; and differences between screened and 
unscreened accounts have not been material thus either social screens do not harm 
investment performance, or diversification costs are being offset by information effects. 
The question becomes, does screening have no effect on performance, or no net effect. 
Regarding diversification, SRI portfolios are active portfolios by definition as their 
screens make them different from any common benchmark and Kurtz (1997) suggested 
that since the impact of social screens is non-random they create uncompensated risk – 
which is the most widely cited objection to SRI. Grossman and Sharpe (1986) found 
that a South-Africa-free portfolio had a residual standard deviation of 2.51% relative to 
the NYSE; and Freeman and Winchester (1994; cited in Kurtz, 1997) found that simply 
removing SRI stocks from their investible universe increased uncompensated risk by 
more than 2%. 
 
Earlier studies found that screened portfolios tend to have “smaller average 
capitalisations, higher price-to-book ratios, higher P/E ratios and more favourable 
‘excellence’ ratios than their unscreened counterparts” (Kurtz, 1997, p. 38). Kurtz 
(1997) stated that SRI exposures can be redressed; and the search for better methods led 
to the use of arbitrage pricing theory (APT; described by Ross and Roll, 1976; cited in 
Kurtz, 1997) which rejects the notion that one portfolio dominates all others. With APT, 
two portfolios are good substitutes as long as the APT factor exposures are equivalent 
and the portfolios are large enough to diversify away idiosyncratic risk. When using 
fundamental factor models it was found that underweighting in the market capitalisation 
factor persisted because there were not enough stocks that were big enough to substitute 
for excluded companies. DiBartolomeo (1996; cited in Kurtz, 1997) found that when a 
screened portfolio was optimised to the S&P 500 using the APT model, there was a 
mean monthly difference of only -0.01%.  
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For information effects the question was whether an SRI effect existed or not. As SRI 
investors believed social screens contributed to the DSI’s performance in the 1990s, 
they disputed an argument put forth by Malkiel (1971; cited in Kurtz, 1997) when he 
argued against the South Africa boycott. He believed that innovative and growth-
minded companies will market their products worldwide, resulting in a relationship 
between profitability and the likelihood that the company will operate in all parts of the 
world, including South Africa. To the extent that these characteristics can affect future 
returns, altering the composition of the portfolio by divesting from South Africa might 
reduce the yield. SRI proponents responded that innovative and growth-minded 
managements will be more likely to have superior environmental programs, good 
employee relations and corporate citizenship; and Waddock and Graves (1997b; cited in 
Kurtz, 1997) found evidence of this quality of management. Thus, these firms would be 
better represented in the DSI than in the S&P 500 and might thereby improve returns; 
and it seemed the historical performance supported this position. Since corporations do 
not operate in a vacuum social responsibility could be a way for them to improve 
relations with important constituencies; however attempts to measure a “social factor” 
directly had failed: 
 DiBartolomeo (1996) and Kurtz and DiBartolomeo (1996) [both cited in Kurtz, 
1997] found that the returns of the DSI were fully explained by its fundamental 
factor bets. 
 Grossman and Sharpe (1986) found a small negative effect of the South Africa 
screen after accounting for all other factors.  
 Luck and Pilotte (1993; cited in Kurtz, 1997) found that the Barra fundamental 
factor model could not completely account for the performance of the DSI 
during 1990 to 1993, and an active return of 9 basis points per month remained 
unexplained. More recent studies with different methodologies, data sets and 
time periods have come to support the idea that social screens may be associated 
with positive abnormal returns. 
Some multifactor studies of the DSI (Luck and Pilotte, 1993; Kurtz and DiBartolomeo, 
1996; and DiBartolomeo, 1996; all cited in Kurtz, 1997) suggested that its performance 
was largely replicable by matching factor exposures, and Kurtz (1997) noted 
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proponents of SRI usually reject the reductionism implied by these findings with one of 
the following arguments:  
Sign of Skilful Management: Socially responsible behaviour may be an indicator of 
management competence (Alexander & Buchholz, 1982) and good managers should 
be more likely to excel at social responsibility than their less clever counterparts.  
Result of Prosperity: Social responsibility may be a by-product of financial success 
as prosperous businesses have less incentive to cheat and more of a stake in protecting 
their names. This justifies avoiding criminal behaviour, having good employee 
relations and investing in environmental programs and philanthropy. Kurtz (1997) 
stated that for researchers investigating this argument, they would need to explain 
why social responsibility is not a coincident indicator and why some of the most-
excluded companies generate significant free cash flows, e.g. General Electric, Philip 
Morris etc. 
Catalyst for Change: Some evidence suggested that SRI programs can stimulate 
operating efficiencies, particularly in the environmental area. Feldman, Soyka and 
Ameer (1997; cited in Kurtz, 1997) and Diltz (1995) reported positive returns to their 
environmental variables.  
Signalling Mechanism: Socially responsible behaviour may be interpreted as a signal 
from management. If management expects increased free cash flows, managers who 
value financial flexibility may choose not to allocate these funds to dividends or share 
buybacks. Instead, they distribute the capital to areas that improve customer and 
employee perceptions of the company, but from where it can be reclaimed if 
necessary without much trouble.  
Kurtz (1997) stated that employee relations provided an example of the difficulties 
faced by researchers who want to find an SRI effect where there was some theoretical 
justification for it. Krugman (1992; cited in Kurtz, 1997) noted firms may offer higher 
wages and benefits in exchange for loyalty from their workforce. This contradicts the 
conventional view that gains to labour come at a cost to shareholders outlined by 
Hotelling (1932; cited in Kurtz, 1997) and market participants may have overlooked the 
possibility that “progressive employment policies make the pie larger, so that workers’ 
gains need not come at the expense of shareholders” (Kurtz, 1997, p. 42). Relationships 
between stock returns and these variables might be expected however many studies 
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failed to find them, and it may be that the market already correctly priced the social 
information. Although this is good news, the down side is that gaining an understanding 
of these issues presents no investment advantage. SRI embodies many different 
disciplines each with its own measurement challenges and subjective inputs and “the 
risk that the market already understands the relationship, or will come to understand it, 
is always present” (Kurtz, 1997, p.42).  
 
Kurtz (1997) noted that screened portfolios may suffer diversification costs which have 
been offset by information effects. In this case the problem is that information effects 
are likely to be arbitraged away when they become known whereas diversification costs 
are permanent in unadjusted portfolios. If social screens have no impact once factor 
exposures have been accounted for, then portfolio managers could apply the screens and 
match the factor exposures to a benchmark resulting in a portfolio that is consistent with 
their ethics and simultaneously offers competitive returns. This would make compliance 
with statutory diversification requirements such as The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) easy; although, it appeared that few portfolio managers had taken 
this approach. Portfolio managers wishing to get rid of active exposures of social 
screens may do so without incurring material costs, however “those who choose to 
accept active exposures, believing that an SRI effect will more than offset the 
diversification costs, have not yet shown why this is a compelling investment strategy” 
(Kurtz, 1997, p. 43).  
 
Sauer (1997) assessed the impact of social responsibility screens on investment 
performance, while focusing on the evidence from the Domini 400 Social Index and the 
Domini Equity Mutual Fund. The performance of this screened portfolio was compared 
to two unrestricted benchmark portfolios in an attempt to provide a better indication of 
the potential costs associated with subjecting the investment universe to social 
screening. Sauer (1997) used various performance measures to compare the DSI to the 
S&P 500 and the CRSP Value Weighted Market Indexes. The results showed that 
although the DSI displayed higher average monthly raw returns as well as variances, the 
differences were not significant. Using Jensen’s alpha, the results showed once again 
that the alphas were insignificantly different from zero (which was consistent with the 
findings of Hamilton et al., 1993). This suggested that screens do not necessarily have 
an adverse impact on the risk-adjusted returns for the well diversified investor. Sauer 
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(1997) noted the more appropriate risk measure for a socially responsible investor 
might be total risk, since if implementing these social screens restricts the investment 
universe then investors may subject themselves to otherwise diversifiable risk. 
Therefore, the Sharpe index may be a more relevant risk-adjusted measure of 
performance for investors that are less than well diversified. The author looked at the 
differences in Sharpe indexes between the DSI and the two benchmarks and found that 
once again there were no significant differences between these measures. Sauer (1997) 
stated that this was surprising since the CRSP index would be more efficient in 
eliminating diversifiable risk through a passive diversification strategy; however, the 
empirical evidence again indicated that the use of social screens did not necessarily 
have an adverse impact on the risk-adjusted returns for the less than well diversified 
investor.  
 
Sauer (1997) examined the additional screening and monitoring costs that may 
adversely impact the performance available to socially responsible investors. For this, 
the author looked at the performance of the Domini Social Equity Mutual Fund (DSE) 
relative to the Vanguard Index 500 Mutual Fund and the Vanguard Extended Market 
Mutual Fund. The raw returns, alphas and Sharpe Index values for the mutual funds 
indicated that there were no statistically significant differences. This suggested that the 
additional screening and monitoring costs associated with implementing social 
screening did not have a negative impact on performance. Sauer (1997)’s evidence 
indicated that “the application of social responsibility screens does not necessarily have 
an adverse impact on investment performance” (Sauer, 1997, p. 148) regardless of the 
market proxy selected. The empirical evidence presented clearly indicated that 
“investors can choose socially responsible investments that are consistent with their 
value system and beliefs without being forced to sacrifice performance” (Sauer, 1997, 
p. 148). 
 
DiBartolomeo and Kurtz (1999) examined the effect social screening had on portfolios, 
and how it was possible to manage the various risk exposures inherent in this process. 
“Equity portfolios whose selection of securities is subject to social responsibility 
screening represent different sets of economic opportunities from, and hence generally 
produce different returns from, those of more broadly based market indices” 
(DiBartolomeo & Kurtz, 1999, p. 3). Critics claim that if markets are efficient then 
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screens impose diversification costs, whereas if they are inefficient then social 
screening interferes with active management strategies. The performance of socially 
responsible portfolios have indicated no significant difference between conventional 
portfolios and screened portfolios. The strong performance of these portfolios have 
asked the question of what is the source behind these returns, and Luck (1993,1998; 
cited in DiBartolomeo & Kurtz, 1999) found that half of the DSI’s outperformance was 
due to stock selection  - a function of the social screens. With the possibility of a “social 
factor” the authors attempted to determine the sources of returns through the use of 
multi-factor models, and they found that the differences between the DSI and the S&P 
500 were not from the socially responsible behaviour of the firms, but rather from the 
economic and sector exposures resulting from the screening process. The difference in 
return of 0.18% between the DSI and the S&P 500 was broken up into 0.06% for the 
DSI’s higher beta, while the 0.12% extraordinary return consisted of 0.02% from bets 
on fundamental characteristics (size etc.) and 0.1% was attributable to differences in 
industry composition. Thus, stock returns were zero to two decimal places suggesting 
that the DSI performed in accordance with its factor exposures – casting doubt on the 
existence of a social factor. Even with the APT optimisation removing differences in 
macroeconomic exposures between the optimised DSI and the S&P 500, the industry 
contribution was still significant and this suggested that some industry-specific risks 
cannot be hedged away even with sophisticated risk management techniques.  
 
Statman (2000) assessed the performance of various socially responsible mutual funds, 
as well as looked at the relative performance of the DSI and other stock indexes. For the 
sample period, the DSI beat the S&P 500 using raw and risk-adjusted returns, however 
using alpha the difference was found to be insignificant (consistent with Sauer, 1997). 
For Statman (2000)’s analysis of socially responsible mutual funds the performance of 
each fund was compared with that of the DSI and S&P 500. On average the raw returns 
of socially responsible funds trailed the returns of the S&P 500 by 6.26 percentage 
points a year (pps), while they trailed the DSI by 8.03 pps. A major concern of socially 
responsible investors is to have performance consistent with conventional funds; thus, 
Statman (2000) compared the performance of socially responsible funds with the 
performance of conventional funds of equal asset size. It was found that the socially 
responsible funds performed better than the conventional funds; however the 
differences were not significant and it seemed that “the mean performance of socially 
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responsible funds was negative but no worse than the mean performance of 
conventional funds” (Statman, 2000, p. 34). While some investors want to invest in line 
with their beliefs, others want to change the world and these investors can use 
investment or political actions. Investment actions are banners in the battle that rally 
people who use political actions (regulation, taxes, consumer boycotts) as swords. 
Investment actions can also act as swords by withdrawing capital from socially 
irresponsible firms. For these firms, their demand for capital depends on the 
profitability of investment projects and on the cost of capital, thus when socially 
responsible investors sell they shift the company’s capital supply function in Figure 
15 from S1 to S2 (labelled Effect of Investment Action), as a withdrawal of capital 
raises the cost of capital. 
 
Figure 15 - The Effect of Investment Action and Political Action (Statman, 2000, p. 36) 
Importantly, the supply function of capital slopes upward if higher returns induce 
investors to increase the supply of capital. The cost of capital to the company is the 
return to the investors who supply the capital, thus the shift in the supply function 
increases the cost of capital to the company, as well as the return to its remaining 
shareholders (unless the demand function is perfectly elastic). If the company’s cost of 
capital increases, and the increase in the cost of capital forces the company to reduce its 
capital investment (from I1 to I2). Statman (2000) stated that socially responsible 
investors can raise the cost of capital of irresponsible firms only in the absence of 
numerous conventional investors who are willing to provide substitute capital at the 
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same cost. Thus, socially responsible investors can raise the cost of capital only if the 
capital supply function is less than perfectly elastic; and Statman (2000) suggests this is 
the case. Kinder and Domini (1997) did not consider this effect as the main objective of 
SRI, nor did they consider it to be an effective sword in the battle for social 
responsibility. Similarly, Teoh et al. (1999) doubted whether consumer boycotts have 
any effect on irresponsible companies after they found no financial impact of 
divestment. 
 
For Kinder and Domini (1997) investment actions served only as banners and political 
actions, the swords. These banners rally the faithful to successful political actions, and 
these actions result in taxes and settlements that are costly to the irresponsible firm. 
These taxes and settlements diminish the number of projects companies can undertake, 
and the reduction of investment can be seen in Figure 15 (labelled Effect of Political 
Action). The imposition of taxes and settlements shifts the demand for capital from D1 
to D2, the cost of capital increases from C1 to C2 (however the return to shareholders 
decreases from R1 to R2) and the increase in cost of capital leads to a reduction in the 
capital investment from I1 to I2. The difference between C2 and R2 is the drain from the 
company in the form of taxes or settlement payments. Both political actions and 
investment actions reduce the number of investment projects undertaken by 
irresponsible companies. Investment actions can lead to a downward shift in the supply 
of capital, which reduces the number of projects the firm can undertake, however it also 
increases the returns for conventional investors who remain loyal to the company. A 
downward shift in the demand for capital through political actions reduces the number 
of projects without increasing the expected returns for conventional investors, with the 
extra return instead going to the government. Statman (2000) concluded that “pooling 
investing power for something other than making money is no worse at making money 
than pooling it for money alone” (Statman, 2000, p. 38). The socially responsible 
investment movement may seem unusual to some investment professionals because the 
utilitarian features of money are being mixed with the value-expressive features of 
social responsibility, but Statman (2000) believed this resistance was odd as most 
products share both utilitarian and value-expressive features.  
 
Stone, Guerard, Gultekin and Adams (2001), henceforth Stone et al. (2001), used an 
illustrative security return forecast as well as the construction of a forecast-based cross 
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section of matched portfolios to study how social screening impacted active portfolio 
management. The authors expanded the generality and robustness of their major 
conclusion which was that there was no significant cost to social screening - which also 
meant that there was no significant benefit to social screening. By no significant cost, 
the authors meant no statistically significant difference in risk-adjusted return for the 
performance possibility cross-section. Stone et al. (2001)’s review of previous literature 
found that superior returns were attributable to greater risk, higher growth and smaller 
size outweighing any negative impact of a higher P/E ratio; and the authors’ results 
suggested that performance from social screening could be sensitive to the market 
environment. Both size and price-earnings factors exhibited high year-to-year variation 
in performance impact, thus “in a market adverse to risk bearing, growth, size, and/or 
high price-earnings ratios, socially responsible portfolios could do worse because of 
their factor exposures” (Stone et al., 2001, p. 21). The authors’ construction of forecast 
portfolios matched over entire cross-sections on risk, growth, size and dividend yield 
eliminated most cross-sectional impact from these factors thus their conclusion of no 
significant cost/benefit from social screens was robust to these factor exposures. 
Additionally, it held for major sub-periods, and the finding was consistent for long-run 
as well as short-run averages.  
 
Guerard (2001) found that the universe of unscreened stocks had an average market 
capitalisation of $3.433 billion, while the screened universe had a mean capitalisation of 
$2.796 billion; thus, the screened stocks tended to have larger market capitalisations. In 
contrast, McWilliams and Siegel (2001)’s framework regarding supply and demand for 
CSR posited that a firm’s level of CSR will be positively related with size; therefore the 
larger a firm is, the more likely it is to display good CSR attributes. This leads to the 
hypothesis that depending on the way one chooses to invest (social screening or social 
tilting) the fundamental factors of the portfolio and ultimately the performance may be 
affected. Stone et al. (2001) noted that screening stocks out of an investment universe 
based on a social criterion decreases the size of the possible investment universe and by 
definition cannot increase possible returns (as any stock selection from the screened 
universe can still be chosen from the unscreened universe). Regarding positive social 
tilting, although no firms are explicitly removed those exhibiting positive social 
performance are favoured in the stock selection, which could increase a portfolio’s 
returns if there is a positive relationship between social performance and financial 
  109
performance. Stone et al. (2001) focused on social screening, and factor assessments of 
their socially responsible portfolios concluded that most portfolios were smaller in size, 
confirming the above hypothesis.  
 
An important question when looking at the theory behind SRI is why do investors feel 
the need to be socially responsive, and what are the differences between these people 
and conventional investors? Williams (2005) used data from an extensive survey of 
stakeholder attitudes to CSR to determine key observations regarding the characteristics 
of the different types of investors. The author focused on six countries which had the 
highest number of shareholders, as well as the most highly developed SRI focus in their 
investment industries: Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, UK and U.S.A. 
Shareholders were taken to be investors who owned shares directly or indirectly 
through a mutual fund, pension plan or other retirement fund and SRI investors were 
defined as respondents who answered that a company’s social responsibility influenced 
their investment decisions (conventional investors either considered it but did not act on 
the information, or did not even consider this information). Williams (2005) developed 
a set of hypotheses regarding the demographics, attitudes and behaviour, investor 
strategy and views on financial return for SRI and conventional investors.  
 
The results of the study showed that in general demographic factors did not appear to 
distinguish between conventional and SRI investors. Some of the findings were that SRI 
investors were more highly educated and tended to have higher income. Williams 
(2005) found that gender did not appear to be important in any of the countries contrary 
to what some earlier studies had suggested. Attitudinal variables were better at 
distinguishing between investor types, where SRI investors prioritised social aims over 
financial aims (in every country except for the U.S.). SRI investors were also found to 
be more likely to follow through with their ethical priorities into their overall 
purchasing, in that they were more likely to punish firms for poor CSR by changing 
buying patterns, or discouraging others from buying from companies with low ethical 
standards. Interestingly, most respondents did not agree that firms should only pay 
attention to shareholder objectives which contradicted Friedman (1970)’s hypothesis. In 
terms of company performance “all investors appear to believe that firms with good 
CSR records have higher profits, whereas as discussed earlier the actual evidence for a 
relationship between CSR and firm performance is at best mixed” (Williams, 2005, p. 
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17). This is interesting since although conventional investors perceived CSR to be 
correlated with better financial performance, they did not act on this belief.  
 
Derwall and Koedijk (2005) recognised the growing importance of SRI within the 
investment arena and analysed mutual funds that invested in socially responsible bonds. 
Conventional wisdom states that markets incorporate information quickly and 
efficiently therefore observed portfolio returns reflect compensation for portfolio risk 
and the best portfolio is one which is efficiently diversified. Social investments 
(inherently a subset of the investment universe) face a financial penalty for avoiding 
assets that could enhance portfolio return. This coupled with the costs of collecting data 
and ranking firms leads opponents of SRI to argue that socially responsible funds 
should underperform. Proponents of SRI believe that CSP is a determinant of long-term 
performance which can be overlooked by a myopic investment community. As markets 
correct their pricing errors, undervalued SRI stocks undergo price corrections and earn 
abnormal positive returns. Derwall and Koedijk (2005) compared socially responsible 
funds with a matched portfolio of conventional funds and employed various measures 
to assess the performance of these bond funds. Using Jensen’s alpha the authors found 
that all one-factor specifications suggested SRI funds and conventional funds do not 
earn statistically different market-risk adjusted returns. Due to the inability of the 
single-index models to explain the returns of all bond classes, the authors turned to the 
APT model, using a number of determinants (passive indexes) as well as fundamental 
economic variables to determine abnormal performance.  
 
The results indicated that SRI funds produced a higher alpha compared to conventional 
funds, with the difference estimated at 0.34% per annum – however it was not 
statistically significant. When the authors conditioned fund performance on economic 
cycles they found that the differential between SRI funds and conventional funds varied 
strongly with the state of the economy. During periods of expansion performance was 
similar, however during economic downturns SRI funds delivered superior factor-
adjusted returns - the estimated differential in alpha was 3.75% and significant at the 
10% level. It was hypothesised that the performance of SRI funds is relatively more 
important during downturns because of the possibility that investors are more risk 
averse and consequently less willing to forego return in order to be socially conscious. 
Thus assuming that investors are relatively more performance sensitive in downturns 
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the authors concluded that “SRI bond mutual funds have outclassed their conventional 
counterparts during periods when such outperformance seems to matter the most” 
(Derwall & Koedijk, 2005, p. 16). Testing the long run performance it was found that 
investors do not have to forego return when investing in bonds constrained by social 
screens and Derwall and Koedijk (2005) concluded that SRI is viable for private 
bondholders and for large institutional players that face strategic asset allocation 
problems. 
 
Barnett and Salomon (2006) examined the relationship between CSR and CFP within 
mutual funds from the investor perspective; and distinguished between the different 
social screens and their effects on portfolio performance. Evidence has shown that SRI 
investments tended to perform well either being on par with conventional investments 
or even outperforming. SRI detractors contend that the increase in financial 
performance in recent times has been a direct result of slacker social screening 
processes which offers support for a negative relationship: as less social screening 
resulted in higher financial performance. In contrast proponents of SRI believe that the 
better a firm’s social performance, the easier it can obtain quality employees, attract 
resources, market products, and create unforeseen opportunities - thus defining social 
responsibility as a source of competitive advantage. Firms with higher CSP (the focused 
investments of SRI investors) would be expected to perform better than their 
conventional peers and deliver higher returns. Since mutual funds seek to maximise 
profit and are also concerned with diversification, funds that have strict social criteria 
may be unable to adequately diversify exposing the fund to additional risk. SRI 
supporters note that although the breadth of firms is lacking, socially responsible firms 
are better managed than the average firm and generate higher financial returns, 
offsetting the diversification costs; thus, this resulted in two opposing views:  
Financial costs of social responsibility: CSR is costly and puts firms at a competitive 
disadvantage. Through screening, SRI funds restrict their investments to firms that 
have higher operating costs, and below-average financial performance. Additionally, 
modern portfolio theory predicts that screening results in a lack of diversification and 
an introduction of specific risk which decreases risk-adjusted returns. 
Financial benefits of social responsibility: Evidence shows SRI funds have yielded 
equal or excessive returns compared to conventional funds (Diltz, 1995; Hamilton et 
  112
al., 1993). Although the screening process limits diversification, portfolio theory does 
not recognise the possible benefits that social screening may bring. While managers 
are constrained in their choice of stocks, the pool from which they choose is superior 
to the overall market, and likely to provide superior returns due to superior 
management talent, as well as better management of key stakeholders.  
Barnett and Salomon (2006) noted that comparing screened and unscreened portfolios 
confounds a range of screening practices within SRI funds and therefore the variances 
within screened funds must be examined to determine the nature of the relationship. 
Combining stakeholder and modern portfolio theory the resultant idea was that there is 
a curvilinear relationship between CSP and CFP. Efficient markets predict that the 
entire universe of stocks has a uniform distribution of returns, with the stocks in the 
centre earning the market return and the left and right tails earning less and more 
respectively. Managers drawing random stocks can expect portfolios that will earn the 
market return as long as they are diversified, but since social screening constrains the 
ability to diversify it is expected that an SRI fund will underperform the market. 
However, a manager using social screens may have better odds at picking stocks in the 
right tail - as from stakeholder theory, firms engaging in CSR are likely to achieve 
superior performance and be in the right tail of the distribution. This situation is shown 
in Figure 16:  
 
Figure 16 - The Effects of Social Screening on the Universe of Stock Choices 
(Barnett and Salomon, 2006, p. 1106) 
Using screens excludes firms with poor stakeholder relations and funnels in firms with 
good relations; therefore, SRI managers are more likely to select firms that achieve 
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above-average returns. SRI funds with weaker social responsibility standards can 
choose from a broader universe of stocks, increasing diversification and risk-adjusted 
performance. As the social standards increase, the pool of possible investments shrinks, 
decreasing the possibility of a well-diversified portfolio, however this is offset by the 
improved selection of firms inherent in the more stringent screening. As a fund bears 
more specific risk by choosing from an increasingly smaller pool of stocks, the pool 
becomes richer and the manager is more likely to pick a stock with superior returns. 
Funds that are “stuck in the middle” may bear all the costs of either pure strategy 
(diversification or social screening) without gaining any of the benefits. This leads the 
authors to their key hypothesis (H1) that “the relationship between the intensity of 
social screening and financial performance for SRI funds is curvilinear (U-shaped)” 
(Barnett & Salomon, 2006, p. 1107). This hypothesis is similar to the results found by 
Brammer and Millington (2008) when they examined the relationship between CFP and 
CSP. They found that a firm which is in the middle category does not avoid the costs of 
CSR initiatives yet does not spend enough to receive the benefits, resulting in inferior 
financial performance. Although earlier papers such as Bowman and Haire (1975) have 
suggested an inverted U-shape for the relationship, advances in social issues as well as 
managements’ responses to these issues may mean that there is no more “optimal” level 
of CSR spending, since the theory predicts being “stuck in the middle” may be 
detrimental to performance. It was argued that either extreme of CSP resulted in inferior 
performance, however as can be seen in both Brammer and Millington (2008) and 
Barnett and Salomon (2006), the extremes performed better. 
 
Barnett and Salomon (2006) found no linear relationship between risk-adjusted 
performance and screening intensity; however they found a positive and significant 
coefficient once they introduced a squared screening intensity term, implying a 
curvilinear, non-monotonic relationship - supporting H1. Once performance reached a 
minimum at seven screens, although it increased continuously until the maximum of 
twelve screens, performance was still lower than that achieved with one screen (a 
decrease of around 2.4% per year) as seen in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 - Non-Monotonic Effects of Screening (Barnett & Salomon, 2006, p. 1115) 
 
Barnett and Salomon (2006)’s finding supported portfolio and stakeholder theories to 
varying degrees: although screening forces a reduction in investment choices, if 
properly implemented social screening can lead to an increase in financial returns and 
“the financial performance of those limited firms chosen through intensive social 
screening offsets costs from loss of portfolio diversification to some degree” (Barnett & 
Salomon, 2006, p. 1117). Funds with many screens eliminate underperforming firms, 
whereas funds with few screens receive the benefits of increased diversification, thus 
funds that are stuck in the middle may not be able to diversify away unsystematic risk, 
nor eliminate enough underperforming firms to improve CFP.  
Lozano, Albareda and Balaguer (2006) stated that a necessary element for the 
development of SRI is to achieve acceptance that SRI is not an end in itself but rather a 
fundamental element of CSR. According to the authors SRI can be understood as “the 
most widely accepted expression of support from the financial markets for good CSR 
practices” (Lozano, Albareda & Balaguer, 2006, p. 313). Thus the aim of SRI is to 
influence businesses to achieve a more sustainable development, and this 
macroeconomic view of SRI (as a driver of CSR) means that collective investment 
needs to be considered. Among their chief conclusions, the authors stated that in order 
to consolidate the link between CSR and SRI, engagement with companies on decisions 
linked to investments must be improved on – as this would allow business to respond to 
the social and ethical concerns raised by conscientious investors. 
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3. Corporate Social Responsibility in Today’s world 
 
In this dissertation, although CSR has been looked at in terms of externalities, a deeper 
look at the corporate governance aspect of CSR may be warranted in terms of South 
African current affairs. In recent times the newspapers have been inundated with stories 
about government parastatals being overrun by bad governance practices and dodgy 
dealings. These serve as good examples of what can go wrong, and why shareholders 
and other stakeholders need to be vigilant. One example of social factors affecting 
decisions was evident in The Star newspaper from 10 March 2010. There was an article 
detailing how a Chinese factory producing figures of the 2010 World Cup mascot had 
stopped production after the merchandise company for FIFA withdrew manufacturing 
approval as the result of an investigation into alleged sweatshop conditions. In a 
statement from the company, it was revealed that “the audit identified a number of non-
conformances against Global Brands’ CSR policy” and as a result approval was 
suspended (Mkhwanazi, 2010). This is interesting, in that traditional CSR values and 
policies would applaud the decision to suspend approval of the Chinese factory until the 
sweatshop allegations were clarified. In the next chapter on developing economies, 
Bernstein (2010) makes a case that sweatshops are essentially a necessary evil due to 
the economic position of emerging economies. Her argument is that by enforcing 
unreasonable and unrealistic restrictions on undeveloped economies, their growth will 
be stunted, poverty will not be alleviated, and it will take longer for the countries to 
grow themselves to a level where they can afford to be socially responsible. Thus, in 
this light, it is important to consider all aspects of social responsibility as although it 
may sound unethical on the surface; the underlying reasons behind such situations may 
necessitate a paradigm shift in our thinking towards developing economies. 
 
In 2000, Anderson & Cavanagh produced a report for the Institute for Policy Studies on 
the Top 200 economic entities in the world where one of their key findings was that out 
of the top 100 economic entities 51 of these were corporations and 49 were countries. A 
cursory examination using lists provided by Wikipedia indicated that this finding more 
or less holds today. Although Bernstein (2010) argued against taking too much out of 
this superficial finding, it does help to see that big business truly carries some influence, 
and inherent in their size lie numerous externalities which if not managed could be 
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detrimental to society. Although fiction has produced the adage “with great power 
comes great responsibility” it seems to have even more meaning in this context; thus 
without restricting business too much, attention should be paid to their ‘responsibilities’ 
to society, whether it comes from the externalities they may produce or just from the 
due course of business.  
 
Professor Mervyn King was quoted in a 2009 SRI Index press release as stating that as 
sustainability is becoming more important “companies cannot separate governance, 
strategy and sustainability.  The State has a constitutional obligation on sustainable 
ecological development and the Commissioner, under the new Companies Act, will 
have the power to stop reckless business.  It is reckless to act oblivious to the parallel 
crises of financial, climate change, ecosystems and biodiversity” (SRI Index, 2009a, 
para. 10). This statement indicates the importance of pre-empting any action by the 
government in terms of regulating company activities. Thus, if companies can recognise 
their impacts and correct them before they are forced to do so by external constituents, 
they can avoid costs as well as bad publicity. This relates to Joseph Stiglitz (cited in 
Petrillo, 2009) when he gave a speech in August 20086 that stated SRI anticipates 
broader social movements by excluding stocks due to trends that the entire market will 
have to respond to, and in this way SRI is thinking ahead. In light of changing ethical 
and social norms as well as acceptable behaviour, it becomes untenable to continue 
business activities in ways that society does not approve of. By maintaining a healthy 
relationship with external stakeholders as well as taking cognisance of their concerns 
for the future; it becomes easier to predict what future issues may become more 
mainstream and affect all participants in the market (voluntarily or otherwise). In this 
way, anticipating the market through socially responsible behaviour can lead to 
competitive advantage.  
 
One of the most succinct examples of positive externalities being generated by socially 
responsible activities was given in Porter and Kramer (2006) where they discussed the 
situation of Nestlé in India. The authors noted that Nestlé’s approach to working with 
small farmers “exemplifies the symbiotic relationship between social progress and 
competitive advantage” (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 11). In 1962 when Nestlé wanted to 
                                                 
6 Stiglitz gave a speech at an event organized by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance.  It can be viewed 
here: http://media01.smartcom.no/Microsite/dss_01.aspx?eventid=3386 
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enter the Indian market they were given permission to build a dairy in a region where 
poverty was severe and people were without electricity, transportation, telephones or 
medical care. The typical farmer owned less than five acres of poorly irrigated and 
infertile soil, and produced just enough milk for their own consumption. Additionally, 
due to the lack of refrigeration and transportation, milk could not travel far and was 
frequently contaminated. Nestlé was in India to do business (not to engage in CSR) and 
its value chain depended on establishing local sources of milk from a large, diversified 
base of small farmers. In order to establish this value chain required Nestlé to transform 
the competitive context and as a result generated tremendous shared value for the 
company as well as the region.  
 
Nestlé built refrigeration dairies as collection points in each town and sent trucks to the 
dairies to collect the milk. With the trucks went veterinarians, nutritionists, quality 
assurance experts as well as medicines and nutritional supplements for sick animals. 
Training sessions were held for local farmers where they learned how to improve the 
quality of the milk, and they began to use previously unaffordable techniques that fed 
cows, increased crop yields, produced surplus wheat and rice, and ultimately raised the 
standard of living. When the milk factory first opened there were 180 local farmers 
supplying milk; whereas at the time of Porter and Kramer (2006)’s article, there were 
more than 75 000 farmers in the region and Nestlé collected the milk twice daily from 
more than 650 village dairies. Milk production increased 50-fold, and as the quality has 
improved the farmers were able to get higher prices than those set by the government. 
Following from these increased payments farmers have been able to obtain credit that 
allowed competing dairies and milk factories to open. The region where Nestlé opened 
its milk factory has a significantly higher standard of living than other regions, where 
ninety percent of the homes have electricity, most have telephones and all the villages 
have primary schools. The region has five times the number of doctors as neighbouring 
regions, and the increased purchasing power of the local farmers has expanded the 
market for Nestlé’s products, further supporting the firm’s economic success (Porter & 
Kramer, 2006, p. 11). Ultimately the firms commitment to working with small farmers 
is central to its strategy as it enables a stable supply of high quality commodities 
without paying middlemen; and in each case where Nestlé has set up factories, 
introduced technologies and helped communities, Nestlé has prospered as well as the 
community. The socially responsible behaviour in the above example has become a part 
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of Nestlé’s strategy to remain competitive, and by investing in the community it helped 
build up a competitive advantage, as well as helped develop the economic progress of 
the society where it operated. 
 
In recent times it has become hard to pick up a newspaper or financial publication 
without finding some news about social responsibility, going green or sustainable 
business. It is stemming from this “demand” that this study attempts to examine the 
underlying relationships between social and financial performance, especially in a 
South African context. The last part is important due to the fact that being an emerging 
market, social responsibility may mean different things for this country. Since CSR 
often aims to solve global issues, the discussion around these topics have tended to be 
similarly global, but the problem with this (and a valid point raised by Bernstein, 2010, 
in the next chapter) is that many of the developed economies went through stages in 
their growth where they could not afford such high social and environmental practices. 
Thus, if South Africa were to take first world ambitions and goals; and impress these 
upon local business there may have detrimental effects to the country’s economic 
development. This and other key issues related to the idea of CSR in developing 
economies are covered in the following chapter. 
 
3.1 Corporate Responsibility in Developing Economies 
 
Bernstein (2010) made a case for business in developing nations where one of the 
central themes was CSR, and specifically its role in emerging economies. Unfortunately 
the author framed CSR as inherently anti-business in that the responsibilities put on 
companies do more harm than good and advocates of CSR seem to be leaning towards 
anti-capitalist ideas that may sound helpful, but under closer inspection reveal to be 
devastating to business as a whole, and developing economies in particular. Although 
Bernstein (2010) does not argue that business can do no wrong, she tries to present a 
new approach to business and society where the inherent good of business is 
recognised. One of her most important and frequent ideas is that business does good 
simply by doing business and making profit. As cited from the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development, successful companies create both shareholder value and 
operate responsibly. They meet customers’ needs for goods and services; they create 
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jobs and pay wages; provide pensions and health plans; innovate products that 
contribute to human progress; pay taxes; and through efficiency gains reduce the 
consumption of resources. When businesses try to be sustainable, it goes beyond 
generating short-term shareholder value to building trust and maintaining a healthy 
business environment and all of the above benefits are created in the normal course of 
responding to the market (Bernstein, 2010, p. 348). 
 
In terms of the environment, Bernstein (2010) argued that global policies regarding 
climate change are far from clear and exceed the competence and remit of private 
enterprise. Although this does not mean individual companies should not clean up their 
emissions it is a different matter from developing international measures to combat 
global warming (Bernstein, 2010, p. 106). This argument may seem reasonable since 
even if big business makes an effort to change; without getting governments and 
subsequently all other enterprises to follow suit it may not be sufficient. Although the 
goal of a more sustainable business environment is the same, Bernstein (2010) 
suggested this should be headed by governments affected with the public interest as 
opposed to private corporations. Previous literature on corporate environmental impacts 
dealt primarily with business practices in developed countries (marked with extensive 
government regulation) and although labelled CSR, business decisions in this field 
frequently represented normal business practices rather than new initiatives in corporate 
responsibility. Additionally, many companies have voluntarily accepted greater 
responsibility for the environmental impact of what they produce, purchase and sell 
(Bernstein, 2010, p. 112). This argument fails to appreciate that, as Stiglitz (cited in 
Petrillo, 2009) suggested, SRI is thinking ahead; thus, a firm acting in accordance with 
its CSR initiatives today may in fact be acting in accordance with normal behaviour in a 
few years time. It is through this anticipation that socially responsible companies can 
foresee future regulation as well as avoid future litigation - and which the author labels 
normal business practice. Bernstein (2010, p. 122) also stated that many claimed 
responsibility successes are things companies would have done anyway as new 
technologies or societal standards changed. This again, however, demonstrates that 
using CSR to prompt these actions before society demands may save companies time 
and resources. When everyone else is forced to comply, the necessary changes have 
already been implemented; and this foresight may result in a competitive advantage for 
the firm.  
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It was noted that the reputation of companies has not affected their ability to hire/retain 
employees, and few companies have been punished or rewarded by financial markets 
for their social performance. CSR is neither necessary nor sufficient for business 
success, however many firms act as if it matters. If CSR is viewed as a strategic 
opportunity then it can be likened to many opportunities that are not necessary or 
sufficient for business success; but which can have strong positive impacts especially in 
terms of competitive advantage and differentiation strategies. Unfortunately, many 
companies now focus on somewhat generic corporate social investment initiatives and 
Bernstein (2010, p. 267) noted that in general a strategic, long-term, fact-based 
approach is lacking from most companies’ efforts, while these are generally present in 
other parts of the business. Firms need to understand objectively the political and social 
context in which they operate and they must pinpoint the complexities, risk and 
dilemmas that may reside unseen within this context. This mirrors what Porter and 
Kramer (2006) suggested about CSR in that previous initiatives have tended to lack 
strategy, and once companies can identify points of intersection between their business 
operations and social issues; they are able to generate value for society and the business. 
Companies should define their plans and social roles on their own terms and once this is 
done, business can identify ways in which it can make a difference to development. 
This would be more strategically oriented and more closely aligned to their core 
activities and skills, as well as the social and economic realities in the developing 
societies in which they operate. Recalling the adage “give a man a fish, and you feed 
him for a day; teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime” it may be wise for 
businesses to move away from the philanthropic aspect of CSR; as corporate giving 
may not be the most efficient and effective use of resources in terms of solving social 
ills. With regard to poverty, Bernstein (2010) noted that through developing the 
economic standing of the country, businesses can slowly improve the living standards 
of the citizens. Thus, instead of wasting money on social contributions, more positive 
and beneficial projects could be undertaken that generate value for society as well as 
business at large. 
 
The author argued that through their normal activities in pursuit of profit, businesses 
makes a profound difference to communities and individuals and this is generally 
ignored or taken for granted in the prevailing conversation about business and ‘doing 
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good’. Large companies are rightly committed to playing a broader social role, and are 
prepared to commit significant resources; however they should be used to maximum 
effect. Although Bernstein (2010, p. 287-288) does not suggest that business is always 
better than government, and that all public services should be privatised; it is important 
to examine what services and goods market forces and companies can provide and 
within what kinds of structures to ensure that society benefits from the discipline and 
innovation of market competition. Although certain essential public goods must be 
provided by the state (or at least funded by it) social goods are sometimes most 
efficiently produced by the private sector, but their public nature calls for the 
government to help pay for them. Therefore to provide the foundation for market action 
the government should supply the monetary, legal and regulatory infrastructure. The 
question of private schooling was raised in her book, and in an article in The Star 
newspaper on August 12 2010, a study by the Centre for Development and Enterprise 
was quoted as having found numerous low-cost and profitable private schools 
appearing, with at least 30% of the schools in the area being privately run. Bernstein 
(2010, p. 253) cited a UN report that called for the provision of services by private 
enterprises which also called for targeted subsidies and tax incentives when they are 
needed to correct market imperfections. It welcomed the private provision of essential 
infrastructure such as power, water, communications, and transport through public-
private partnerships. Interestingly this has started happening in South Africa with 
independent power producers looking to partner governmental organisations for the 
provision of infrastructure and public services. 
 
Another contrasting view was when Bernstein (2010) questioned the need for 
“development goals” in light of the success that business has had in eradicating poverty 
in developing economies – through the normal course of business. Generally the 
impression is created that all actions by business in the social arena are desirable, and 
energy and commitment count more than results. It was argued that the solution to 
solving major public problems lies in a functioning government, good courts and 
economic opportunities for growth. Corruption, poor education and very little 
accountability get in the way of results, thus companies should attempt to build public 
capacity instead of trying to replace it. Resulting from this inability to enact change all 
the pressure on corporations sets them up for failure as, regardless of the intentions 
behind these projects, their cumulative social impact is greatly overstated (Bernstein, 
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2010, p. 241). The discussion concerning business and global poverty ignores the 
phenomenal economic achievements of successful developing countries which engaged 
with companies who are now deemed inadequate. The commitments society forces on 
business to do more are not good for developing countries, do not solve the issue of 
poverty and are not key priorities on the business agenda. If people are truly concerned 
about the masses living in poverty, instead of focusing efforts aimed at restricting 
global trade, businesses need to act for the countries by developing alliances with the 
governments and citizens, and assisting them in developing strategies in line with their 
circumstances and needs. “Business needs its own agenda, one that will have much 
more to do with governance, an improved environment in which to do business, and 
national competitiveness” (Bernstein, 2010, p. 243).  
 
The author also questioned why first world tastes and preferences are considered 
morally superior to the life-determining choices facing poor people in developing 
countries. How can developed nations tell poor countries to adopt sustainable 
development doctrines that restrict energy and economic development when those same 
countries went through a similar stage in their economic expansion? The risks taken 
were necessary to achieve their current environmental and technological status, and by 
imposing additional restraints on the developing world they are penalising the poorest 
of the poor who are most in need of the resultant economic development. Bernstein 
(2010, p. 320-322) offered South Africa as an example of a developing country 
adopting first world best practices regarding environmental impacts, and its negative 
effect on the development of the poor; as well as making the delivery of a better life for 
South Africans harder and more expensive. Current discussions do not reflect the trade-
offs that developing countries must make and other important elements missing from 
this dialogue include the role of markets in economic and social arenas, as well as the 
role of the state in creating the context for growth. The key here is that developing 
economies cannot afford to be as responsible as developed nations desire, but this does 
not mean they should be able to develop while sparing no thought towards the 
externalities which they produce. There are things companies can and should do and it 
is in their long-term interests to do so, however, they should be handled far more 
strategically than they are at the moment. This is where the previous academic literature 
overlaps with the author’s suggestions in that as Porter and Kramer (2006) proposed 
there are social aspects that companies must pay attention to which should be done in 
  123
strategic ways that benefit the business and society simultaneously. Companies should 
use their resources for domestic and international policy change, however “the key is to 
marry business interest with social involvement and to build on business strengths 
rather than pretend to be experts in arenas far removed from company activities” 
(Bernstein, 2010, p. 323). A balance must be found for social responsibilities to be 
fulfilled while maintaining the economic development that is critical to growth and 
prosperity. Lankoski (2009) suggested that companies include economic responsibility 
in addition to environmental and social responsibilities as it is a much richer concept 
than economic performance and perhaps an ideal like this is needed to combine the 
importance of economic growth with sustainable business practices in developing 
nations. 
 
It was noted that the wide scope of CSR and the question of who a company is 
responsible to is unhelpful in this conversation. As covered earlier, one of the 
staunchest opponents of social responsibility was Milton Friedman, who stated that the 
main responsibility of business was to maximise the profits of shareholders. The author 
argued against the idea that ‘the business of business is business’, as it is too narrow to 
be helpful to either society or business and it implies that companies should operate in 
isolation of the societies in which they are embedded (Bernstein, 2010, p. 324). Another 
one of Bernstein (2010, p. 335)’s most fervent arguments is that business shall remain a 
part of the problem until they clarify the benefits of their companies and the importance 
of markets and companies for social welfare. Successful enterprise is taken for granted 
and additional regulations and accountability will have an impact on companies’ core 
business and bottom lines; which ultimately will hurt the process of innovation and risk-
taking. Companies should start focusing on the key development challenges holding 
back economic growth such as increasing competitiveness and improving business 
environments; instead of spending too much attention on welfarist approaches to 
development. Bernstein (2010, p. 370) suggested a few key areas which need to be 
thought about, and which will help produce solutions to the issue of ‘business and 
society’: 
 Companies and business organisations need to be clear on appropriate roles and 
relationships involving the state and markets.  
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 Companies should think about establishing specialist organisations to help 
governments become more effective in certain areas that are vital for business.  
 Companies should introduce information and new ideas about business and 
national development into public debates.  
 Business leaders should stand up for the market economy, and participate in the 
battle of ideas about business and society as they have an interest in reshaping 
the framework and the role of companies in contributing to the public good.  
The debate about corporate power and responsibility is important because it bears on 
the role of market dynamics in the world economy and individual nations, the place of 
business organisations within the market, the relationship of both the market and 
business organisations with politics, the nature of development and modernisation, the 
best route out of poverty, and the relationship of all of these issues with the global 
community. 
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4. Methodology 
 
As seen with the earlier academic literature, there are a number of methods that can be 
used to analyze the problem at hand. There are options with regard to the measurement 
of CSP as well as that of firm financial performance; where some of the performance 
measures are market based while others are accounting based and some thought must be 
given as to which measures will be used. Similarly, trying to account for the social 
performance of firms can be challenging as the two most common methods of content 
analysis as well as reputational indexes require a lot of subjectivity in compiling the 
data. Waddock and Graves (1994) noted the difficulty in measuring CSP consistently 
(as mentioned in Aupperle et al., 1985) - and the variety in research methods is evident 
as some researchers attempted to use forced-choice instruments, the Fortune 
reputational and social responsibility index, content analysis of documents, behavioural 
and perceptual measures, and case study methodologies. The limitations for each 
method have been presented as follows:  
Survey method:   this method has problems relating to return rates and  
consistency among raters, 
Fortune ratings:  these were criticized as being as much a measure of 
overall corporate financial performance as of CSP 
Content analysis:  this method depends on the comprehensiveness of and the  
purposes for which the documents were originally created 
Behavioural measures:  these potentially suffer from respondent bias and 
inconsistency 
Case study methods: these suffer from both inconsistency and lack of 
generalisability.  
Recalling the businessmen and student surveys, Arlow and Gannon (1982) questioned 
whether evaluations made by students, executives and whoever in the 1970s apply in 
present times. On top of this, it was doubted that individuals have a sufficient amount of 
information about corporations to make assessments on CSP, and judgements are likely 
to vary depending on the respondents or their locale. This lends credit to the 
methodology used by the JSE to measure the CSR of firms, and indirectly affords the 
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proxy used in this study with some credibility. According to Cochran and Wood 
(1984)’s examination of CSR and CSP measurement, it can be seen that EIRIS’ analysis 
of firms for the JSE takes into account both content analysis and the use of a 
reputational index. Since the firms are analysed using a list of criteria, this ‘reputation 
index’ can be taken to mean that these firms comply with social responsibility in certain 
areas, and although it cannot be used to distinguish between different levels of 
performance, it was easy to tell apart the performers from the non-performers. To 
collect the data for application of these criteria, EIRIS looked at all public 
documentation (such as annual reports, websites etc.) and then gathered feedback from 
the completion of surveys to clarify research in addition to gathering non-public 
information. Thus, in its totality, this method of assessing the firms can be seen to 
encompass two of the most popular methods of measuring CSR. Generally, publications 
tend to be associated with social disclosure and Ullmann (1985) stated that social 
disclosure cannot be used as a proxy for social performance when attempting to 
examine the relationships between CFP and CSP. However, participation in the SRI can 
be taken as a proxy for social performance as opposed to social disclosure; since the 
criteria are applied generally to areas of firm performance and thus companies who are 
actually showing positive signs of social activities are likely to be recognized by the 
SRI as potential constituents. 
 
Abbott and Monsen (1979) noted theoretical reasons why corporations should be 
expected to under and over report their activities. Since these activities involve costs, 
reading of such social activities by shareholders can be taken to mean that the firm is 
not taking their interests as the highest priority, and therefore the corporation may be 
induced to underreport such social activities. Alternatively, reading of the corporations 
progressive views on social responsibilities can enhance confidence of the politically 
savvy shareholder in management’s policies, resulting in overreporting of these 
activities. On top of shareholder responses, staff effectiveness and sensitivity to issues 
are also determinants of reporting activities. Arlow and Gannon (1982) questioned the 
use of annual reports as measures of social responsiveness as they may more 
appropriately reflect PR or promotional effort rather than responsiveness. Although 
these aspects of firm behaviour need to be accounted for when performing content 
analyses, the fact that EIRIS used many sources of information to assess social 
performance could be taken to mean that any over and under reporting of activities, as 
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well as PR efforts, may not have affected the outcome in any way. The assimilation of 
public and private information would have resulted in a complete overview of the CSR 
situation of the firm, and thus Abbott and Monsen (1979)’s theoretical ideas (although 
valid) do not have too much bearing in this situation. Callan and Thomas (2009) found 
that their results changed significantly when they broke up their CSP measure into two 
distinct variables, one accounting for the positive screens (Qualitative Issue Areas) and 
another for the negative screens (Controversial Business Issues). The authors found that 
grouping these two aspects of social performance into one measure may obscure results, 
and their study showed that the negative screens had markedly stronger influences on a 
firm’s return than changes in qualitative areas such as corporate governance and human 
rights. Since the main proxy for CSP in this study was participation in the SRI index, 
the criteria used to assess inclusion can be examined – however, they generally seem to 
be positive in nature. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the core ideas behind the 
SRI was to focus on positive issues so that instead of excluding poor performers, they 
could be guided towards improved social performance. In this way there was no 
possibility to separate negative screens from positive screens, due to the fact that the 
SRI index focused on the positive aspects of CSP, as opposed to the KLD ratings where 
they reported on both types of screens. 
 
In light of the data being derived from the SRI index, as well as any other conventional 
firms sourced from the JSE, these publicly held firms mean that the framework used by 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) for their theory of a firm perspective holds in this case. 
This was as a result of their framework implying that the market for corporate control is 
a motivator behind mangers acting in the shareholders interests; thus, for privately held 
companies this market is missing and firms may behave differently from what is 
expected. This allows the various hypotheses developed by McWilliams and Siegel 
(2001) to be applied and tested in this study, and some of the propositions regarding 
CSP attributes and size are examined in later chapters. The main methodological 
approaches for this dissertation differ firstly in their time horizon, and secondly in their 
objectives. This study looked to examine the question of CSR from two perspectives, 
those being from the standpoint of the actual company involved in CSR, and from the 
standpoint of the investor who chooses to invest ethically. For the firm, the question is 
how does being socially responsible affect the traditional bottom line, as well as affect 
any firm characteristics that would be fundamental to its operations. Ultimately this 
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allows the firm to determine if being socially responsible is viable as the financial effect 
will be examined, and it will be possible to establish if the benefits outweigh the costs 
or not. From the investor’s perspective, the key performance indicator here is the 
financial return that can be attained from the investment. Therefore the question here is 
finding out how well the socially responsible investment performs relative to a 
benchmark, market index or conventional investment. This is important because the 
answer to this allows conclusions to be made about the outcome of SRI. If there is a 
cost to ethical investing it may deter some people from investing with their morals, or if 
investors still choose to be socially responsible it is clearly understood that they are 
sacrificing return in order to invest in accordance with their beliefs. Alternatively, if 
being socially responsible with your money results in no significant differences in 
return, an investor may be indifferent to this position. A final possibility is that being 
socially responsible bestows additional financial benefits, and this outcome may drive 
additional investors to socially responsible firms, even if their only investment criterion 
is financial performance. 
 
Regarding the empirical methodology, three main approaches were used in the analysis 
of these relationships. The short-term approach for the firm perspective was embodied 
by the event study, where short term price changes were examined around the 
announcement dates of the SRI company lists. This approach by its very definition 
examines the market “return” in that the abnormal returns around specified events were 
examined to see if they were significant. It is also short term as the efficient market 
hypothesis states that efficient markets impound new information immediately; thus, if 
the specified CSR event has any significance and does motivate investors to change 
their perceptions of the firm, it should happen almost instantaneously. As a result it 
made no sense to look for a long-term effect in terms of changes on the share price, and 
ultimately the market measure was restricted to the short-term analysis. The actual 
methodology was taken directly from McWilliams and Siegel (1997) where they 
examined the event study methodology as it relates to management, and specifically 
CSR. The upcoming section on the event study details the steps followed as well as the 
results found. Ortlitzky et al. (2003) noted that some areas required further inquiry, such 
as the relationship between CSP reputation measures and market-based CFP. In 
addition, Arlow and Gannon (1982) pointed out that using measures related to common 
stock have limitations since common stock valuation and returns on equity may be 
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dependent on other factors such as the state of the economy. These issues may be tested 
using the SRI index as a proxy for reputation and the market based measures from this 
study. An informal test of this comes when examining the announcement dates of the 
SRI constituent lists. If there is no significant result it may indicate that the reputation 
of socially responsible firms has already been priced into the firms stock. Alternatively, 
no result could also mean that the firm’s reputation does not affect its financial outcome 
in the eyes of investors.  
 
In terms of another research methodology, once again from the firm perspective, the 
longer term approach entailed using regression analysis to compare SRI firms to 
conventional firms. The aim of this analysis was to find out if any abnormal return 
differences do exist between these two categories of investments, and also if being 
socially responsible changes the firm in any fundamental way. As an example, the 
majority of the 40 largest firms on the JSE were consistently in the SRI index 
constituent list, thus it would be important to find out if this is a direct consequence of 
being socially responsible, a consequence of the SRI selection process, or perhaps a 
consequence of circumstance in that the largest firms in South Africa have been able to 
afford CSR initiatives ahead of the rest of the market. These regressions were also used 
to test for causality in terms of the CFP-CSP relationship by introducing lags into the 
variables. As noted by McGuire et al. (1988) the effects of past and future firm 
performance need to be noted in terms of this relationship, and in some of the 
regressions the past ROE and ROA were included over the previous five years. The 
problem when looking at future performance was that since the SRI index was only in 
existence from 2004 onwards, if the analysis started in 2004 there would be 5 years of 
future returns for the constituent firms in that year. However, each subsequent year 
would have one less observation of future performance until the final year where no 
future performance could be observed, due to the fact that the results had not yet been 
published at the time. Therefore although prior performance was thoroughly tested, 
future performance needed to be examined in a different way. As a direct consequence 
of this issue, for causality separate regressions were run using one year’s prior and 
subsequent performance on the participation in the SRI index, as described in Waddock 
and Graves (1997).  
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In order to use the regression analysis to test for the SRI effect, there were potentially a 
few alternative ways to do this. To test whether SRI firms were more profitable, 
regressions were run using the dummy SRI variable to indicate past or present 
participation in the SRI index, whereas a zero in the dummy variable indicated that the 
firm had never been on any of the SRI constituent lists. Therefore this analysis 
compared firms who had been on the SRI to the firms that had not made it, and this 
analysis was back-tested over a fifteen year period. A more refined approach used the 
SRI dummy variable to indicate if the firm was on the SRI index for the given year, an 
approach similar to that of McWilliams and Siegel (2000). With this method, it was 
possible to look at firms coming on and off the SRI, and to analyse whether these 
changes had any relationships with the prior or current financial performance of the 
firm.  
 
Measures of financial performance are generally separated into two categories: 
accounting and market based. Arguments for both of these have been given in the 
literature review, and they include numerous types from EPS and P/E (which are 
influenced by the rate of growth and accounting practices, and cannot be compared 
without considering leverage and risk) to ROA and ROE. McGuire et al. (1988) noted 
that accounting based measures tap into the historical aspects of performance, and are 
generally subject to bias from managerial manipulation and differences in accounting 
procedures. These measures need to be adjusted for risk, industry characteristics and 
other variables. On the other hand market based measures are less susceptible to 
accounting procedures and represent the investors’ evaluation of future earnings. 
However, these measures imply that the investors’ evaluation is the proper performance 
measure and due to multiple constituencies concentration on investors may not be 
sufficient. An earlier view on these two contrasting measures noted that accounting 
returns are generally best able to capture the firm’s unique characteristics and internal 
efficiencies as opposed to the general performance measure of market return. Brammer 
and Millington (2008) pointed out that market based measures are influenced by a range 
of factors unrelated to the activity of the individual firm, and similarly the objectivity 
and informational value of accounting data can be questioned. Although they ultimately 
used market measures as they reflected the possible trade-offs involved in ownership of 
firms with different social performance characteristics, the fact that market measures 
may encompass general market movements might skew the results. Thus, accounting 
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measures were used as the main focus for the regression analysis in this dissertation. 
Supporting this choice, Orlitzky et al. (2003) found that accounting measures were 
more closely correlated with CSP - a finding that also resulted from the study of 
McGuire et al. (1988). Two of the most popular measures used in recent literature 
include ROA (Aupperle et al., 1985; McGuire et al., 1988; Waddock & Graves, 1994; 
Callan & Thomas, 2009) and ROE (Waddock & Graves, 1994, 1997; Bowman & Haire, 
1975; Abbott & Monsen, 1979; Callan & Thomas, 2009) and these were used as the 
main proxies for financial performance in the regression analysis.  
 
An interesting caveat is found in Callan and Thomas (2009)  where they pointed out 
that Ruf et al. (2001; cited in Callan and Thomas, 2009) did not find a positive 
relationship between CSP and CFP until year three using ROE, and consequently they 
concluded that ROE may be more correlated with social performance in the long term. 
ROS was also used in some of the earlier literature however McGregor BFA did not 
supply this return measure as a line item, thus only ROE and ROA were used. Callan 
and Thomas (2009) also noted the importance of testing for linearity as generally in 
earlier academic studies linearity had just been assumed and this may have resulted in 
biased results. Thus in their regression model, the authors included the squares of a few 
select control variables to examine if indeed the relationships were linear. What they 
found was that Total Assets was quadratically related to financial performance in both 
the ROA and ROS models, thus these relationships needed to be tested for to avoid 
incorrect results.  
 
One of the major findings of McWilliams and Siegel (2000) was that previous 
regression models may have been misspecified due to omitted variables such as those 
pertaining to R&D intensity, and the industry advertising intensity of firms. Although 
using these variables in the regression analyses would help confirm McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000)’s hypothesis, the lack of data places limitations on the possibility for 
research into this aspect of the relationship. As covered in a later chapter, the main 
source of data for the regressions came from McGregor BFA where there was no 
variable to calculate the advertising expenditures, and although a variable for R&D was 
present, it contained no observations for any of the sample companies over the entire 
sample period. Callan and Thomas (2009) noted that despite the research, Waddock and 
Graves (1997) and Ruf et al. (2001), Hillman and Keim (2001) and Salama (2005), all 
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cited in Callan and Thomas (2009), omitted one or both of the variables. Following 
from this, the regression analysis was performed without these variables, bearing in 
mind the possibility of misspecification as noted by McWilliams and Siegel (2000).  
 
As noted in the previous studies (Arlow & Gannon, 1982; Cochran & Wood, 1984; 
Waddock & Graves, 1994, 1997), industry plays an important role in the relationship 
and generally this variable needs to be included into any analysis concerning CFP and 
CSP. On top of distinguishing between industries, Brammer and Millington (2008) 
suggested that the industry life cycle may affect CSP, but due to the lack of data 
concerning industries only a cursory examination of the industry affect was included in 
this study. Generally the papers based in the U.S. used the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes to classify the various industries, however for the models in 
this dissertation industry classifications were taken directly from McGregor BFA line 
item (MRK), where each of the different industries were assigned to a dummy variable. 
As a side note, the BFA industry classifications matched up with a previous list sent 
through from the JSE which included most of the listed companies along with key data 
such as industry and sub-sector. Other key control variables include size and debt levels 
and Waddock and Graves (1994) used Total Assets and Total Sales as two indicators 
used to proxy for the size of the firm. Callan and Thomas (2009) used the number of 
employees (a measure also used by Abbott and Monsen, 1979), net sales and total assets 
as the proxies for size, while Brammer and Millington (2008) used the natural logarithm 
of firm total assets (following Adams & Hardwick, 1998; cited in Brammer and 
Millington, 2008). Risk measures were also included, using the leverage ratios as 
proxies where Waddock and Graves (1994) used the ratio of total long-term debt to 
total assets, and McGuire et al., (1988) also used the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
The final key methodological section entailed the question of CSR’s effect on the 
investor, specifically through the idea of SRI. This method involved the comparison of 
socially responsible investments to conventional investments and assessing if there 
were any significant differences in firm performance. Some of the previous literature 
used asset pricing models such as the market model or the APT to attribute performance 
and determine if there existed a social factor. Others used risk-adjusted performance 
measures such as Jensen’s alpha to compare the returns between the two investment 
styles. Viviers, Bosch, Smit and Buijs (2008), henceforth Viviers et al., examined the 
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situation of responsible investments (RI) in South Africa and used a variety of risk-
adjusted performance measures such as the Sharpe ratio, the Sortino ratio and the 
Upside Potential ratio. A similar approach was used in this study, in that these measures 
are market independent and this may be useful in light of the composition of the SRI 
index. Due to the prominence of the top 40 in the SRI this may skew results when using 
market models to determine performance metrics, thus Viviers et al. (2008)’s approach 
may provide an easy and acceptable solution to this issue. Following on from earlier 
literature, raw returns as well as risk-adjusted returns were examined to give a complete 
picture of the relative performance of SRI funds and companies especially in the South 
African context. Although some of the earlier literature used various performance 
attribution models (such as the APT in DiBartolomeo and Kurtz, 1999) some of the 
methodologies are too in-depth and are beyond the scope of this study. The three-factor 
model was the only methodology of this type used, and was examined briefly to 
compare excess returns between a portfolio composed of the SRI companies and that of 
a conventional portfolio. 
 
4.1 Event study 
 
The event study methodology followed directly from McWilliams and Siegel (1997) 
where the authors gave a comprehensive examination of this method - specifically in 
the area of management research and CSR. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) did not 
dispute the validity of the event study methodology however their concern was over the 
empirical implementation and due to the important implications of management event 
studies, it is critical that the research designs and implementations be flawless. The idea 
behind the event study is to measure the effect of an unanticipated event on stock 
prices, and to do this one begins by estimating a market model for each firm and then 
calculating abnormal returns where these are assumed to reflect the stock markets 
reaction to the new information. Before the actual methodology is looked at, it is 
important to note the assumptions underlying this method, as outlined by McWilliams 
and Siegel (1997):  
Market efficiency: 
One of the most important assumptions is that markets are efficient, which implies that 
stock markets incorporate all relevant information that is available to market traders. If 
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this holds, then financially relevant information is instantaneously incorporated into 
stock prices where following from this, an event is anything that results in new 
information with value to investors. In order to satisfy this assumption, short event 
windows were used as “market efficiency is difficult to reconcile with the use of a long 
event window” (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997, p. 630). 
Unanticipated events: 
Here the market previously did not have information on the event, and traders gain 
information from the announcement. Thus, abnormal returns can be assumed to be the 
stock market’s reaction to new information gained specifically from the event.  
Confounding effects: 
This is based on the claim that the researcher has isolated the effect of the event from 
the effects of other events. To properly ascertain the importance of an event, it is 
assumed that there are no confounding effects from other events, and these events can 
include declaration of dividends, announcements of upcoming mergers, etc. Events such 
as these may impact the share price during the event window and the longer the window 
the more difficult it is to control for confounding effects.  
Event Study Methodology:  
Following McWilliams and Siegel (1997, p. 652) their final suggestions included steps 
for implementing an event study, and they were as follows7:  
Step 1: Define an event that provides new information to the market. 
- For purposes of this study, the event was the announcement date of the SRI 
constituent list, as it has been hypothesised that if being a socially responsible 
firm moves investors to behave differently, announcement of firm participation 
may underlie abnormal returns. 
Step 2: Outline a theory that justifies a financial response to this new information. 
- As examined in the previous literature, some academics posited that CSP is a 
predictor of good management, as well as the firm’s ability to manage 
stakeholder relations in addition to implicit claims on the firm. Thus, if investors 
take participation on the SRI to be a sign of good CSR, and thus increases their 
implicit valuation of the firm, they may bid up the price of the stock; resulting in 
positive abnormal returns. 
                                                 
7 Steps not relevant were left out of the methodology 
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Step 3: Identify a set of firms that experience this event and identify the event dates. 
- The set of firms identified was every firm on the JSE that had participated in the 
SRI in the given year, and the events were the various announcement dates, 
spanning from the indexes inception in May 2004, until the most recent list in 
the sample period, being Nov 2009.  
Step 4: Choose an appropriate event window. 
- Since the effects were hypothesised to be instantaneous, and to isolate the 
effects from this event, the event window was restricted to a maximum of two 
days. The reason for two days is that generally there was a difference of a day 
between the announcement dates and the dates that the index went live. 
Although the go live dates supplied by the SRI index associate indicated that for 
2008 the date was the same as the announcement date; the two day window was 
used to make sure the effects were not missed.  
Step 5: Eliminate or adjust for firms that experience other relevant events during the 
event window.  
- Although this step is important, the fact that none of the results showed any 
significant abnormal returns meant this step may be ignored; since there was no 
significance which could be attributed to the SRI announcement, let alone any 
other event.  
Step 6: Compute abnormal returns during the event window and test their significance. 
- To calculate abnormal returns, a market model was estimated for each firm 
where the rate of return on a share price of firm i on day t was expressed as 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit 
where Rit is the return of firm i on day t and Rmt is the return on a market 
portfolio. From this equation, estimates of daily abnormal returns were derived 
by subtracting the expected return from the actual return: 
   ARit = Rit – (ai + biRmt)  
where a and b are the OLS parameter estimates from the regression of Rit on Rmt 
over the estimation period. In this case the period was from 250 days to 50 days 
prior to the event.  The abnormal returns represent the returns earned by the firm 
after adjustment for the normal return process. Next the abnormal return was 
standardised by its standard deviation:  
   SARit = ARit / SDit 
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 where  
SDit = {Si² x [1 + 1/T (Rmt – Rm)²/Σ(Rmt – Rm)²]}0.5 
Si² is the residual variance from the market model, Rm is the mean return of the 
market portfolio during the estimation period, and T is the number of days in the 
estimation period. Next the standardised abnormal returns were cumulated over 
the event window to derive a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each firm:  
   CARi = (1/k0.5) Σ SARit 
where k is the number of days in the event window. From this, the average 
standardized cumulative abnormal (ACAR) returns across n firms could be 
calculated as: 
ACARt = 1/n x 1/[(T-2)/(T-4)]0.5 Σ CARit 
Step 7: Report the percentage of negative returns and the binomial Z or Wilcoxon test 
statistic. 
- The test statistic used to assess whether the ACAR is significantly different 
from zero was given as:    
Z = ACARt x n0.5 
The results are presented in the Discussions chapter along with analysis of their 
significance in light of the previous empirical evidence. 
 
Step 8: Report firm names and event dates in data appendix 
The event study firm names and event dates have been reported in the appendix 
chapter 8.5 Event Study Lists. 
 
In terms of the data used for the event study, the main source for data was I-Net Bridge 
due to the fact that only the share prices were needed for this analysis. As already 
mentioned the market proxy used was the J203 and thus the returns were calculated 
from the closing price and dividend yield as given by I-Net. For the SRI companies, the 
initial list of 85 SRI stocks that had participated at some point in time was examined at 
each announcement date. Those firms without returns data from 250 days prior up until 
the day following the announcement date were excluded. As a result the size of the lists 
were as follows: 2004 date (44 firms), 2005 (43), 2006 (53), 2007(50), 2008 (57) and 
2009 (63). Overall, this empirical section resulted in the hypothesis: 
H1: The market does not price the social factor into a companies stock 
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The null hypothesis in this case was that there is no significance around the 
announcement dates, and that the market does not price the social factor into the 
companies stock. The alternate hypothesis was consequently that the market does price 
the social factor, which results in significant price changes at the time of the 
announcements. 
 
4.2 Financial Performance of SRI 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between a firm’s social performance and the 
financial performance from the perspective of the investor. The key focus here was that 
investors who use social screens and other criterion in their investment decision-making 
processes require an understanding of the relationship between the decisions being 
influenced by their morals, and the effect this may have on their investment 
performance. The main examination consisted of looking at the raw and risk-adjusted 
returns between SRI and conventional portfolios, but before this methodology was 
examined, the portfolios’ excess returns were looked at using the Fama and French 
Three Factor model.  
 
4.2.1 Fama-French Three Factor Model 
One of the tools used to compare differences between SRI portfolios and conventional 
portfolios was Fama and French’s Three Factor Model. This is an extension of the 
traditional asset pricing model, the CAPM, where in addition to Beta; returns are 
explained by a Size factor and a Book to Market factor. The size factor was calculated 
as the return of a portfolio of small firms minus a portfolio of large companies, and the 
Book to Market factor was computed as the difference in returns between a portfolio of 
the top 30% of companies ranked by the Book to Market ratio, and a portfolio of the 
bottom 30%. 
R = Rf + b1(Rm - Rf) + b2(SMB) + b3(HML) + ε 
The data used for this analysis came from the Wits Masters Database (henceforth 
Findata@Wits), and the companies here were cross referenced with the constituent lists 
from the SRI index. Two sample periods were looked at, namely from 1995/07 (the 
earliest time where every factor in the Three Factor model had data) until 2009/06 (the 
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end of the database) and from 1999/10 (approximately 5 years before the start of the 
SRI index) until 2009/06 which resulted in a 15 year and a 10 year sample period. After 
cross-referencing the SRI constituent list with the firms in the Findata@Wits Database, 
as well as excluding any companies that were not in existence for the entire sample 
period, the size of the sample was 53 companies for the 15 year period, and 65 for the 
10 year period. Ultimately these two time periods allowed for a “back-test” of the SRI 
companies as the SRI index was essentially around from 2004 onwards. Therefore these 
sample periods were used with the intention of examining whether socially responsible 
behaviour was related to prior performance or past firm characteristics. Since the 
portfolio of conventional firms consisted of the database of all companies, minus those 
firms that had appeared on the SRI index at any point in time, the conventional portfolio 
constituents were the same for both time periods.  
 
An alternative ‘conventional’ portfolio was created using the lists derived from the 
regression analysis (described in chapter 4.3 Regression Analysis) where the 74 largest 
firms by market capitalisation in 2009 and 1995 were combined. From the 188 firms, 
since 74 were part of the SRI index this left 114 firms that were by this study’s 
definition, conventional, in that they never appeared on any of the SRI index constituent 
lists. These 114 firms were then cross-referenced with the Findata@Wits Database and 
thirty-four companies were removed because their share codes could not be found in the 
database. In addition to these companies, one of the companies, New Africa 
Investments had a return of 1400%, thus as this was probably a typographical error the 
firm was left off of the portfolio creation. The resulting final conventional portfolio 
consisted of 79 firms. The size of this alternative portfolio was more comparable to the 
53 and 65 firm SRI portfolios, especially when one considers the fact that the broader 
universe of all stocks less those considered “socially responsible” numbered over 1000 
companies.  
 
For the Three Factor Model, to compute the SMB factor all of the firms from the 
database were looked at in each period and sorted into those firms above and below the 
median market capitalisation. Value-weighted portfolios were then created in each time 
period for the big and small firms respectively, and the difference in each time period 
was computed as the SMB factor. Similarly, for the HML factor the companies were 
sorted by book to market ratios into the top 30% and bottom 30%. Value-weighted 
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portfolios were then created, and the differences taken as the HML factor for each time 
period. In terms of portfolio rebalancing dates, the same composition of each portfolio 
was held for a year after the rebalancing date (in line with the original three factor 
model). The rebalancing date occurred on the first date with sufficient data which for 
the SMB factor was December 1989, resulting in a portfolio held from January till 
December of the subsequent year. Similarly, for the HML factor the first date with data 
was August 1990, thus the portfolios were rebalanced every August and held from 
September to the following August. The market rate was taken as the return on the J203 
index and the risk-free rate was calculated as the 30-day equivalent rate of the RBAS 90 
day banker’s acceptance rate using the formula:  
r30 = (1 + r90)⅓ – 1 
Statman (2000) noted that for his study, mutual funds on average tended to tilt their 
portfolios towards small-cap stocks, and in the sample period small-cap stocks 
underperformed large-cap stocks. For this reason, it is important to analyse whether 
return differences can be attributed to fundamental firm characteristics, or if indeed 
there is something more. In terms of the methodology for portfolio creation, two 
portfolios were created for the SRI and Conventional firms where the SRI portfolio 
consisted of the firms that participated in the SRI index at least once during its existence 
(2004-2009) and this analysis was to serve as a back-test of these responsible firms. The 
conventional portfolio, as stated, consisted of the universe of all stocks in the 
Findata@Wits database, excluding those firms who had participated at least once in the 
SRI index. In addition to this broader conventional portfolio, the alternative 79 firm 
portfolio was also examined. Due to the composition of the SRI index, value-weighted 
as well as equally-weighted portfolios were created and tested to examine if the 
structural characteristics masked any of the relationships between excess performance, 
size and CSP.  
 
For the value-weighted portfolios, in each period the market capitalisation of each stock 
was divided by the total market capitalisation of the portfolio to calculate the weight, 
and this was then multiplied by the firms return for the period. These returns were then 
summed to calculate the return for the portfolio. To calculate the equally-weighted 
portfolio returns, for the 15 year time period (with only 53 firms in the SRI index) each 
of the firms return contribution was calculated was 1/53 multiplied by its return for the 
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period. Once again these returns were summed to get the total portfolio return. 
Similarly, for the 10 year period, since there were 65 firms in the SRI portfolio each 
firm’s weight was 1/65 and this was multiplied by their returns for each period to get a 
weighted contribution; and these contributions were then totalled to calculate the 
portfolio’s return. Regressions were then run with the returns series of the value-
weighted SRI and Conventional portfolios as the dependent variables for both sample 
periods, and the Market Risk Premium, SMB factor and HML factor were used as the 
independent variables. The final regression consisted of the equally-weighted SRI 
portfolio being regressed against the Market Risk Premium, SMB and HML factors. 
 
An important aspect of this analysis is the examination of the size factor inherent in SRI 
portfolios. From Stone et al. (2001), concurrence with the earlier hypothesis regarding 
investment style and size can be found when attention is paid to the SRI index. For 
inclusion into the index, the criteria applied can be viewed as positive social tilting in 
nature as opposed to the social screening method. Companies such as SAB Miller Plc 
(which may be excluded using screens due to its position in the alcoholic beverages 
market) are present in the index due to their admirable CSR performance as evaluated 
using the JSE’s set of criteria. In line with McWilliams and Siegel (2001)’s framework, 
these positive CSR attributes that cause firms to be included in the SRI index should be 
positively correlated with size and indeed, for the 2009 list of constituents, 34 out of the 
Top 40 companies were included. Over the existence of the SRI index, the Top 40 firms 
have generally been well represented and this may raise the question of size (as well as 
profitability) being a predictor of social performance. The list of companies that were 
automatically assessed for participation comprised the Top 100 (the Top 40 firms and 
then 60 of the next biggest mid cap companies) on the JSE along with all constituents of 
the previous year’s SRI index. For the year 2009, there were also 30 of the 60 mid cap 
companies that passed the required criteria making it the largest year for the SRI index.  
 
As mentioned earlier in the literature review, it was shown that in portfolios where 
social screening took place the companies that were excluded tended to be large 
corporations - possibly due to their expanse and reach as it is more likely they fall into a 
category that is considered undesirable by ethical investors. This contrasted with the 
positive social tilting method where companies that showed impressive social 
performance were favoured, and where once again these firms tended to be larger 
  141
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). This was important because the composition of the SRI 
index confirmed the earlier hypothesis, and this has direct implications on the portfolio 
performance for investors who wish to use social criteria when making their investment 
decisions. If the methodology affects the portfolio’s composition, style and biases then 
it can influence the returns that the portfolio will attain.  
 
4.2.2 Comparison of SRI and Conventional Portfolios 
To examine the differences between conventional portfolios and SRI portfolios the raw 
and risk-adjusted returns over time were looked at. Since the main proxy for CSP was 
participation in the SRI and this was only in existence from 2004 onwards, different 
sub-periods were tested including a back-test of the SRI constituents. The main 
measures of risk-adjusted performance were taken from Viviers et al. (2008) in that the 
Sharpe Ratio, Sortino Ratio and Upside Potential Ratio were examined to determine the 
difference in risk-adjusted returns between the SRI portfolios and the conventional 
portfolio. The explanations of the measures, as well as their interpretations were taken 
directly from the aforementioned paper, where the actual formulas and calculations of 
the measures have been included in the appendix (Viviers et al., 2008, p. 42-43): 
Sharpe Ratio: the Sharpe ratio divides the average annualised differential return of a fund by its 
annualised standard deviation. In terms of interpretation, a higher Sharpe ratio is better. 
Sortino Ratio: replacing the downside variation (semi-variance) for the annualised standard 
deviation in the Sharpe ratio, this new measure is referred to as the Sortino ratio and differentiates 
between good and bad volatility. To calculate this downside deviation, a minimum acceptable return 
(MAR) needs to be chosen, and this is generally set to zero since investors are averse to negative 
returns. Once again a higher ratio is better. 
Upside - Potential Ratio: the Upside–Potential ratio (UPR) divides the portfolio’s upside potential 
(returns in excess of the MAR value) by its downside deviation. Once again the MAR was set to zero, 
and a higher ratio is perceived as better.  
As seen in the appendix chapter 8.3 Risk-adjusted Performance Measures, the 
calculation of the downside deviation and upside potential measures requires the 
integration of probability density functions. In practice, however, Viviers et al. (2008) 
calculated the downside deviation by creating a spreadsheet indicating the negative 
returns for each fund in each month, and the standard deviation of these returns was 
then calculated. Similarly, for the upside potential, a spreadsheet was constructed where 
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the monthly returns (greater than zero) were determined, the sum of squares was 
calculated and the square root taken thereof (Viviers et al., 2008, p. 43).  
 
Since the use of the Fama-French Three Factor model resulted in the 15 year and 10 
year time periods being chosen (with appropriate SRI portfolios constructed as such) 
the same cut off dates were used for this return performance analysis. Once again, the 
same company lists were used for the analysis, thus the risk-adjusted returns of the SRI 
portfolio, the broader conventional portfolio and the alternative portfolio (with 79 
firms) were compared. Equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios were created 
for both sub-periods since the composition of the SRI meant that the majority of the JSE 
Top 40 stocks were constituents. Using market benchmarks as well as value weighted 
portfolios may skew the SRI portfolio towards these large stocks. Similarly, with the 
market indices, they tilt towards the larger stocks, and since the compositions were 
largely the same this may mask any other social effects that the analysis is trying to 
uncover. Therefore, by using equally-weighted portfolios, the potentially biased results 
may be avoided and may produce a better understanding of the relationship between 
socially responsible firms and their financial performance.  
 
Hamilton et al. (1993)’s null hypothesis was that SRI characteristics did not affect 
mutual funds, and this was in essence most similar to the standard hypotheses in finance 
where factors that do not proxy for risk cannot affect returns. Interestingly, one of 
McGuire et al. (1988)’s key findings was that risk reduction may be viewed as an 
important benefit of CSR. If this is the case it may be possible that social performance 
can proxy for risk, and thus there should be a relationship between social and financial 
performance, as evidenced by the difference in returns between socially responsible 
firms and conventional firms. This section can be summed up with the hypothesis: 
H2: Socially responsible portfolios do not perform better than conventional 
portfolios 
The null hypothesis states that the difference in returns between SRI portfolios and 
conventional portfolios is not significantly different from zero, whereas the alternate 
hypothesis would mean that there is a significant difference (as a result of superior 
financial performance or other risk reducing effects of CSR as hypothesised above). 
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4.3 Regression Analysis 
 
This section examined the relationship between social performance and firm financial 
performance in terms of the characteristics of the firm, as well as any inherent temporal 
differences. This analysis can aid in understanding the nature of the relationship, and by 
including various control variables (that have been theoretically justified) it may be 
possible to better predict a firm’s social performance. Another important aspect of the 
relationship is the direction of causality which has been described by Waddock and 
Graves (1997) as either falling under the Good Management or Slack Resources theory. 
The first idea hypothesised that good social performance is a result of good 
management and, thus, in turn leads towards better financial performance. In contrast 
the second theory stated that good financial performance results in the availability of 
slack resources that can be used to improve the firm’s social performance. The reason 
this distinction is important lies in what CSR and subsequently the socially responsible 
behaviours (as well as initiatives) mean for the firm and its bottom line. If it is the case 
that slack resources are needed before investments in CSP can be made, and there 
doesn’t seem to be a positive spin-off from CSR initiatives, then this would be at odds 
with Porter and Kramer (2006)’s idea that CSR can be viewed as a competitive 
advantage.  
 
With respect to the companies examined, the list of SRI index participants was cross-
referenced with the McGregor BFA database and this resulted in 74 of the socially 
responsible companies being found with data from 1994 to 2009 – with the actual time 
period being examined only starting in 1995. The reason for this was that the time 
period covered a 15 year span was well as gave enough data to calculate the changes in 
some of the variables, as if the period began in 1995, then data from 1994 would be 
needed for these changes. For the two portfolios, the SRI portfolio consisted of the 74 
companies representing the socially responsible firms, and a comparison group was 
compiled by taking the 74 largest firms (excluding the SRI participants) in the years 
2009 and 1995. These two lists of companies were then combined to give a list of firms 
which could be directly compared to the SRI firms. The resulting list of firms (including 
conventional as well as SRI) totalled 188 companies for the years 1995-2009. Thus, for 
the panel data regressions the initial dataset comprised of 188 companies spanning 15 
years - which resulted in a total of 2820 firm-year observations. For the various 
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regressions the different variables used were filtered out so that any firms without data 
for the specific variable were omitted, and thus the regression sample sizes varied in 
accordance with the data, variables, and regression models used. Importantly however, 
the number of observations was generally more than 500 so the regressions maintained 
strong levels of statistical power. One important thing to note from the data was the 
possibility of outliers, and since the data was taken directly from McGregor BFA, data 
that seemed seriously flawed had to be discarded. This was the case with the regressions 
looking at the 2004-2009 sample period where Hwange Colliery Company Limited was 
included in the comparison portfolio. The ROA for 2005 and 2006 were 14626 and 
1824 respectively, which is clearly incorrect and biased the average ROA upwards to 45 
(up from around 14 when these two data points were excluded). Due to the fact that all 
the data for these firm-year observations were abnormal, it is possible that the company 
was included as a result of an inflated size measure; thus exclusion of this firm made 
sense. There were some cases in the less significant regressions where outliers may 
have been present, and where these observations were removed and the tests rerun. 
However, as there were no considerable changes in terms of sign or significance these 
outliers were not reported, and the original data sets were used.  
 
Recalling the argument from Cochran and Wood (1984), the authors proposed two 
possible explanations for their results which indicated the importance of assets in their 
regression models. Firstly, firms that are more socially responsible may utilize their 
assets in a less efficient manner; however this was not consistent with the evidence 
regarding return on sales. A second explanation was that inflation had seriously 
distorted reported asset values and the positive correlation of asset age and CSR 
rankings supported this explanation. Newer firms have higher CSR rating and higher 
reported asset values relative to their older competitors. Unfortunately, the data 
retrieved from McGregor BFA did not allow for the more detailed inspection of asset 
age and turnover as independent variables – due to the lack of key financial ratios. In 
light of their evidence, and the fact that these variables were not included in the 
regression models; this may leave open the possibility of misspecification.  As a result, 
because these questions were not looked at the potential misspecification of the model 
must be borne in mind when the results are interpreted.  
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In order to replicate McWilliams and Siegel (2000)’s regression analysis, their model 
needed to be looked at, however, as it was based on Waddock and Graves (1997), the 
measures for CSP and CFP from the earlier paper were first examined. In terms of CFP, 
Waddock and Graves (1997) used three measures of financial performance in their 
regressions: ROA, ROE and ROS. Taken directly from the McGregor BFA database, 
ROA (BFA line item 07290037) and ROE (BFA line item 07290038) were found for 
the sample firms and included in the model. The data for returns was given as 
percentages, thus instead of 0.16, the data was given as 16. These were not converted to 
percentages since the results would not change, and the only differences arise in the 
interpretation of coefficients. One important point to mention regarding the financial 
performance measure is that the interpretation of the coefficients gives us a difference 
in percentage points as opposed to percentage. What this means, is that the difference in 
return is an absolute value and therefore the base from which one starts is important. As 
an example, if the model found that SRI firms attained 5% more ROE; 5% for a firm 
that earns 10% ROE is considerable, whereas for a firm that earns 50% ROE it is 
somewhat less significant. To overcome this, it is possible to take the natural log of the 
return, thus giving the abnormal performance as a percentage. The problem with this 
method, however, is that all observations with negative performance measures are 
undefined and would thus be ignored in the model. As a result of this issue, it was 
decided that correcting for this deficiency at the expense of data was not acceptable and 
the absolute values were retained. Turning to Waddock and Graves (1997), their model 
was estimated as: 
Perfi = f(CSPi, SIZEi, RISKi, INDi) 
where CSP was a proxy for CSR based on an index of social performance. Size was a 
proxy for the size of the firm and was represented by Total Assets, Total Sales and the 
number of employees in the firm. For risk, Waddock and Graves (1997) used the 
debt/asset ratio as a proxy, and finally they used dummy variables to account for the 
different industries present in their sample. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) hypothesised 
that R&D and advertising intensity were correlated with profitability as well as social 
performance, therefore omitting these from the models would result in biased results - 
due to the misspecified models. Unfortunately the McGregor BFA database did not 
contain information regarding the advertising intensity, and although R&D expenditures 
were present (BFA line item 03090303) for all 2820 firm-years, not one firm had data 
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available for this variable. Thus, due to these data restrictions the two variables included 
by McWilliams and Siegel (2000) had to be excluded from the model in this analysis. 
One of the main features used from their paper was the proxy for CSP in that their 
original CSP measure was a dummy variable indicating whether a firm was present in 
the DSI for a given year. Similarly, for the sample of 2820 firms-years, the dummy 
variable SRI was 1 if the firm was present in the SRI (at some point in time) and 0 if it 
was never included in the index. Importantly, the SRI dummy variable was defined 
slightly differently in the 15 year regressions and in the 5 year regressions, but this shall 
be covered a bit later. As a result of the dummy variable specification, this general 
regression had no power to determine causality; however, it was hoped that it would 
shed light on any structural differences between the firms that have been responsible at 
some point in time and those that have not. The rest of the control variables were 
included, with the industry dummy variables coming from the BFA line item MRK, 
where they were coded accordingly:  
Dummy Variable Industry Code 
0 Industrials 
1 Consumer Services 
2 Financials 
3 Basic Materials 
4 Telecommunications
5 Consumer Goods 
6 Technology 
7 Health Care 
8 Oil & Gas 
As a result, the dummy variables were included for the industries coded as 1 through to 
8 (there were 9 different industries therefore n-1 dummy variables were used). In the 
regression models, the variables have been shortened for brevity, thus ConsServ 
represents firms classified as those from the Consumer Services sector, BasicMat 
represents Basic Materials etc. For risk the debt/asset ratio was calculated as Long-
Term Debt (BFA line item 02010016) divided by Total Assets (BFA line item 
02010050). The size variables from Waddock and Graves (1997) were also used with 
Total assets (BFA line item 02010050) and Total Sales (Turnover, BFA line item 
02020060) being included. Since there were significantly fewer firms with data for the 
Number of Employees variable, this resulted in far fewer firm-year observations for the 
regressions using employees as a control variable (with similar restrictions in later 
regressions). Filtering the data on ROE, ROA, Assets and Sales left the sample with 
1686 firm-years whereas filtering the data using the Number of Employees variable 
resulted in only 1237 firm-years. Due to the presence of two financial performance 
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variables and three different size variables, a total of six regressions for this model were 
performed:  
Regression 1a: ROE = a0 + a1SRI + a2ASSETS + a3RISK + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat 
+ a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + ε  
Regression 1b: ROE = a0 + a1SRI + a2SALES + a3RISK+ a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat + 
a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + ε  
Regression 1c: ROE = a0 + a1SRI + a2EMPLOYEES + a3RISK + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ 
a6BasicMat + a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + ε  
Regression 2a: ROA = a0 + a1SRI + a2ASSETS + a3RISK + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat 
+ a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + ε  
Regression 2b: ROA = a0 + a1SRI + a2SALES + a3RISK + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat + 
a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + ε  
Regression 2c: ROA = a0 + a1SRI + a2EMPLOYEES + a3RISK + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ 
a6BasicMat + a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + ε  
Due to much of the previous empirical evidence suggesting that prior and future returns 
be included in models attempting to explain this relationship (McGuire et al., 1988; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997; Orlitzky et al., 2003), the feasibility of such an extension 
was examined. Unfortunately, due to the relative youth of the SRI index, the only data 
available for companies participating in the index starts in 2004 and ends in 2009, and 
as a result it was impractical to use future returns as an explanatory variable. In addition 
to the data restriction, it was noted in McGuire et al. (1988) that “rather than examining 
the relationship between corporate social responsibility and a firm’s subsequent 
financial performance, future research should investigate the influence of prior firm 
performance” (McGuire et al., 1988, p. 869). Thus prior returns were examined, and for 
both ROE and ROA the returns from the previous five years were included as additional 
independent variables. Importantly, for these regression models the SRI dummy 
variable was not coded as 1 if the firm had participated in the SRI index at any point in 
time (like in the previous regressions). Instead, since the period examined was restricted 
to 2004-2009, the dummy variable was coded 1 if the firm was present in the SRI index 
for that year. The reason for this was to examine if the previous five years financial 
return had an impact on the firms participation in the SRI index in the period examined. 
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In other words, had the firm’s prior financial performance affected its current social 
performance in any way? The additional regression models were as follows:  
Regression 3a: ROE = a0 + a1SRI + a2ASSETS + a3RISK + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat + 
a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + a12ROE(T-1) + a13ROE(T-2) + 
a14ROE(T-3)+ a15 ROE(T-4) + a16 ROE(T-5) +  ε  
Regression 3b: ROE = a0 + a1SRI + a2SALES + a3RISK+ + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat + 
a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + a12ROE(T-1) + a13ROE(T-2) + 
a14ROE(T-3)+ a15 ROE(T-4) + a16 ROE(T-5) +  ε 
Regression 3c: ROE = a0 + a1SRI + a2EMPLOYEES + a3RISK + + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat + 
a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + a12ROE(T-1) + a13ROE(T-2) + 
a14ROE(T-3)+ a15 ROE(T-4) + a16 ROE(T-5) +  ε 
Regression 4a: ROA = a0 + a1SRI + a2ASSETS + a3RISK + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat + 
a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + a12ROA(T-1) + a13ROA(T-2) + 
a14ROA(T-3)+ a15 ROA(T-4) + a16 ROA(T-5) +  ε 
Regression 4b: ROA = a0 + a1SRI + a2SALES + a3RISK + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat + 
a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + a12ROA(T-1) + a13ROA(T-2) + 
a14ROA(T-3)+ a15 ROA(T-4) + a16 ROA(T-5) +  ε 
Regression 4c: ROA = a0 + a1SRI + a2EMPLOYEES + a3RISK + a4ConsServ + a5Financials+ a6BasicMat + 
a7Telecomm + a8ConsGoods + a9Technology + a10Healthcare + a11Oilgas + a12ROA(T-1) + a13ROA(T-2) + 
a14ROA(T-3)+ a15 ROA(T-4) + a16 ROA(T-5) +  ε 
Subsequent performance was included in five progressive regressions, starting with the 
full specification of all five years prior performance, (regression 3a1 and 4a1) where the 
second regression only included 1-years prior performance. The third regression 
included 1-year and 2-years prior performance, the fourth regression included the 
performance from 1-, 2- and 3-years prior, and the fifth and final regression included 
the performance of the prior four years. In the appendix, the regression models were 
labelled 3a1-5, 3b1-5. etc where the models 1,2,3,4 and 5 each represent the different 
specifications. The models labelled 1 were the full specification models (with all 5 
years prior performance) because these were the initial regression models tested. 
Following from this, model 2 only included 1-year’s prior performance, model 3 
included 1-year as well as 2-year’s prior performance; model 4 included 1-,2- and 3-
year’s prior performance and finally model 5 included 1-,2-,3- and 4-year’s prior 
performance. 
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Lankoski (2009) surveyed managers on CSR issues that they perceived to influence 
economic performance over the medium term of five years. The author hypothesised 
that market measures of performance rest entirely on investor perceptions, and 
considering the information asymmetry between investors and managers, management 
perceptions may be more valuable than investor perceptions. Additionally, the reason 
for the five year time period was that there may be a temporal asymmetry in the 
distribution of costs and benefits with many corporate responsibility issues, and thus the 
choice of a time frame may affect the outcome. In terms of this study, the proxy for 
CSP that was used meant that actual corporate social investments were not being 
observed, thus the temporal asymmetry could not be examined. Instead the performance 
of firms included in, and excluded from, the SRI index was looked at during the period 
of the index’ existence and back tested to periods before the initiation of the index to 
see if there existed any temporal effects. The above methodologies can be summarised 
in the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is no significant relationship between CFP and CSP 
The null hypothesis above is that there is no relationship, whereas the alternate 
hypothesis may imply a positive or negative relationship between social and financial 
performance.  
 
Although the previous regressions detailed have been rather thorough, different 
perspectives may be examined to get a more complete understanding of the relationship 
between social and financial performance. To this end, another regression model was 
looked at; this time taken from Callan and Thomas (2009). Using their regression 
model, the main control variables for size were included as quadratics to test the 
linearity of the relationship. Three measures of financial performance were tested, 
where operating profit, ROE and ROA were taken as the dependent variables, while the 
independent variables consisted of:  
SRI – Once again a dummy variable indicating whether or not the company has ever been in the SRI 
index at some point in time 
DebtEquity – The long-term debt to equity ratio 
Total Assets (millions) – A control for size, included was Total Assets² as a test of linearity. 
Total Sales (millions) – Another control, where again Total Sales² was included. 
Employees (thousands) – The final control variable for size; again Employees² was also included. 
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Industry Variables – A list of dummy variables pertaining to the various industries that the companies 
are from. 
In Callan and Thomas (2009) the authors used four financial performance measures 
commonly used in the previous literature; ROA, ROE, ROS, as well as a less familiar 
measure, that being Tobin’s q. Due to the lack of information for a standardised ROS 
measure from McGregor BFA, as well as a measure for Tobin’s q, these metrics were 
excluded and instead Operating Performance (BFA line item 02020094) was used. This 
resulted in the following regression models: 
Regression 5a: Operating Profit = a0 + a1SRI + a2DebtEquity + a3TotalAssets + a4TotalSales + 
a5Employees + Industry + ε 
Regression 5b: Operating Profit = a0 + a1SRI + a2DebtEquity + a3TotalAssets + a4TotalAssets² + 
a5TotalSales + a6TotalSales² + a7Employees + a8Employees² + Industry + ε 
Regression 6a: ROE = a0 + a1SRI + a2DebtEquity + a3TotalAssets + a4TotalSales + a5Employees + 
Industry + ε 
Regression 6b: ROE = a0 + a1SRI + a2DebtEquity + a3TotalAssets + a4TotalAssets² + a5TotalSales + 
a6TotalSales² + a7Employees + a8Employees² + Industry + ε 
Regression 7a: ROA = = a0 + a1SRI + a2DebtEquity + a3TotalAssets + a4TotalSales + a5Employees + 
Industry + ε 
Regression 7b: ROA = a0 + a1SRI + a2DebtEquity + a3TotalAssets + a4TotalAssets² + a5TotalSales + 
a6TotalSales² + a7Employees + a8Employees² + Industry + ε 
Each pair of models consisted of the regression with and without the quadratic size 
variables (as in Callan & Thomas, 2009); and each of the three performance measures 
was examined resulting in six unique regression models. The above regression models 
were once again used for a longer-term analysis, therefore the sample period examined 
was 1995-2009. 
 
As was covered earlier, some studies of the DSI (Luck and Pilotte, 1993; Kurtz and 
DiBartolomeo, 1996; and DiBartolomeo, 1996; all cited in Kurtz, 1997) suggested that 
its performance was replicable by matching factor exposures; however, Kurtz (1997) 
stated proponents of SRI usually reject the reductionism implied by these findings using 
various arguments. It was noted that one of these arguments resulted from studies that 
associated positive returns with progressive management practices, as this may be an 
underlying cause of the relationship; therefore one of the arguments employed by 
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advocates of CSR is that it is a sign of skilful management. This follows from the 
possibility that socially responsible behaviour is an indicator of management 
competence (Alexander & Buchholz, 1982) in that good managers should be more 
likely to excel at social responsibility than their less clever counterparts. Waddock and 
Graves (1997b; cited in Kurtz, 1997) showed a relationship between positive social 
ratings and the Fortune “Most Admired” list however the problem of direction 
(causality) remained: is the company successful because of good management, or is 
management perceived as being of high quality because of the stock price? Furthermore 
social ratings appear to be relatively stable over time whereas the history of the Fortune 
“Most Admired” list showed the transient nature of management reputation, thus 
casting some doubt on the direct relationship between social ratings and the 
management prowess of these socially responsible firms. 
 
Due to the data limitations subsequent financial performance could not be examined as 
extensively as prior performance, however, the performance of the year directly 
following each SRI year was examined as a cursory analysis of future performance. 
This was done for completeness; thus, although it was not as thorough as the prior 
performance analysis, subsequent performance was still included in some form. The 
regression using future financial performance was described in this dissertation as the 
‘test for causality’ and generally tried to follow the methodology of Waddock and 
Graves (1997). The authors were able to regress their financial performance on social 
performance as well as the other way around since both their variables were 
quantitative. Due to the fact that the CSP measure used in this study was a dummy 
variable representing when the firm participated in the SRI index, for comparative 
regressions examining the CSP proxy as the dependent variable a Logit analysis needed 
to be used. This allowed for the dependent variable to be a binary response variable, 
where the results give a prediction of the probability of occurrence. To clearly examine 
the direction of causality regression analyses were performed more in line with 
Waddock and Graves (1997, p. 313) in that they examined their two hypotheses using: 
 A regression analysis with 1990 CSP as dependent variable, and 1989 financial data as the 
independent variables 
 A regression analysis with 1991 financial performance (profitability) as dependent variable and 
1990 CSP as the key independent variable with 1990 financial control variables. 
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As stated, a direct consequence of the CSP proxy being a binary variable was that Logit 
analysis was needed when examining social performance as the dependent variable. For 
the data, the same sample firms were used as from the earlier regression analysis (188 
SRI and conventional firms combined). Filtering the data on the variables for the 
current year, the data for the previous years, as well as the subsequent year’s financial 
data, resulted in around 578 firm-year observations for the Total Assets and Total Sales 
regressions with around 445 firm-year observations for the Employees regression 
models. The above methodology can be formed into the following three hypotheses 
(borrowed from Waddock and Graves, 1997): 
H4: Good CSP does not result in better CFP (Good management theory) 
H5: Good CFP does not result in greater CSP (Slack resources theory) 
H6: CSP and CFP do not affect each other mutually and simultaneously in a 
virtuous circle 
The standard linear regressions had the financial performance from the subsequent year 
regressed against the SRI variable (and other control variables) for the period looked at 
– thus testing if CSP influences CFP. For the Logit regressions, the dependent variable 
was the SRI variable in the period looked at, where the independent variables were the 
control variables as well as the financial performance from the previous year – testing if 
CFP influences CSP. The above regressions were described as follows:  
Regression 8a: ROET+1 = a0 + a1SRIT + a2TotalAssetsT + a3RiskT + Industry + ε 
Regression 8b: ROET+1 = a0 + a1SRIT + a2TotalSalesT + a3RiskT + Industry + ε 
Regression 8c: ROET+1 = a0 + a1SRIT + a2EmployeesT + a3RiskT + Industry + ε 
Regression 8d: ROAT+1 = a0 + a1SRIT + a2TotalAssetsT + a3RiskT + Industry + ε 
Regression 8e: ROAT+1 = a0 + a1SRIT + a2TotalSalesT + a3RiskT + Industry + ε 
Regression 8f: ROAT+1 = a0 + a1SRIT + a2EmployeesT + a3RiskT + Industry + ε 
Regression 9a: SRIT = a0 + a1ROET-1 + a2TotalAssetsT-1 + a3RiskT-1 + Industry + ε 
Regression 9b SRIT = a0 + a1ROET-1 + a2TotalSalesT-1 + a3RiskT-1 + Industry + ε 
Regression 9c: SRIT = a0 + a1ROET-1 + a2EmployeesT-1 + a3RiskT-1 + Industry + ε 
Regression 9d: SRIT = a0 + a1ROAT-1 + a2TotalAssetsT-1 + a3RiskT-1 + Industry + ε 
Regression 9e: SRIT = a0 + a1ROAT-1 + a2TotalSalesT-1 + a3RiskT-1 + Industry + ε 
Regression 9f: SRIT = a0 + a1ROAT-1 + a2EmployeesT-1 + a3RiskT-1 + Industry + ε 
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Risk in the above regressions was taken as the long-term debt to assets ratio, and 
industry once again represented a vector of the different industry dummy variables as 
described in the previous section.  
 
4.3.1 Panel Data 
Due to the fact that panel data may introduce some bias into the results using traditional 
linear regressions, this can be accounted for by using the appropriate functions. In Stata, 
this was done using the xtreg command which treated the data set as time-series data 
and analysed it accordingly. In terms of statistical problems with regressions and the 
data, it is important to remember the possibility of multicollinearity and 
heteroskedasticity. Additionally, the stationarity of the data needs to be tested. Using 
the panel data regression analysis (xtreg) allowed the regression to be run using fixed 
effects or random effects; however, the problem with random effects is that it makes 
strong assumptions about the residuals being uncorrelated and is therefore very 
unrealistic. Additionally, since multicollinearity is most likely, the regressions were run 
with the fixed effects specification. This controls for unchanging individual effects, and 
helps pick up any unobserved variables that may underlie the relationship being 
examined. In all of the regressions using fixed effects, the industry variables were 
dropped since they remained unchanged throughout the sample period; as a result these 
regressions did not shed light on any of the importance derived from different 
industries.   
 
This was vital because, as mentioned earlier, the SRI dummy variable was defined in 
two ways for this study. In the shorter time periods restricted to the existence of the SRI 
index, the dummy indicated when the firm was present in the index for the given year, 
thus over the sample period this variable changed according to whether the firm 
entered, remained in or left the index. For the longer periods, the variable indicated if 
the company had been in the index at any point in time, and therefore was unchanged 
over the entire sample period. In this case using fixed effects for the longer regressions 
resulted in the SRI variable being dropped, and thus diminishing the regressions 
usefulness. For the regression models using extended periods of time, and where the 
fixed effects models were not used, standard linear regressions were used to assess the 
relationships. Thus, the McWilliams and Siegel (2000) regressions over the 15 year 
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period [1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b and 2c], the Waddock and Graves (1997) causality regressions 
[8a-f, and 9a-f], as well as the Callan and Thomas (2009) regressions [5a, 5b, 6a, 6b, 7a 
and 7b] all used the standard linear regression analysis. In contrast, the regressions 
restricted to the 5-year period [3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b and 4c] were run using the xtreg fixed 
effects specification. In these regressions, modified Wald tests indicated the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, thus to remove any biases the panel regressions were run using 
robust residuals. In some of the xtreg regressions (spanning different performance 
measures and size proxies) a Year term was included to distinguish the effect of the 
business cycle on any of the regressions. The reason for this is that participation in the 
SRI index may coincide with peaks or troughs in the business cycle; and therefore by 
including the Year term as an independent variable, significant coefficients would 
indicate the direction the economy was moving and its effect on financial performance. 
For the most part, however, the regressions tended to have highly insignificant 
coefficients for the year variable, and thus the variable was excluded from the 
regression analysis.  
 
The final issue examined was that of stationarity, and to get an idea of the movement of 
the series, a visual representation of the returns distribution for ROE (Figure 18) and 
ROA (Figure 19) over the 1995-2009 sample period was examined: 
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Figure 18 - A Histogram of the ROE Distribution for the 1995-2009 Sample Period. 
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Figure 19 - A Histogram of the ROA Distribution for the 1995-2009 Sample Period. 
 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 give an indication of the distribution of ROE and ROA, 
and as can be seen they tend to cluster closely to the modal bin. Another way of 
interpreting the distribution is by examining a graph of the median and mean of each of 
the financial performance measures over the period 1995-2009: 
Median vs Mean ROA - 1995 - 2009
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Figure 20 - Median Versus Mean ROA - 1995 - 2009 
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Figure 21 - Median Versus Mean ROE - 1995 - 2009 
As can be seen, the results for the graph of ROA tend to be rather stable over the period. 
Although the values do rise and fall, they appear to hover around the mean quite 
closely. In Figure 20 the average of the mean and median for ROA are very similar, 
and both trend lines hover around this average. In contrast, Figure 21 shows that the 
average for the median of ROE is higher than the average of the mean, which indicates 
that there are more values above the mean, however they are of smaller magnitude than 
the negative returns, which pulls the mean down. This is also evident in the highly 
erratic trend lines for the mean and median ROE, as although in later years it recovered; 
the middle period indicates severe drops into negative values for the series. Overall, 
these graphical illustrations do not indicate any critical issues, and the empirical section 
analysis was discussed and concluded in the upcoming chapters. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 
Since the empirical section examined various methodologies with differing aims, each 
of the tests shall be looked at individually, with their results contrasted to the earlier 
academic findings. Once the results have been discussed in-depth, they shall be tied 
together and discussed as a body of evidence for or against CSR and SRI, where the 
conclusions of these results are discussed in the next chapter.  
 
5.1 Event Study 
 
Looking at the results from the short term analysis (event study) the Z-statistics seemed 
to indicate that none of the event dates had any significant influence on the stock price 
of the constituent companies: 
Event Dates Z-score 
19-May-04 -0.011016132 
19-May-05 -0.029494245 
25-Apr-06 0.031508765 
27-Nov-07 0.089542563 
26-Nov-08 0.325614726 
30-Nov-09 -0.014947688 
Table 1 – Event dates and corresponding Z-score statistics for an event study with 
a 1-day event window. 
Table 1 shows the results for an event study where only the date of the announcement 
was used, resulting in a 1 day event window. The results indicated that, in absolute 
value, the largest of the test statistics was for the 26 November 2008 event date, and this 
was only 0.326. Therefore these results show that essentially none of the event dates 
had a significant impact on the financial returns of the firms examined. Due to the fact 
that the announcement date, and the date the index went live sometimes differed by a 
day, the event window was increased to two days: the day of the announcement and the 
next day (the go live date for the index). The same tests were run using this expanded 
event window, and once again it was evident that none of the statistics were significant. 
Since the main conclusion was the same (no statistical significance) and a smaller event 
window is generally better, the results for the 2-day event window have not been 
presented here.  
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The consequences of this result may not be entirely conclusive, and may not necessarily 
impede any motivation for research in the CSR field. It is possible that the proxy for 
CSR (that being participation in the SRI index) was either not a good enough 
representation of social performance, or it was not recognised by investors to the degree 
that it influences their decisions. Alternatively, if markets are not efficient then it is 
possible that the announcement dates possess some influence; however, the effects are 
not instantaneously adjusted in the stock prices, and may only appear over the longer-
term - voiding the use of the event study. Arlow and Gannon (1982) tentatively 
concluded that economic performance (at least in the short run) was not directly linked 
in either a positive or a negative fashion to social responsiveness. The results from the 
event study seemed to confirm their finding as none of the event dates had significant 
statistics, indicating that the announcements of the SRI constituents had no effect on 
their performance. Thus, in the short-term, using price changes as the measure of 
financial effect, there seemed to be no relation between perceptions of the firms CSR 
characteristics and the share price movements. 
 
Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) also concluded that CSR may only be related with firm 
profitability over the long-term and thus if investors are able to evaluate the potential 
future impact that positive CSR announcements will have, they may be able to bid up 
the price of the firm. As discussed, the results of the event study seemed to indicate that 
none of the event dates had any significance; however the theoretical justification for 
such expectations shall be explained briefly. For the purposes of this study, using the 
SRI index as a proxy for CSP, the event dates were used as the day that the SRI 
announced the constituent list for the following year. The hypothesis was that if 
investors truly value the social aspect of business, then the announcement may change 
the investors’ perceptions of the constituent companies and there may be a follow-
through effect on the stock prices. Instead what was found was that none of the dates 
held any significance, and there may be a few reasons for this. The first possibility is 
that some of the key assumptions underlying the model may have been violated, and 
they are as follows: that markets are efficient, the event was unanticipated and there 
were no confounding effects during the event window. The final assumption regarding 
confounding events did not even come into picture due to the insignificance of the 
statistics for each event date, thus in the case that this assumption had been violated, it 
would mean that for each firm some external event resulted in a change in the opposite 
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direction to that hypothesised from the announcement. Since this was highly unlikely 
the other two assumptions were examined.  
 
The assumption of anticipation was likely to be upheld due to the fact that the event 
window covered the date of the announcement as well as the date on which the changes 
went live on the index. The process involved in constituent selection meant that only the 
research organisation (EIRIS) and the JSE would know prior which companies had met 
all the required criteria for admission into the index, and there would have been no 
public announcements regarding this matter before the actual announcement of the 
constituent lists. Thus it was with some confidence that the events were taken to be 
unanticipated. The final major assumption was that of market efficiency, where the 
EMH contends that if the market is efficient, then any new public information which 
could affect the value of the shares should be impounded into the stock price as soon as 
it becomes known. In light of the results, the conclusions that may follow are either that 
markets are not efficient, and consequently the information had not been priced 
immediately even if it did have some value; or alternatively the announcement did not 
change the perceptions of any investors. Teoh et al. (1999) found that the shareholder 
boycott resulting in the divestment from South Africa had no financial impact on the 
markets, where their methodology also entailed the use of an event study. Teoh et al. 
(1999) conducted their event study with the aim of discerning the financial impact of 
divestment on South African markets and their analysis was divided into different areas 
such as looking at U.S. banks with loans to South Africa, South African financial 
markets, and the impact of legislative events as well as the effect of pension fund 
divestment. As with the event study presented in this dissertation, none of the event 
dates were significant. Teoh et al. (1999) found that in terms of legislative events, there 
was no evidence that the market perceived any individual date to have had significantly 
adverse effects on banks with South African operations, and similarly there was little 
evidence that the South African financial markets (or its exchange rates) were adversely 
affected by these legislative events. The authors also examined the effect of pension 
fund divestment announcements on U.S. firms with large South African operations 
where it was concluded that the evidence did not indicate that announcements of 
pension fund divestment significantly hurt these firms. There was also no reliable 
negative reaction on any individual financial series at individual divestment dates or 
with the aggregated divestment dates. The final analysis looked at voluntary divestment 
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announcements and the associated mean abnormal returns. The aim of this analysis was 
to determine if political or social preferences were additional attributes of investments 
so that investor preferences created downward slowing demand. In other words “is the 
elasticity of demand for divesting firms’ stock low enough so that regaining the 
approval by social activists can increase the firm’s share price” (Teoh et al., 1999, p. 
74). Teoh et al. (1999)’s results showed no significant return reactions, indicating that 
there was no evidence of firms being affected by their divestment announcement.  
 
In its totality, the results from their study showed that (as with the event study in this 
dissertation) the markets did not seem to price the social characteristics of the firm. This 
resulted in a situation where those firms with operations in South Africa that were sold 
as a result of their behaviour could find sufficient willing buyers who were not as 
ethically stringent, and consequently where the share price did not change significantly. 
Since the announcements were essentially in opposite directions (SRI announcement 
were taken to be positive, where operations in South Africa were negative), the results 
for this study meant that in South Africa the social characteristics of the firms were 
either already priced in the markets, or that investors did not value this information 
enough to act on it. This contrasts with the South African divestment in that although 
there was definitely a lot of publicity concerning this social issue, the number of 
investors willing to act on their beliefs may have been marginal compared to the 
number of investors with traditional investment criteria and who would readily invest in 
the firms regardless of their social performance (and political stance). Their conclusion 
was that the use of boycotts to influence share prices and subsequent company actions 
had no effect, and their result can be extended to this study in that it seems that the 
announcement of participation on the SRI index had no effect on the share price. Thus, 
although it is possible that markets are not efficient, it may seem more likely that the 
chosen event carried no informational value for investors. Ultimately either socially 
responsible investments are not being valued by investors, or the proxy used (the SRI 
index) was not an adequate representation of the firm’s CSP – but whatever the 
underlying reason it was apparent that there were no abnormal price adjustments at the 
time of announcement. 
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5.2 SRI analysis – Three Factor Model and Portfolio Return Comparisons 
 
The next examination was of the social factor from the perspective of the investor, 
where the different methods included risk-adjusted metrics as well as the use of a 
performance attribution model – Fama and French’s Three Factor model. The reason for 
this section was to examine if being an ethical investor has any direct consequences on 
portfolio returns. This ties into previous literature (Hamilton et al., 1993; Diltz, 1995; 
DiBartolomeo & Kurtz, 1999; Viviers et al., 2008) where the importance of the cost to 
SRI was examined. To outline the three cases once more, it is possible that there are no 
differences between SRI and conventional portfolios, thus enabling investors to be 
indifferent about the investment criteria. Alternatively, if there are positive returns to 
SRI investments, then the social factor is resulting in additional return for investors who 
act responsibly with their investments. The final possibility is that SRI firms perform 
worse than conventional firms, and in this case investors have to bear a cost to invest 
according to their ethics and be ‘socially responsible’ with their funds. Due to the 
variety in the possible outcomes, it is important to ascertain exactly which situation 
exists in South Africa today so that investors may make informed decisions about their 
investment choices. 
 
5.2.1 – Three Factor Model  
The methodology used to examine excess portfolio returns was the Three Factor Model, 
and it was performed using both value-weighted and equally-weighted portfolios. 
Looking at the model using the value-weighted portfolios the results showed that in 
terms of the SRI portfolio, the model explained 56.22% of the variation in the 1995-
2009 time period, and only 34.81% of the variation in the shorter 1999-2009 time 
period. What this indicates is that using the extended market model, the returns could 
not completely be explained; and that there may be something else driving returns. This 
is in contrast with the conventional portfolio as for the longer period, 89.84% of the 
variation was explained while looking at the shorter period this decreased to 86.93%. 
The results regarding the conventional portfolio are somewhat to be expected as this 
portfolio consists of the majority of the market, thus the market index should predict 
returns well. Interestingly, in every model run, the intercept was negative, meaning that 
the alpha was negative, and that both portfolios underperformed the market-based 
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benchmark. This was an alpha of -0.0159 and -0.023 per month for the SRI portfolio in 
the 1995-2009 and 1999-2009 periods respectively. In both periods, the alpha for the 
conventional portfolio was smaller than for SRI, with values of -0.0148 and -0.0168 for 
the long and short periods respectively. For both portfolios, the underperformance was 
worse during the shorter period. Additionally, all of the intercept coefficients were 
significant at the 1% level. Another interesting finding was that the coefficients for the 
SMB factor indicated that the SRI portfolio was considered large-cap (while the 
conventional portfolio was small cap). As mentioned earlier, due to the process of social 
investing and the nature of the SRI, as opposed to excluding socially irresponsible 
stocks, the positive social tilting resulted in the majority of the top 40 companies being 
included in the SRI. Thus, the SRI portfolio relative to the conventional portfolio is 
much larger, and this is evident in the coefficients of the SMB factors.  
  
Turning to the equally-weighted portfolios, the results indicated that the Three Factor 
Model explained a lot more of the variance in the SRI portfolio in both time periods 
when the adjusted R² increased to 84.04% and 81.87% for the 15 year and 10 year time 
periods respectively. This was the opposite of what was expected, as if there is a social 
factor influencing results, due to the size of the constituents and their contribution to 
market performance it may be distorted when value-weighted portfolios are used. In this 
case however, turning to equally-weighted portfolios the explanatory power of the 
models increased. Once again the intercepts were negative and highly significant with 
both coefficients having p-values of 0.0000 and t-stats greater than 10 (in absolute 
value). Although using the value-weighted portfolios resulted in the HML factors 
tending to be 0 for all the models, a stark contrast with the equally-weighted portfolio 
showed that for the SRI portfolio in the 15 year period, the HML factor increased from 
0.06 to 0.17, and in the 10 year period the factor increased from 0.1 to 0.23. Thus using 
equally-weighted portfolios, the SRI portfolio seemed to show signs of value 
characteristics; which were previously obscured when using the value-weighted 
approach. Following from these differences, the value-weighted portfolio showed that 
the conventional firms had only one insignificant factor, that being HML - which 
indicated that the portfolio had growth biases. For the SRI portfolio both the HML and 
SMB factors had insignificant coefficients, however using the equally-weighted 
portfolio showed that HML was significantly different from zero, and thus tended 
towards value while maintaining its large cap bias.  
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5.2.2 – Risk-adjusted Return Comparisons   
Due to the difference in composition between the SRI portfolio for the 1995-2009 and 
1999-2009 time periods, they were labelled SRI95 and SRI99 for clarification, and 
these portfolios were tested against the J203 as well as the Conventional portfolio for 
differences in their mean over different time periods. The summary statistics are 
presented in the following tables:  
Period: 1995/07/31-2009/06/30     
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conventional 168 0.015631 0.0525041 -0.21157 0.128046 
SRI95(value) 168 0.017788 0.0656984 -0.29424 0.187594 
SRI95(equal) 168 0.01855 0.0559156 -0.23688 0.1570005 
J203 168 0.035948 0.0614342 -0.31792 0.169095 
Table 2 - Comparison Between SRI and Conventional Portfolios - 15 Year Period 
Period : 1999/11/30-2009/06/30 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conventional 116 0.015838 0.051754 -0.10559 0.125639 
SRI99(value) 116 0.017623 0.060155 -0.13785 0.149783 
SRI99(equal) 116 0.018928 0.0499094 -0.1270967 0.1274848
J203 116 0.038357 0.056175 -0.11427 0.169095 
Table 3 - Comparison Between SRI and Conventional Portfolios - 10 Year Period 
As can be seen from Table 2 and Table 3 the means in both time periods followed 
similar patterns where the Conventional portfolio consistently underperformed the SRI 
portfolio, which in turn performed worse than the market index - as proxied for by the 
J203. Interestingly, the patterns of the standard deviations were again similar in both 
time periods, where the least volatile portfolio was the Conventional portfolio, followed 
by the market index, and then by the SRI index which had the highest standard 
deviation. These raw statistics gave an indication of which portfolios had comparatively 
higher mean returns, however to perform a more statistically accurate analysis the 
return series were tested for differences in means, where the results are summarised in 
Table 4: 
Paired t-test - 15 year t-stat p-value 
SRI95 - J203 -14.09370 0.00000 
Conventional - J203 -7.52290 0.00000 
Conventional - SRI95 -0.66320 0.50810 
Paired t-test - 10 year t-stat p-value 
SRI99 - J203 -19.03530 0.00000 
Conventional - J203 -7.15230 0.00000 
Conventional - SRI99 -0.4913 0.62410 
Table 4 - T-tests for Differences in Mean (Conventional Versus SRI) 
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It was found that in the 15 year period the Conventional and SRI portfolios were 
significantly different from the J203 market series, with t-stats of -7.52 and -14.09, 
respectively. Similarly, in the 10 year period the two portfolios were once again 
significantly different from the market series with t-stats of -7.15 and -19.04 
respectively. In contrast, when the two portfolios were compared to each other, the 
conventional and SRI portfolios had t-stats of -0.49 and -0.66 for the 10 and 15 year 
periods respectively. Thus, in terms of statistical significance the two portfolios attained 
similar performance and using these tests it was impossible to determine whether the 
SRI portfolio definitively outperformed its conventional peer; therefore further analysis 
was required. 
 
Risk-adjusted Performance: 
Using the same SRI lists for the 1995-2009 and 1999-2009 subperiods as from the three 
factor model analysis; the portfolios were compared using the three risk-adjusted 
performance measures mentioned earlier (taken from Viviers et al., 2008), and the 
results have been presented in Table 5: 
Portfolio SRI (Value) SRI (Equal) Conventional 
 SRI95 SRI99 SRI95 SRI99 Conv95 Conv99 
Sharpe Ratio 0.17451779 0.443788 -0.24839 0.063167 -0.74471 -0.21274 
Sortino Ratio 0.240090845 0.758689 -0.37002 0.118225 -1.01956 -0.31989 
Upside Potential Ratio 0.259595755 0.329755 0.265348 0.621449 0.223972 0.237781
Table 5 - Summary of Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures 
As can be seen, in all cases (value-weighted SRI, equally-weighted SRI and 
conventional) the shorter 10 year portfolio always outperformed the 15 year portfolio. 
For the value-weighted SRI assessment, the SRI99 Sharpe Ratio gave a value of 0.44 as 
opposed to 0.17 for the SRI95 which indicated that per unit of risk, the shorter period 
portfolio attained greater excess return; and similar results were found in the same 
portfolio when the Sortino ratio was used. The differences were slightly smaller for the 
Upside Potential Ratio; however, once again the shorter period outperformed. An 
interesting difference was seen when the SRI value-weighted portfolio was compared to 
the equal-weighted portfolio, as all metrics were worse off except for the Upside 
Potential Ratio. The SRI95 portfolio had a negative measure for the Sharpe and Sortino 
ratios, which meant that on a risk-adjusted basis both of these measures achieved 
negative returns by performing worse than the risk free asset. Importantly, both of the 
SRI portfolios outperformed the conventional portfolio using all three of the risk-
  165
adjusted metrics - as well as in both time periods. For the Sharpe and Sortino ratios, the 
Conventional portfolio was negative in all cases which indicated that using the same 
risk free rate, the Conventional portfolio performed much worse than the SRI portfolio 
in the 10 year and 15 year time periods. The Upside Potential Ratio was positive, 
however, once again the measure showed that the Conventional portfolio 
underperformed both of the SRI portfolios (0.224 and 0.238 verses 0.26, 0.33, 0.265 
and 0.621). Using the alternative conventional portfolio as a comparison for raw 
returns, an investment in July 1995 of R1 in both the SRI (value-weighted) and the 
conventional portfolios was examined by compounding the returns series created for the 
two portfolios. This analysis showed that the investments grew to R13.48 and R10.76, 
for the SRI and conventional portfolios respectively. Figure 22 describes the 
movement of the portfolios (including the equally-weighted SRI portfolio), from 
inception in 1995 until the end of the sample period in 2009. 
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Figure 22 - Simple Compounding of SRI Return Series (Value- and Equally-
Weighted) Versus Alternative Conventional Return Series 
It is interesting to note that for the first five years, the differences between the two 
portfolios were marginal, with the differences hovering around zero until 1999. After 
January 1999, the differences were always positive in that the SRI portfolio consistently 
had a higher value than that of the corresponding conventional portfolio. As can be seen 
in the trend line, the SRI portfolio seemed to outperform the conventional portfolio with 
the differences slowly increasing over time. Towards the end of the sample period the 
difference between the two series reached its maximum; with the biggest difference 
between the portfolios (R6.37) occurring during June 2008. Thus, using raw returns 
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aside from the marginal differences earlier in the sample period, the SRI portfolio 
seemed to have consistently performed better than its conventional counterpart – a 
result which is corroborated using the afore-mentioned risk-adjusted performance 
metrics. Another important finding that must be discussed before moving on was the 
fact that both of the constructed portfolios consistently underperformed the market 
index (J203). This may be an artefact of the portfolio creation as they were formed on 
the basis of SRI and size characteristics only, for the SRI and conventional portfolios, 
respectively. As a result, these criteria may have introduced biases as well as additional 
risk factors which were not accounted for and may explain why the purely diversified 
‘portfolio’ - the market index - outperformed both of the constructed portfolios. A 
graphical representation of this finding is seen in Figure 23, which includes the same 
returns series compared in Figure 22, with the addition of the J203 returns series. As 
can be seen, the large discrepancies between the hypothetical portfolios and the market 
index has compounded over time to result in a significantly different end value. 
Conventional vs SRI
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Ju
l-9
5
Ja
n-
96
Ju
l-9
6
Ja
n-
97
Ju
l-9
7
Ja
n-
98
Ju
l-9
8
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
Ja
n-
05
Ju
l-0
5
Ja
n-
06
Ju
l-0
6
Ja
n-
07
Ju
l-0
7
Ja
n-
08
Ju
l-0
8
Ja
n-
09
Date
Va
lu
e 
of
 P
or
tfo
lio
Conventional Portfolio
SRI Portfolio (Value)
SRI Portfolio (Equal)
Market Index (J203)
 
Figure 23 – Comparison of SRI and Conventional Returns Series Versus the Market 
Index (J203) 
One possible explanation is that due to selection issues, although many of the SRI index 
constituents currently comprise the majority of the market capitalisation of the JSE, this 
may not have been the case in the past. The fact that the market index included all new 
companies as well as those influenced by booms, while the SRI list remained the same 
over time may explain the vast differences in performance. To this end, the composition 
of the Top 40 since the beginning of the sample period was examined, and the 
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companies were cross-referenced with those that participated in the SRI index. Using 
the Findata@Wits database the market capitalisations of the universe of stocks were 
examined at the end of January for each year from 1995 until 2009. These market 
capitalisations were then sorted so that the 40 largest companies for each year could be 
determined (these company lists can be found in the appendix chapter 8.4 SRI Index 
Participants). The constituent companies of the SRI portfolios were compared against 
the Top 40 lists throughout the sample period. This was to try explain the significant 
differences in performance, as if the Top 40 companies differed greatly from the SRI 
portfolio companies over time, it is reasonable that the performances of the overall 
market and the SRI portfolio may vary. In the following table, the number of companies 
that were in the Top 40, as well as the corresponding SRI portfolio were given for each 
year from 1995 until 2009.  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SRI95 
SRI99 
15 
15 
15 
15 
16 
16 
15 
16 
15 
17 
17 
22 
19 
24 
21 
27 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
SRI95 
SRI99 
22 
28 
21 
28 
21 
29 
20 
28 
22 
31 
23 
30 
22 
30 
 
Table 6 - Number of companies common to both the SRI portfolios and the Top 40 
As can be seen from Table 6, for the first few years the SRI portfolios did not even 
constitute half of the Top 40; which may account for vast differences in performance - 
assuming the Top 40 companies still influence the market considerably. Overall, both 
SRI portfolios tended to increase the number of Top 40 participants over time, with 
occasional reversals in trends until they ended with 22 Top 40 constituents for the 
SRI95 portfolio, and 30 constituents for the SRI99 portfolio. This may be an artefact of 
the portfolio creation process as the portfolios were created using lists from 2004-2009 
where the SRI companies were already majority constituents of the Top 40 list. These 
findings regarding the Top 40 compositions do however give some support as to why 
the performances of the overall market and these constructed SRI portfolios differed by 
such a large degree. 
 
An alternative check on these results was performed by creating a portfolio of the SRI 
companies but restricting the period to 2004-2009; during which the SRI index was in 
existence and during which the SRI companies constituted the majority of the Top 40 
(as well as the general market). The same process used for the creation of the SRI95 and 
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SRI99 portfolios was followed; however as this was just a check for robustness the 
results have not been presented in this dissertation. It was found that the mean return for 
the value-weighted portfolio over the 2004-2009 sample period was 0.02083 which was 
higher than both the SRI95 and SRI99 mean returns, but once again lower than the 
general market. The equally-weighted portfolio had a mean return 0.0181 which was 
lower than the value-weighted return. This was in contrast to the earlier findings where 
for both SRI95 and SRI99; the equally-weighted portfolios outperformed the value-
weighted portfolios on a raw-returns basis. This result suggests that the smaller 
companies in the portfolio performed worse, and once the weightings were levelled 
their poor performance pulled down the overall portfolio performance. Interestingly the 
large discrepancy between the J203 and the SRI portfolio is once again counter-intuitive 
as during the sample period, the Top 40 shared most of its constituents with the SRI 
index. A final check was performed where a portfolio was created from all of the SRI 
companies with market capitalisations less than the median market cap of the SRI index 
constituents. This restricted the portfolio by excluding the larger half of the 
constituents; and it was found that the mean return of the value-weighted portfolio was 
0.001442 (0.00853 for the equally-weighted portfolio) - a much smaller return when 
compared to any of the previous portfolios. On a value-weighted basis, the portfolio of 
smaller SRI companies only comprised around 7% of the return, where the rest of the 
returns came from the larger SRI companies. Looking at this portfolio from an equally-
weighted perspective; the smaller SRI companies’ contribution increased to 41%.  
 
Overall it was interesting to note that the SRI portfolios consistently outperformed the 
conventional portfolio, albeit while simultaneously underperforming the overall market 
index (as proxied for by the J203). The SRI portfolio was broken down into different 
sample periods, as well as by capitalisation to try and explain the large discrepancies 
between performances. Even though the large SRI companies accounted for over 90% 
of the SRI portfolio’s performance, this was still only half of the general market’s 
performance and it is possible that the process of portfolio creation introduced biases 
which over time have decreased the portfolios relative performance.  
 
 
  169
5.3 Regression Analysis   
 
For the section regarding the regression analyses, it was broken down into chapters that 
covered the various models used from the earlier empirical literature. This was done so 
that the different models (with different aims) were examined thoroughly and their 
results discussed in light of the CSP-CFP relationship. The general distinctions drawn 
between the models were:  
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) – This regression model was used in two variations, 
where the first tested the equation that financial performance is a function of social 
performance, size, risk and industry. The second specification of the model extended 
the first by including prior financial performance (over the previous one to five years) 
as additional explanatory variables.  
Callan and Thomas (2009) – These models looked at three measures of financial 
performance and had two specifications for each measure where the size variables were 
included with and without their quadratic forms (as a test of linearity).  
Waddock and Graves (1997) – The main methodology in this study was employed to 
test the direction of causality. Thus, through the use of linear as well as logistic 
regressions; models were estimated that introduced lags in an attempt to discern which 
of the Good Management or Slack Resources hypotheses held in this study. 
5.3.1 McWilliams and Siegel (2000) 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) extended the earlier regression model used in Waddock 
and Graves (1997) by including the R&D and advertising intensity variables. As 
mentioned in the chapter on the empirical methodology, due to the lack of data (as well 
as some previous studies which omitted these variables) the regression models were run 
without these additional explanatory variables. The sample data was described in the 
earlier chapter, however to recap the initial set of firm-year observations spanned 2820 
for the 188 companies over 15 years. With firm-year observations being dropped due to 
missing data, the number of observations were 1686 and 1237 for the models using 
Assets/Turnover and Employees respectively. The final numbers differed slightly due to 
the presence of probable outliers in 3 of the observations. The excluded observations 
along with the year and observation value were: Randgold and Exploration, 1999 (ROE 
= 4229); Hwange Colliery, 2005 (ROE = 54752) and 2006 (ROE = 3473). Some of the 
key findings of the basic models have been presented in the following table:  
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CFP  Regression Adj R‐squared  Size  Significance  SRI coefficient 
ROE  1a  0.029  Assets  10%  11.18 
ROE  1b  0.029  Sales  None  8.130 
ROE  1c  0.017  Employees  none  0.0477 
ROA  2a  0.029  Assets  None  ‐0.616 
ROA  2b  0.032  Sales  5%  ‐1.824 
ROA  2c  0.074  Employees  None  ‐0.00172 
Table 7 – Regression Results Following McWilliams and Siegel (2000) Using the 
1995-2009 Sample Period 
As can clearly be seen, the adjusted R-squared was rather poor, with the best model 
explaining less than 8% of the variance in financial performance. Regardless, there 
were a few distinct trends which can be seen here, namely that the models for ROA 
explained more of the variance than those models using ROE. In addition, the models 
using number of employees were considerably worse at explaining the variance in the 
ROE models, and considerably better in the ROA regressions. Interestingly, it has been 
hypothesised in earlier academic studies that ROE may be more related to CSP in the 
long-term, and since these measures were essentially testing the social performance 
against the financial performance in the same year, this may explain why ROA was 
marginally better at prediction than ROE.  
 
In terms of the actual social performance, the SRI variable was only significantly 
different from zero in two of the models, with regression 1a being significant at the 
10% level and 2b significant at the 5% level. An interesting finding here was that the 
SRI coefficient was negative for all three of the models using ROA as the financial 
performance measure, whereas it was positive in all of the ROE models. In terms of the 
two significant coefficients, model 1a had a SRI coefficient of 11.18 which was 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that SRI participants tended to attain a ROE that 
was over 11 points higher than their conventional peers (this finding was for the 15 year 
period which is quite significant). The other coefficient was significant at the 5% level 
and had a value of -1.824, which indicated that SRI participants achieved marginally 
lower ROA values. These conflicting results are interesting as in addition to their sign, 
the specification of the models used different financial performance measures as well as 
size proxies.  
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McWilliams and Siegel (2000) – Prior performance over five years included: 
To be more precise, the sample was restricted to the years in which the SRI index was 
in existence (2004-2009), so that a more accurate representation of McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000)’s CSP proxy may be used. For these models, the SRI dummy variable 
was coded as 1 only if the firm participated in the index for that year. Thus, the 
restricted sample period of 2004-2009, again with 188 companies resulted in a total of 
940 observations; with the number of observations varying depending on the regression 
model used. As a result of the varying model specifications, once the firm-years with 
missing data were removed the models using Assets and Turnover had around 669 
observations; while the models using Employees had 535 observations.  
 
In addition to the restricted sample period, McWilliams and Siegel (2000)’s model was 
extended as although the same sample companies were used during the period 2004-
2009, previous financial performance was included as additional independent variables. 
The regression models included the stepwise addition of prior performance, starting 
with the financial performance of one year prior to the current year being examined. In 
addition to one-year prior, the financial performance of two-years prior was added, all 
the way until the performance from five-years prior was included in the model. Size 
was proxied for using the three measures of assets, sales and employees once again. 
Therefore, in total for each performance measure there were fifteen regressions (five 
different lengths of prior performance multiplied by the three measures for size). Since 
the two performance measures examined were ROA and ROE there were a total of 30 
regressions for this section. One important observation is that, as mentioned in the 
methodology section, due to the nature of the statistical analysis using fixed effects, the 
industry dummy variables were necessarily dropped as they were unchanging over time. 
Thus the regressions in this section were unable to observe the role of industry in the 
social-financial performance relationship.  
 
Examining the results from the regressions (which can be found in 8.7 Regression 
results) shows that once again the R² statistics were not too powerful, and thus the 
models did not necessarily explain all of the variance in financial performance. The 
highest value was 0.179 for regression 3c1, and this ranged down to a minimum of 0.02. 
It is interesting to note that in each case, the model that only had 1-years prior 
performance had the smallest R², where the statistic increased until it reached a 
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maximum with all five prior years’ performance included. Callan and Thomas (2009) 
noted that earlier evidence may have suggested a long-term relationship between CSP 
and ROE, thus the improved explanatory power may be a result of the inclusion of the 
longer-term prior performance. In spite of the relatively low R² statistics, the 
regressions highlighted some interesting results, specifically in terms of the differences 
between ROA and ROE in the social-financial performance relationship. Looking at the 
constants, the coefficients were positive in all thirty of the regressions, and were 
significant in every one of the models using ROA as the financial performance measure 
as opposed to significant in only two out of the fifteen ROE regressions. Turning to the 
risk variable it was found that for the ROA regressions the sign of the coefficient was 
negative in all fifteen regressions, however the variable was not always significant. For 
the regressions using Employees (4c1-5) none of the coefficients were significant, 
whereas the models using Assets (4a1-5) and Turnover (4b1-5) the only models that did 
not have significant risk coefficients were 4a2 and 4b2. Interestingly, the striking 
difference between the models using the different size proxies followed through 
somewhat in the ROE regressions. In this case however, although none of the 
coefficients were significant, they were negative for all of the models using Assets and 
Turnover, but positive for the models using Employees. From these results it seemed 
that risk was significantly and negatively correlated with ROA except when Employees 
was used as a proxy for the size of the firm. In addition, risk had no significant power in 
predicting the ROE of a firm. 
 
Size has been often hypothesised to be correlated with the social performance of a firm. 
Thus, it is interesting that in these results including the various measures into the 
models did not seem to have such a significant effect on the financial performance; as 
evidenced by the fact that none of the size coefficients were significant in the ROE 
regressions. Similarly, for the ROA regressions using Assets and Employees none of 
the coefficients were significant; however, when Turnover was used as the size proxy, 
four out of five of the coefficients were significant. This makes sense intuitively as 
turnover should be highly correlated with profitability – although it must be considered 
that turnover did not have any significant correlation with performance as measured by 
ROE. Again the signs of the coefficients match up in the ROA and ROE models, where 
for Employees nine out of the 10 regressions had negative coefficients, for Turnover ten 
out of ten had positive coefficients and for Assets, the same three out of five regressions 
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were negative for both ROE and ROA. Overall, for the most part, the influence that size 
had on financial performance seemed to be more or less the same regardless of the 
measure that was used.  
 
The coefficients from the prior performance variables indicated that for the ROA 
regressions, generally the coefficients for 3-years and 5-years prior performance were 
significant. The coefficients for 4-years prior were significant in four out of six 
regressions, and those of 2-years prior performance were significant in all twelve of the 
regressions where it was included. One important finding here was that in all of these 
regression models the sign of these coefficients was negative, thus it seemed that the 
performance from two to five years prior had a negative relationship with ROA. In 
contrast, the results indicated that fourteen out of fifteen coefficients for 1-year prior 
performance were significant, and all of them were positive. This showed that the 
performance of the previous year had a significant and positive relationship with current 
ROA. The differences across size proxies were not significant for ROA, but in the case 
of ROE it became clear that there were some differences between the models using 
Assets and Turnover, and those using Employees. In the case of the first two proxies 
(regressions 3a1-5 and 3b1-5) the only time the prior performance coefficients were 
significant (at the 5% level) was in regressions 3a1 and 3b1 where all five years prior 
performance was included – and all were significant. In the rest of the regressions using 
between one and four years prior performance none of the coefficients were significant. 
This result did not carry through to Employees however, where in regressions 3c1-5, 
only three of the five coefficients were significant in regression 3c1, and two of those 
were significant again in 3c5.  
 
The final analysis of these regressions entailed the SRI coefficient which is the variable 
most pertinent to this study, and which also offers the most interesting finding. Unlike 
the earlier regressions, the SRI coefficients were positive in all thirty of the ROE and 
ROA regressions. The important distinction, however, is that in all fifteen of the ROA 
regressions, the coefficient for the SRI variable was insignificant at all of the traditional 
confidence levels. In contrast, all fifteen of the ROE models showed significance; thus 
the results indicated that SRI seemed to be positively and significantly correlated with 
performance (when measured by ROE). This result was important as it definitively 
stated that social performance was positively correlated with financial performance in 
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all of the regressions examined. The significant results were robust to the size proxy 
used, as well as to the degree of prior performance included in the model. The only 
caveat is that the period is somewhat short being only six years, however due to the fact 
that the SRI index is relatively new it is hoped that future studies may be able to 
confirm the results from these regressions. The magnitudes of these coefficients showed 
that the smallest coefficient was 17.17 whereas the largest coefficient was 25.14. This 
means that during the sample period a firm that participated in the SRI index would 
have attained a return on equity that was between 17.17 and 25.14 higher than its 
conventional peers. This is an economically significant amount, and the result seemed 
to support the hypothesis that social responsibility pays off. 
 
One caveat to note is that due to the model including lagged dependent variables, it is 
possible that using the Ordinary Least Squares method biases the results as a 
consequence of endogeneity. As a test of robustness the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) - two-step system with Windmeijer corrections – was used to check 
the results from this section and the findings from this method have been presented in 
the appendix chapter 8.7 Regression results. Following on from the McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000) models where the prior performance over the past five years were 
included, ROA and ROE were looked at while including lagged terms that were 
accounted for by the statistical model. As the model took care of the lags there was only 
one equation for each ‘financial performance measure–size proxy’ pair. Thus, there 
were six new equations being examined: three for ROA and three for ROE. A familiar 
pattern from earlier regressions appeared where the p-values for the SRI variable 
appeared similar to the R² from the original McWilliams and Siegel (2000) regression 
from the full sample period. For both ROA and ROE, the Assets and Sales models have 
similar p-values, but with employees as the size proxy, the p-value is much less 
significant in the ROA model, and drastically more significant in the ROE model. The 
most important difference between the GMM models and the previous regression 
models is that out of the six, only the ROE model using employees as the size proxy has 
a significant SRI coefficient – using traditional confidence levels. Interestingly, the SRI 
coefficients for all three of the ROE models (14.51, 21.67, and 23.34) are of the same 
magnitude, and the same can be said for two of the three ROA models (-1.252 and -
1.430). The p-values for the SRI coefficients in the ROA models were 0.638, 0.621 and 
0.945; while those of the ROE models were 0.134, 0.129 and 0.026. This implies that 
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while the findings from the earlier (biased) results may not be wholly correct or 
dependable; there may definitely be something to the relationship between social 
performance and ROE. This is confirmed when the confidence level is decreased as at 
the 15% level all three of the ROE models have significant SRI coefficients where none 
are significant in the ROA models – which once again mirrors the earlier findings. 
Further analyses were performed to see if the findings remained consistent. 
 
5.3.2 Callan and Thomas (2009) 
For these regression models, Callan and Thomas (2009) used a full set of size proxies 
employing assets, turnover and employees simultaneously; in addition to including the 
quadratics of these variables to test for linearity (which shall be referred to as the fully 
specified models). One of the prominent differences between the basic McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000) model and these models were the R² statistics, which indicated that 
without the quadratics, the models explained 60.1%, 9.2%, and 3.2% of the variance in 
financial performance for Operating Profit, ROA and ROE respectively. When the 
quadratic variables were included these metrics increased to 67.2%, 10.2% and 3.7% 
respectively. As can be seen, generally for ROA and ROE these values were marginally 
higher than the previous regressions indicating that the models were a slightly better fit, 
whereas the Operating Profit regressions have much higher R² statistics. One possible 
reason for this is that operating profit is highly correlated with turnover and thus since 
Total Turnover is one of the explanatory variables, the explanatory power of the model 
is increased dramatically.  
 
In all six models, the intercept coefficients were highly significant at the 1% level. An 
interesting difference between the models, however, was seen in the fact that for the 
normal and fully specified models of ROE and ROA, the intercepts were positive, 
whereas both specifications of the Operating Profit regressions were negative. In terms 
of the risk proxy, the long-term debt to equity variable coefficients were positive for all 
model specifications except for those using ROA, although they were only significant in 
the models using ROE. Thus, the risk measure was more closely related to the financial 
performance measure of ROE. In addition, for the ROE models the only size proxies 
that were significant were turnover (at the 1% level for models 7a and 7b) and number 
of employees (at the 10% level) for model 7b. For Operating Profit every size proxy 
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(including the quadratics) was significant in both of the specifications, except for the 
number of employees in the normal regression model 5a. In contrast, every size variable 
was significant in the ROA models except for the turnover quadratic variable in model 
6b. Ultimately, it seemed that size was indeed significant in predicting financial return 
and cannot be omitted. In terms of the industry variables, thirteen out of sixteen were 
significant in the ROA models, whereas this number was only two out of sixteen for 
ROE, and nine out of sixteen for Operating Profit. This indicated that in terms of the 
industry effects, they were far more important when using ROA as the financial 
performance measure, and least important when ROE was being examined.  
 
Turning to the social performance aspect of these models, it was found that the SRI 
dummy variable was negative in three out of six of the regression models (5a, 7a, 7b), 
and positive in the remaining three (5b, 6a, 6b). More important than the direction of 
the coefficient was the significance for each of the coefficients and it was found that 
none of the coefficients were significant at the 10% level or better. Thus, using the 
model specification of Callan and Thomas (2009), there seemed to be no significant 
relationship between social and financial performance. In all specifications of the ROE 
and ROA models, when the quadratics were included the sign of the SRI coefficient 
remained the same, however for Operating Profit it was seen that as the model was fully 
specified, explanatory power of the model increased and the SRI coefficient changed 
from a positive 13 916 to -68 461. Interestingly, the finding that the SRI coefficients 
were positive for both ROE models and negative for the ROA models was consistent 
with findings from the McWilliams and Siegel (2000) fifteen year regressions. Once 
again, since the results regarding the social-financial performance relationship seemed 
insignificant, no clear conclusion could be drawn from these regressions. Although as 
stated there seemed to be a distinct trend appearing that SRI is positively correlated 
with ROE and negatively correlated with ROA, this relationship may need to be 
examined further.  
 
5.3.3 Waddock and Graves (1997) – Testing for Causality 
This section examined the results from the Waddock and Graves (1997) regressions 
which had at their core the question of causality. As mentioned earlier, the authors 
proposed two hypotheses regarding the direction of the CSP-CFP relationship. The 
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Good Management theory stated that good management (as determined through better 
social performance) results in improved financial performance. The alternative theory is 
the Slack Resources hypothesis which stated that through good financial performance in 
prior years, companies are able to afford social initiatives that improve their future 
social performance.  
 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, since the proxy for social performance in 
this dissertation was a binary response variable the standard linear regressions could not 
be used when examining social performance as the dependent variable. As a result, half 
of the regressions were run using linear regression analysis when financial performance 
was the dependent variable, and logistic regressions were run when the social 
performance was being examined. For the linear regressions, ROA and ROE were 
looked at as the measures of financial performance and generally the adjusted R² 
statistics were more powerful for the ROA models than the ROE models. The values 
were 0.097, 0.088 and 0.1499 as opposed to 0.035, 0.034 and 0.0316 for regressions 8d, 
8e and 8f, and 8a, 8b and 8c, respectively. Additionally, the statistics indicated that for 
ROE the models using assets and turnover as the proxies for size explained more of the 
variance in return than the model using the number of employees. In contrast for ROA, 
the model using employees had a significantly higher R² when compared to the assets 
and turnover models. This mirrored an earlier finding from the McWilliams and Siegel 
(2000) regression over the long-term period - namely regressions 1a-c and 2a-c. 
Another similar finding was that although none of the six linear regression models had 
significant SRI coefficients, the coefficients were negative for two out of three for the 
ROA models and positive for all three of the ROE models (only regression 8f did not 
conform). As mentioned, the earlier regression models had positive coefficients for 
ROE models 1a-c and negative coefficients for ROA models 2a-c. Turning to the 
logistic regressions it appeared that the results were somewhat more interesting. The 
two regression models that used employees as the size proxy had higher pseudo-R² 
statistics than the other models which used assets and turnover. The regressions R² 
statistics as well as model number were as follows: 0.3562 (9c) and 0.3578 (9f), using 
employees; and 0.2441 (9a), 0.256 (9b), 0.2417 (9d) and 0.2572 (9e), using assets and 
turnover. Once again the most important variable in these regressions was the financial 
performance explanatory variable as this indicated whether prior financial performance 
affected social performance. In none of the six regressions (9a-f) were the financial 
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performance coefficients significant at the 10% level or better. The signs of the 
coefficients were generally positive, with five out of six regressions showing positive 
albeit insignificant relationships between financial and social performance (only 
regression 9e showed a negative correlation). Interestingly, the significant coefficients 
were identical across model specifications regardless of the financial measure used. In 
other words, the models using turnover, assets and employees as size proxies had 
identical results for both the ROA and ROE regression specifications. For assets and 
turnover, the results indicated that the size variables were significant, in addition to the 
healthcare and oilgas industry variables, and the intercept – all at the 1% level. In five 
out of the six regressions, the risk proxy was significant, thus although it was not 
entirely consistent it seemed that risk had a part to play in predicting future 
performance.  
 
5.3.4 Overall conclusions from the regression analyses 
Taken together, the regression analyses offer varying results, obviously depending on 
which models one uses, and this poses some theoretical issues. To avoid just running 
regressions until statistically significant results are found, it is important to have a 
theoretical basis that justifies the use of the model. As covered in the empirical 
literature Fitch (1976) argued for social responsibility as firms can achieve CSR without 
sacrificing performance, if they identify and solve social problems in which they are 
intimately involved. This theme recurs in Porter and Kramer (2006) where they suggest 
identifying the points of intersection between social problems and business operations. 
These rational arguments can be tied into earlier frameworks as suggested by the likes 
of Carroll (1979) in that the three aspects of CSR he proposed encompassed the 
philosophy of social responsiveness, the different responsibility categories and the 
various social issues involved. By identifying the social problems the firm can solve, 
and determining which category the issue falls under; firms are able to use the 
appropriate managerial response whether it be reaction, accommodation or pro-action. 
The reason these ideas are important is because as suggested by some of the empirical 
evidence, social performance can sometimes be significantly related to financial 
performance. In this way, understanding where and how to respond to these social 
issues, a firm can improve its financial performance. 
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McWilliams and Siegel (2001) offered a supply and demand framework for CSR, in 
that it was described as any other firm attribute. From this the authors predicted a 
neutral relationship, as the firm uses cost-benefit analysis to determine the optimal level 
of CSR. Orlitzky et al. (2003) showed that there was a positive association between 
CSP and CFP across industries and study contexts; and this did not support the 
contingency theory purported by McWilliams and Siegel (2001) as they took earlier 
findings at face value and ignored the impact of statistical artefacts. In this study, due to 
the nature of the social performance proxy there could be no differentiation between 
optimal levels of CSP, thus the best analysis available using these measures was to 
examine the relationship between firms deemed socially responsible, versus those who 
have not been classified as such.  
 
The regression models using Callan and Thomas (2009)’s specification (regressions 5a-
7a) did not do a very good job at explaining the variance in performance, and out of the 
six regressions none of them had significant SRI coefficients. The interpretation from 
these models is that the socially responsible firms performed no worse in terms of 
financial performance, regardless of which of the three measures was looked at. 
Examining the relationship one step further involved a different regression model, this 
time looking at the size control variables independently, and using a different risk 
measure (long-term debt to assets, instead of equity). The findings with these models 
were that they explained slightly less variance, however, two of the six regression 
models displayed significant SRI coefficients. Regression 1a had a coefficient of 11.18 
and regression 2b a coefficient of -1.824, which indicated that for socially responsible 
firms, depending on the social performance measure looked at, and the size proxy used 
they would either attain 11.18 points higher ROE, or 1.82 points less ROA. It is 
important to remember that as mentioned earlier, these values are absolute and therefore 
the base from which one interprets the results is significant. An important finding with 
these models is that for all of the ROA regressions SRI was negatively correlated with 
financial performance, whereas for the ROE models this relationship was positive. This 
was also found using the Callan and Thomas (2009) models, where both the normal and 
fully specified ROA models indicated negative correlations between social and 
financial performance; while the ROE models showed positive correlations. Thus, there 
may be something in the structural differences between returns on assets and equity that 
relate differently to social performance.  
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The attempt at developing a fully specified model of the relationship came with an 
extended version of McWilliams and Siegel (2000) where the firm’s prior financial 
performance was added. They key finding from these regression models was that out of 
the thirty regressions there was a clearly distinct trend separating the ROE and ROA 
models – specifically with respect to the SRI coefficients. Although in every single 
regression the coefficients were positive, they were insignificant for all ROA 
regressions and significant for all of the ROE models (twelve models at the 5% level 
and three at the 10% level). This seemed to be some of the clearest evidence in the 
study that there indeed existed a relationship between social and financial performance, 
especially when prior performance was included as an additional variable. The 
interpretation of the SRI coefficients meant that socially responsible firms could attain 
between 17% and 25% higher ROE. The fact that these were all statistically and 
economically significant supported the hypothesis that social performance and financial 
performance are positively related, as over the entire existence of the SRI index firms 
that have participated have clearly performed better in terms of their reported ROE. 
Once the fact that these results may have been biased had been taken into account, only 
one out of the six models had a significant SRI coefficient at traditional significance 
levels. If the confidence level was dropped, all three of the ROE models were 
significant while once again none of the ROA models had significance – thus indicating 
some credibility to the hypothesised relationship.  
 
The final aspect of the relationship looked at was the direction, and although this is a 
very important question this study included a brief examination using a methodology 
employed in Waddock and Graves (1997). Looking at current social performance as a 
predictor of future financial performance (the Good Management hypothesis, tested 
using regressions 8a-f) it seemed that in none of the regressions was the SRI coefficient 
significant, thus rejecting this hypothesis. When the analysis was focused on previous 
financial performance as a predictor of social performance, the models once again 
indicated that none of the logistic regressions had a significant CFP coefficient for 
either ROA or ROE. Thus, these results show that in terms of the Waddock and Graves 
(1997) methodology there is very little support for either the Good Management (H4) or 
Slack Resources hypotheses (H5).   
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6. Conclusions 
 
When it comes to arriving at a simple conclusion the evidence from this dissertation 
seems to be mixed depending on the methodologies used and the approaches taken. In 
terms of the short-term analysis it was found that since there were no significant Z-
statistics, the announcement dates of the SRI constituent lists had no significant effects 
on the prices of the companies involved. This was found in the case of the 1-day event 
window, thus H1 could not be rejected. As mentioned however, this finding may be the 
result of key assumptions being violated, the most important of which is the assumption 
that markets are efficient. Ultimately, although there were some interesting findings; 
and it is important not to take the results at face value and to remember what limitations 
this study faced. The most stringent restriction was that of the measure for social 
performance, where the dichotomy of this variable as well as its limited existence needs 
to be taken into account. Hopefully as time progresses, more robust measures shall 
appear in academia; and time will prove the validity of the SRI index as a proxy for 
social performance. As it stands, however, the evidence could not reject the hypothesis 
that the market does not price social factors, and as a result there were no short-term 
effects.  
 
Next, the analysis of the investor’s perspective in terms of comparative performance 
between socially responsible and conventional portfolios indicated that using raw 
returns over the period, the SRI portfolio outperformed the conventional portfolio. 
Turning to risk-adjusted measures it was found that during the 10 year as well as 15 
year time period, the SRI portfolio outperformed the conventional portfolio using the 
Sharpe Ratio, Sortino Ratio and Upside Potential Ratio as performance criteria. From 
these results, it seems that H2 can be rejected, and that the socially responsible portfolio 
performed better than the portfolio of conventional firms (bearing in mind both 
portfolios consistently underperformed the general market index). Looking at the long-
term relationships, the different regression models gave instances where current social 
performance was a significant predictor of financial performance, and where the SRI 
firms appeared to be more profitable. The tests of causality indicated that prior financial 
performance had no significant relationship with social performance. Similarly, the 
logistic regressions that tried to predict SRI using prior performance again found no 
  182
evidence of significant correlations and the regression specifications taken from Callan 
and Thomas (2009) indicated that for the all of the models the SRI coefficients were, 
once again, insignificant. In contrast, the results of the analysis examining raw portfolio 
returns seemed to corroborate the findings of the McWilliams and Siegel (2000) models 
which included prior performance, as both indicated that SRI companies had better 
financial performance. For the raw returns, this was evident in the graph that indicated 
the superior performance of SRI firms compared to the conventional portfolio. Using 
the McWilliams and Siegel (2000) models, it looked like ROE was more closely related 
to social performance, as there were far more significant coefficients (fifteen out of 
fifteen) when compared to the ROA models (zero out of fifteen). The significant 
superior performance that was indicated in the model ranged from 17.17% to over 
25.14% in ROE, and these figures were not trivial, therefore there may definitely be 
something to the relationship. In addition to this were the GMM models which at 15% 
significance indicated a positive relationship between social and financial performance 
with coefficients ranging from 14.51% to 23.34% ROE. The fact that the corrected 
models still showed some significance in the relationship adds power to the hypothesis. 
 
These findings, as well as the consistent signs of the SRI coefficients from Callan and 
Thomas (2009) lead to H3 being rejected; however the direction of the relationship was 
not be so clear. The fact that ROE seemed to be the financial performance measure 
most significantly correlated to social performance, results in a need to recap some 
caveats that Aupperle et al. (1985) noted in their study. They stated that ROE may 
mislead as it is not only a function of profitability but of leverage. Thus, while some of 
the most significant results regarding the SRI variables in the regression analyses were 
found using ROE as the financial performance measure (and prior ROE as additional 
explanatory variables), it is important to note that leverage was taken into account using 
the long-term debt to assets ratio. From this it may be possible to accept the results with 
slightly more confidence, as if ROE was affected by other factors, but these were 
accounted for, the significant results may not be biased due to model misspecification. 
The final regression analysis examined was the Waddock and Graves (1997) 
specification which aimed to test the causality of the relationship. As mentioned, there 
seemed to be no evidence of current social performance predicting future financial 
performance, nor of prior financial performance predicting social performance. As a 
result, neither H4 nor H5 could be rejected. In addition to these two hypotheses, due to 
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the fact that the relationship was found to be insignificant in both directions, the 
hypothesis relating to the virtuous circle, H6, could not be rejected. 
 
Joseph Stiglitz (cited in Petrillo, 2009) stated that SRI anticipates broader social 
movements and in this way is thinking ahead. This is just another example of how SRI 
is now being seen as mainstream, and how understanding this topic more fully can help 
investors in the future. For this dissertation, understanding that SRI anticipates future 
social movements is key to driving the ethical investment movement forward. By 
accepting the fact that socially responsible firms are not wasting resources meant for the 
shareholders on pet projects and unviable environmental initiatives, investors can 
recognize that there is indeed legitimacy in the actions of these companies. Orlitzky et 
al. (2003) noted that managers need to use CSP as a reputational lever and be attentive 
to the perceptions of third parties as the key to reaping benefits from CSP is a return 
from reputation. In addition, earlier studies noted the importance of promoting the 
benefits of CSR if firms want to derive any benefit from it, thus by talking up the 
positive aspects investors and investment professionals alike can take this information 
to heart. As more and more investors start believing in the social investment movement, 
the more benefits the firms shall see, and through this cycle investors, firms and society 
will all be able to reap benefits. 
 
Although various reasons have been suggested for companies to pursue CSR, Porter and 
Kramer (2006) suggested that many of the arguments tend to be very limited and too 
general in nature. Although sustainability is a noble goal, attempting to coerce everyone 
to be sustainable according to the same standards does not work, and it may be better 
for firms to be as sustainable as their circumstances allow. In other words, taking their 
business objectives and strategies into account, companies must be as socially 
responsible as they can while maintaining value for themselves as well as their 
surrounding communities. Thus the trade-offs are considered when looking at CSR 
decisions, and shareholder interests are not sacrificed for the vague social commitments 
companies are expected to appease. Kurtz (1997) stated that it was unlikely that there 
would ever be a final word on the subject of CSR, as it is the nature of SRI that it 
responds to the changing political and social landscape and the same can be said of 
companies. As these questions are answered it is important to note that “the findings 
should matter not only to practitioners of socially responsible investing but also to all 
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investors” (Kurtz, 1997, p.44). It is in this light that the findings of this study are 
considered, as Kurtz (1997) mentioned the results would pertain to all spheres of the 
investment industry, as well as to all the echelons of company management.  
 
In terms of developing nations, as Bernstein (2010) has suggested, being socially 
responsible as defined by developed economies may actually hurt economic growth in 
the long-run, and result in poverty for a longer period of time. Coster (2007) noted that 
Carlos Slim Helu, one of the world’s richest men - and one of the first from an 
emerging economy - has been criticised for his astronomic personal wealth, in the face 
of a country faced with extreme poverty. Despite making sizeable donations, he was 
reported to have poked fun at his American counterparts’ philanthropic efforts by 
stating that “poverty isn’t solved with donations” and “building businesses often does 
more for society than going around like Santa Claus” (Coster, 2007, para. 6). This view 
is exactly what was espoused earlier by Bernstein (2010) and perhaps a more tempered 
view of social responsibility needs to be accepted. Although recognising the 
responsibility business has in society is important, its economic role as a developer of 
economies needs to be incorporated into the social responsibility model. Lankoski 
(2009)’s idea of economic responsibility (combined with the earlier conceptual models, 
all highlighting economic aspects)  may be the catalyst that turns CSR into a field taken 
more seriously, as it promotes companies adhering to their social responsibilities., 
without neglecting shareholders. In this way, companies can behave responsibly in the 
non-traditional spheres of business; while concurrently being mindful of the limitations 
inherent in their relationships with the shareholders of the firm. This ties in with 
Bernstein (2010)’s idea that not all socially responsible behaviours are appropriate for 
economies at different stages of development, thus the ultimate goal of the firm may be 
thought of as being ‘responsible’ - responsibly.  
 
6.1 Areas for Further Study 
 
A new way to look at CSR in the future may be required, in that as Bernstein (2010) 
suggested some public goods may be effectively outsourced to private enterprises. As 
CSR may be looked at as a strategic opportunity, this coupled with government 
assistance may result in firms using their expertise to provide public goods (in place of 
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the government) with a much greater level of efficiency. Tax and other incentives may 
be required to instil this level of “responsibility” however it would ultimately benefit 
the company as well as society (Bernstein, 2010, p. 290-292). Ullmann (1985) stated 
that for more convincing and consistent results, there was a need for an improved 
strategic framework and methodological improvements in terms of the additional 
variables based on a contingency approach that should be included in any attempt to 
correlate social performance, economic performance and social disclosure. Samples 
should be developed that include firms with different strategic postures, and 
longitudinal studies could provide insight into how strategies change as a function of 
shifting stakeholder power or economic performance. Although some longitudinal 
aspects were included in this study, a more thorough investigation into the strategic 
framework is needed.  
 
Important issues regarding CSR may arise in the South African context, where they are 
specific to the circumstances in this country and as such have not been dealt with or 
researched overseas. These may include concerns such as Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE), the AIDS issue, land reform, and education. Due to South 
Africa’s unique history, the social problems that can be found are somewhat distinct. 
Ultimately, as a country it may be beneficial for some future research into these areas in 
terms of how business and society can work together to solve these problems. As 
already noted the appearance of low-cost private schools show just one example of how 
private enterprise can alleviate a social ill while turning a profit, and it is out of the box 
thinking such as this that may help South Africa along its economic development to a 
first world economy. For future growth, education is one of the most important criteria 
in that the more people that can be educated, the greater the opportunity there is in 
terms of jobs, as well as for entrepreneurs and small businesses to drive the economic 
growth. Land reform is a slightly more difficult topic in that it has its roots in a deeply 
politicised country. In addition to this, land reform programs have not gone according to 
plan, with around 90% of the land reclamations resulting in failure (Duvenhage, 2010). 
Thus where once there existed productive land; through the process of land reclamation, 
this productivity has disappeared and it is in circumstances like this that opportunity 
may present itself. It can be argued that private enterprises who have expertise in the 
running of farms and other productive land functions could partner with government 
organisations to help facilitate this transfer. As opposed to just taking the land and 
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giving it to the people who need it, helping in their training and ensuring that they have 
adequate resources to make the farm work would result in a far greater success rate – 
and far more benefits for all parties involved.  
 
Brammer and Millington (2008) described a few models of the possible relationships 
between CSP and CFP where one of these possible models described a positive 
relationship between CSP and CFP reflecting benefits that were not subject to 
diminishing returns and where increased CSP could reduce costs or increase revenues. 
A second model depicted a nonlinear relationship which assumed positive financial 
payoffs to good social performance that were subject to diminishing returns. This view 
was consistent with agency theory in that owners are assumed to be risk neutral as they 
can diversify their overall risk, whereas managers are risk averse because their job 
security and income are tied to the firm. If the financial benefit of social performance is 
subject to diminishing returns but its capacity to reduce firm-specific risks is not, then 
the differences in the degree of risk aversion of principals and agents leads managers to 
overinvest in projects that reduce a firm’s financial risks at the expense of the higher 
(and riskier) level of financial performance preferred by owners. This may offer an 
alternative path for future research, as determining if the social benefits of CSR are 
subject to diminishing returns, it may be possible calculate whether there are additional 
agency costs involved in the question of CSR. 
 
Another interesting aspect of this topic for future research would be the development of 
a method to sidestep the issue of the SRI index composition. Due to the dominant 
presence of the Top 40 in the SRI, this may make analysis using this index quite 
difficult especially when comparing this index to other benchmark indexes, or indeed 
the general market in South Africa. Other ways of measuring social performance do not 
yet exist, and as this index is still rather new, more research into this index as a proxy 
may be required. In addition to the actual measurement of the social performance, 
additional explanatory variables need to be examined. Cochran and Wood (1984) found 
that asset age seemed to be correlated with social performance, however due to data 
limitations this variable was not included in any of the regression models. Thus, if this 
truly is a key variable then omission may bias the results; and future studies may want 
to examine this aspect of the CFP-CSP relationship further. 
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In communication with the SRI index, the possibility of introducing rankings was 
mentioned as a future feature of the index. As found in Gompers et al. (2003) and the 
numerous studies using the KLD ratings, being able to differentiate between different 
levels of social performance is important for future analyses. This is an interesting 
prospect especially since the index is unique to South Africa. Previous academic 
evidence has suggested contrasting relationships in that some found inverted U-shaped 
links between social and financial performance (Bowman & Haire, 1975). Others 
(Barnett & Salomon, 2006; Brammer & Millington, 2008) found that there seemed to be 
a U-shaped relationship, where firms stuck in the middle tended to perform the worst. 
Interestingly this finding was robust to CSR and SRI, in other words from the 
perspectives of both the firm and the investor. For SRI, the finding was that firms with 
average screening intensity bore diversification costs as a result of their screens 
however they failed to screen exclusively enough to improve the pool from which they 
picked stocks. From the CSR perspective, the firms that spent average amounts on 
social initiatives spent more than the firms who spent nothing, but did not spend enough 
(less than the high CSP performers) to gain a competitive advantage. Therefore 
improved measurements of social performance in South Africa would be one of the 
most critical areas for future research in this area of finance.  
 
Waddock and Graves (1994) noted the efficient market theory (from the EMH) which 
says institutional investors consider both their short time horizon, as well as the 
relationship between CSP and risk when determining the appropriate discount rate at 
which to discount future cash flows. Waddock and Graves (1994) described the 
investor’s discount rate as the rate at which future benefits are discounted due to the 
investor’s preference for current over future income. Myopic behaviour is related to the 
discount rate, and CSP as a risk-reducing measure is related to risk adjustment. EMH 
suggests that investors consider the effect of public information on both future cash 
flow and investment risk simultaneously, thus if a firm makes a socially responsible 
investment that reduces cash flow, but not risk, then the present value of all future cash 
flows are reduced, and the stock may be sold in line with the predictions of myopic 
institutions theory. In contrast, if the firm makes the same investment but reduces the 
probability of adverse legal or regulatory action through CSP enhancement (so the risk 
adjusted discount rate falls) then the decline in the discount rate could more than 
compensate for the drop in cash flow making the stock more attractive to investors. 
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Thus, to predict the effect of CSP-enhancing commitments, the investigator needs to 
know the effects of the measure on both cash flow and risk, and to the extent that the 
performance of firms is comparable, institutional investors will tend to choose less risky 
stocks from firms with strong social performance. This perspective may help in future 
research in that although this dissertation examined the social performance using a 
dichotomous variable, future improved measures of CSP may help determine varying 
levels of performance, and from this the relationships between CSR activities and cash 
flow or risk. For the perspective of the investor, Williams (2005) also suggested 
investigating the availability of social funds, the switching costs between conventional 
and ethical portfolios and the risk profile of investors that choose conventional products 
compared with those that choose SRI products; where research into these areas may 
also help understand the difference between ethical and conventional investors. 
 
Although covered in this study to some extent, the direction of causality in the 
relationship between social and financial performance is key to the understanding of 
this phenomenon. If firms can definitively identify whether improved social 
performance will result in future financial performance or not; this will assist firms in 
taking more defined positions on where they stand in the business and society debate. It 
is through improved research methodologies that managers as well as investors will 
truly understand the importance of SRI and CSR - as well as the place of these 
ideologies in the investment community. In conclusion, as much of the literature has 
suggested management plays an important role in the firm; for companies to progress in 
this area it is key that the top decision-makers are on board with this strategy. Only if 
they believe in social responsibility and its benefits to society as well as the firm, can it 
succeed as a legitimate business activity.  
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Summaries of Empirical Studies 
 
Figure 24 - Social Performance and Economic Performance (Ullmann, 1985, p. 547-548) 
Social Performance and Economic Performance 
 
              Economic             Control for  
 Study        Social Performance        Performance         Other variables      Sample  Result 
 
1. Alexander & 
  Buchholz (1978) 
Reputational scales from 
Business and Society Review 
(“How Business Students Rate 
Corporations.” 1972; “Industry 
Rates Itself,”1972) 
 
Stockholder return 1970-
1974 
Beta 40 firms included in both 
surveys 
No correlation 
2. Bowman &  
    Haire (1975) 
CEP pollution performance 
index 
Median ROE 1969-1973 None 15 firms from the paper & pulp 
industry included in Council on 
Economic Priorities Survey 
U-shaped correlation: 
middle polluters 
outperform best and 
worst 
 
3. Bragdon &  
    Marlin (1972) 
CEP pollution performance 
index 
Average ROE 1965-1970 
Average ROC 1965-1970 
EPS growth 1965-1970 
 
None 17 firms from the paper & pulp 
industry included in CEP survey 
Positive correlation 
4. Chen &  
      Metcalf (1980) 
CEP pollution performance 
index 
ROE, P/E ratio, total risk, 
beta 1968-1973, 1969-1971, 
1971-1973 
Size 18 firms form the paper & pulp 
industry included in CEP survey 
Spurious positive 
correlation, size 
explanatory variable 
 
5. Cochran & 
      Wood (1984) 
Moskowitz’ (1972, 1975) 
reputational scale 
Op. Earnings / Sales, Op. 
Earnings / Assets, Excess 
market valuation 1970-1974, 
1975-1979 
 
Asset age 
Asset turnover 
 
39 (36) firms in 29 industries 
compared against industry 
control groups 
Weakened positive 
correlation when 
controlling for asset age 
6. Fogler &  
      Nutt (1975) 
CEP pollution performance 
index 
Normalised P/E ratios 
3/1971-3/1972, mutual fund 
purchase, short run stock 
price 
 
None 
 
9 firms from the paper & pulp 
industry included in CEP survey 
No correlation 
7. Kedia &  
      Kuntz (1981) 
Existence of social responsibility 
programs in 5 different areas 
Income before security 
gains/losses, taxes/total 
assets 
None 30 commercial banks in Texas Positive with female 
promotions, negative with 
charitable contributions, 
rest no correlation 
 
8. Moskowitz (1972) n.a. Stock price change 1/1972-
7/1972 
None 14 firms Positive correlation 
9. Parket &  
    Eilbirt (1975) 
Existence of social responsibility 
programs 
Net income, net profit 
margin, ROE, EPS 
None 80 Fortune 500 firms compared 
against Fortune 500 
 
Positive correlation for all 
economic performance 
measures 
10. Spicer (1978a) CEP pollution performance 
index 
ROE, P/E ratio, total risk, 
beta 1968-1973, 1969-1971, 
1971-1973 
None 18 firms from the paper & pulp 
industry included in CEP survey 
Moderate positive 
correlation for 1969-
1973, less for 1971-1973 
 
11. Spicer (1978b) CEP pollution performance 
index 
Total risk, beta 1968-1973 None 
 
(1) Earnings  
      variability;   
(2) Firm size;  
(3) Leverage;  
(4) Current ratio 
 Negative correlation 
pollution performance-
risk; pollution 
performance increases 
explained variance of 
total risk after (1), (2) and 
(3), and of beta after (1), 
(2) and (4) 
 
12. Sturdivant & 
   Ginter (1977) 
Moskowitz’ (1972, 1975) 
reputational scale 
EPS growth 1964-1974 Industry 28 firms of Moskowitz’ list Positive correlation; 
positive correlation 
between managers’ social 
values and economic 
performance 
 
13. Vance (1975) Moskowitz’ (1972) reputational 
scale 
 
Reputational scales from 
Business and Society Review 
(“How Business Students Rate 
Corporations.” 1972; “Industry 
Rates Itself,”1972) 
Stock price change 1972-
1975 
 
Price per share change 1974-
1975 
None 
 
 
None 
14 firms of Moskowitz’ list 
 
45 (50) firms from surveys 
Negative correlation 
 
 
Negative correlation 
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Figure 25 - Studies Examining the Relationship between Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and Profitability (Aupperle et al., 1985, p. 449-451) 
Studies Examining the Relationship between Corporate  
Social Responsibility (CSR) and Profitability 
 
      Performance  Findings 
 Study  Methodology      Criteria            Implications  Limitations 
 
Moskowitz (1972) Simplistic comparison of stock price 
increases in Moskowitz’ 14 firms 
with “perceived” high CSR with the 
average increase in the Dow-Jones 
index 
 
Stock price increases 
over time (six months) 
High CSR firms outperform 
the Dow-Jones Industrials 
No adjustment for risk; small sample; 
sample is not necessarily representative of 
high CSR firms; performance measured 
over short-term;  performance criterion is 
questionable; no test for significance 
Bragdon &  
    Marlin (1972) 
Seventeen firms in the paper and 
pulp industry were rated on a 
pollution index developed by the 
Council on Economic Priorities. 
Each firm’s index was compared to 
its ROE 
 
Return on equity 
(ROE) 
The better the pollution 
index, the higher the ROE 
No adjustment for risk; findings limited to 
one industry; limited definition of CSR; 
small sample; performance criterion is 
inadequate; no test for significance 
Bowman &  
    Haire (1975) 
Eighty-two food processing firms 
classified into low, medium and high 
CSR categories based on the number 
of lines devoted to the topic of CSR 
in corporate annual reports. The CSR 
categories are compared on the bases 
of their ROE 
 
Five-year return on 
equity 
Existence of a U-shaped 
performance curve; the 
highest performing firms 
being those found in the 
middle range of CSR 
No adjustment for risk; lopsided sample; 
reliance on annual reports and on the CSR 
firms of Moskowitz; performance criterion 
is inadequate; no test for significance 
Parket &  
    Eilbirt (1975) 
96 firms that responded to the 
researchers’ previous CSR survey 
were assumed to be CSR firms. The 
profitability of 80 of these firms 
compared to the Fortune 500 
 
Absolute net income, 
profit margin, ROE 
and EPS 
On all four measures, the 80 
CSR firms proved to be 
more profitable 
No adjustment for risk; questionable 
sample; performance measured over short-
term (12 months); performance criterion is 
inadequate; no test for significance 
Vance (1975) Two-fold:  
1. Replicating Moskowitz  
2. Correlating CSR firms derived 
from two Business and Society 
Review Surveys with stock price 
changes over time 
 
Stock price increases 
over time 
CSR firms are determined 
not to be good investments; 
negative correlation 
between CSR and stock 
price increases 
No adjustment for risk; questionable 
samples; performance measured over 
short-term; regression line does not fit the 
data; performance criterion is inadequate 
Heinz (1976) Correlating CSR ratings of 29 firms 
from a Business and Society Review 
survey with ROE 
 
Several measures such 
as ROA, ROE and 
profit margins 
A significantly positive 
correlation between CSR 
and ROE. 
No adjustment for risk; small sample; 
questionable sample; reliance on 
reputational rating system for determining 
CSR. 
 
Sturdivant & 
   Ginter (1977) 
A population of 67 high CSR firms 
as identified by Moskowitz in the 
business and Society Review are 
used in a CSR survey. Twenty-three 
firms returned 130 questionnaires. 
The 67 firm population is also 
reduced down to 28 firms and 
reclassified into four industrial 
groupings. CSR and the 10-year 
growth in EPS is examined 
10 year EPS growth High CSR firms (Best and 
Honourable Mention) 
outperform low CSR firms. 
Honourable mention CSR 
firms have the best 
performance and supports 
findings of Bowman and 
Haire and to some extent 
that of Bragdon and Marlin 
No adjustment for risk; employed t-test 
with very small sample; industrial 
categories are inconsistent. Many low CSR 
firms outperform high CSR firms in the 
same industry group; questionable sample; 
removal of outliers reduces greatly the 
difference between high and low CSR 
firms; performance measure is 
questionable; failure to identify curvilinear 
relationship revealed in data between CSR 
and EPS 
 
Alexander & 
  Buchholz (1978) 
Replicating efforts of Vance by 
using reputational rankings derived 
from Business and Society Review 
surveys. CSR ratings are correlated 
with stock price increases over time 
and adjusted for risk 
 
Stock price increases 
over 2 years and 5 
years 
CSR has no effect on stock 
market performance; 
repudiates both Moskowitz 
and Vance 
Reliance on a questionable sample; 
performance measure is inadequate 
Abbott & 
    Monsen (1979) 
Development of a Social 
Involvement Disclosure (SID) scale 
from a content analysis of Fortune 
500 firms. The SID is used to 
determine CSR firms which are then 
compared on the basis of their 
investment yield 
10 year yield CSR has no effect on the 
total return to investors 
No adjustment for risk; the SID may not 
reflect the true level of CSR; the content 
analysis used is superior to that of 
Bowman and Haire but is still 
questionable; performance measure is 
inadequate 
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8.2 Social Screens 
Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) assessed companies on eight attributes of CSP providing a 
multidimensional assessment of their social behaviour. The eight attributes concern “community 
relations, employee relations, environment, product, treatment of women and minorities, military 
contracts, nuclear power and South Africa” (Waddock & Graves, 1994, p. 1038).  The following table 
summarises the screens examined in Diltz (1995): 
 
Figure 26 - Simplified Summary of Council on Economic Priorities Ethical Ratings 
(Diltz, 1995, p. 71) 
Ethical screening  
Category   Rating Criteria 
 
 
Environment   Good Substantial positive programmes; relatively clear of violations 
    Fair Mixed record; some positive programmes and some problems 
    Poor Poor public record; lobbying against environmental policies 
 
Charitable giving  Good > 1.2 per cent of net pre-tax earnings 
    Fair 0.7 per cent to 1.2 per cent of net pre-tax earnings 
    Poor < 0.7 per cent of net pre-tax earnings 
 
Women in management  Good At least three women among Board of Directors or top officers 
    Fair At least two women among the Directors or top officers 
    Poor None or one woman among the Directors or top officers 
 
Minority management   Good  At least two minorities among Board of Directors or top officers 
    Fair One minority among the Directors or top officers 
    Poor No minorities among the Directors or top officers 
 
Animal testing    Good No animal testing 
    Fair Testing, but with reduction by > 40% over the last five years 
    Poor Testing, with < 40% reduction and/or < $250,000 annually spent for research  
       into alternatives 
 
Information disclosure   Good Completes the CEP questionnaire 
    Fair Provides some specific information  
    Poor Provides only the most basic publicly available information 
 
Community outreach   Good Strong programmes promoting education, housing, or volunteerism 
    Fair Moderate community programmes, or mixed record 
    Poor Little or no evidence of programmes 
 
South Africa    Good  No involvement in South Africa 
    Poor Involvement through franchising, subsidiaries, etc. 
 
Family benefits  Good Offers at least 11 specified family benefits (e.g. parental leave, job-sharing, and    
  child/dependent care assistance) 
    Fair Offers 3-10 specified benefits 
    Poor Offers < 3 specified benefits 
  
Military work    Good Not one of the top 100 contractors 
    Fair Top 100 contractor, but no weapons work 
    Poor Top 100 contractor with weapons work 
 
Nuclear involvement   Good No involvement 
    Poor Supplies construction, production equipment, fuel, or consulting 
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8.3 Risk-adjusted Performance Measures 
 
Jensen’s Alpha: 
 
As used in Hamilton et al (1993), their measure of excess performance was Jensen’s 
Alpha as given by: 
Ri – Rf = αi + βi(Rm – Rf) + εi 
Rm is the monthly return on the value-weighted NYSE and Rf  is the monthly return on the three-month 
U.S. Treasury bill. 
 
 
Portfolio Analysis (taken from Viviers et al., 2008, p. 42-43) 
 
 
Sharpe Ratio: 
 
Sharpei = (ri – rf) / σi    
where: 
 
ri = The mean annualised rate of return of fund i during a specified time period 
rf = The mean annualised rate of return of a risk free asset during the same time period 
σi = The annualised standard deviation of the rate of return of fund i during the pecified time period 
 
 
Sortino Ratio: 
 
Sortinoi = (ri – rf) / δi    
where: 
 
ri = The average annualised rate of return for fund i during a specified time period 
rf = The average annualised rate of return on a risk free asset during the same time period 
δi = The annualised downside deviation of the rate of return of fund i during the specified time period  
                      and: 
  
where: 
 
τ = the investor’s threshold or MAR value 
ri = the return of fund i with a cumulative probability density function f(.) 
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Upside Potential Ratio: 
 
UPRi = θi / δi     
where: 
 
θi = Fund’s i’s upside-potential 
δi = Fund i’s downside deviation 
                   and: 
   
   where: 
 
τ = The investor’s threshold or MAR value 
ri = The return of fund i with a cumulative probability density function f(.) 
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8.4 SRI Index Participants 
 
 SRI INDEX PARTICIPANTS 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 ABSA Group Ltd X X X X X X
2 AdvTech Limited   X X X X
3 AECI    X
4 African Bank Investments Ltd X X X X X X
5 African Oxygen Ltd X X X X X X
6 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd X X X X
7 Alexander Forbes Ltd X X X  
8 Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd X X X X X X
9 Allied Technologies Ltd X X X X X X
10 Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd X      
11 Anglo American Platinum Corporation Ltd X X X X X X 
12 Anglo American plc X X X X X X
13 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd X X X X X X
14 Arcelor Mittal (Iscor / Mittal Steel) X X X X X
15 Aveng Ltd X X X X X X
16 AVI Ltd X  
17 Barloworld Ltd X X X X X X
18 BHP Billiton plc X X X X X X
19 The Bidvest Group Ltd X X X X X X
20 Brait S.A. X X X X 
21 Bytes Technology Group Limited   X X  
22 Capitec     X 
23 City Lodge Hotels Ltd X X X  
24 Dimension Data Holdings plc X  
25 Discovery Holdings Ltd  X X X X X
26 DRDGold Limited   X
27 Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd X X X  
28 Ellerine Holdings Ltd  X    
29 Exxaro Resources Limited   X X X X
30 FirstRand Ltd X X X X X X
31 Foschini     X X
32 Gold Fields Ltd X X X X X X
33 Gold Reef Casino Resorts Ltd X  
34 Grindrod Limited   X X X 
35 Group Five Limited   X X X X
36 Growthpoint Properties Limited    X
37 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd X X X X X X
38 Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Limited   X X X X 
39 Illovo Sugar Ltd X X X X X
40 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd X X X X X X
41 Imperial Holdings Ltd  X X   
42 Investec Ltd X X X X X X
43 Investec Plc  X X X X X
44 Johnnic Communications Ltd X  
45 JSE Limited    X X X
46 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd X X X X X
47 Liberty Group Ltd  X X X X X
48 Liberty International plc X X X X X X
49 Lonmin    X X X
50 Massmart Holdings Ltd X X X X X X
51 Medi-clinic Corporation Ltd X X X X X X
52 South African Chrome and Alloys Ltd / Merafe Ltd X X X X X X 
53 Metropolitan Holdings Limited   X X X X
54 Mondi    X X X
55 MTN Group Ltd X X X X X X
56 Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd X X X X X X
  204
57 Nampak Ltd X X X  X
58 Nedcor Ltd / Nedbank Group Ltd X X X X X X
59 Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd X X X X X X
60 New Clicks Holdings Limited  X
61 Northam Platinum Ltd X X X X X
62 Oceana Group Ltd  X X X X X
63 Old Mutual plc X X X X X X
64 Palabora Mining Company Limited  X
65 Pick n Pay Holdings Ltd X X X X X X
66 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd X  X X X X 
67 Rainbow chicken Limited  X
68 Remgro Ltd X X X X X X
69 RMB  X
70 SABMiller plc X X X X X X
71 Sanlam Ltd  X X X X X
72 Santam Limited   X X X X
73 Sappi Ltd X X X X X X
74 Sasol Ltd X X X X  X
75 Standard Bank Group Ltd X X X X X X
76 Steinhoff International Holdings Limited      X 
77 Sun International Limited     X X
78 Telkom SA Ltd X X X X X X
79 The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd X X X X X X
80 Trans Hex Limited   X   
81 Truworths International     X X
82 Venfin Ltd X  
83 Vodacom Group Limited  X
84 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd  X    
85 Woolworths Holdings Ltd X X X X X X
 
 
The above table indicates the constituents for each year of the SRI, where the X’s 
represent when a firm was included in the SRI constituent list for the corresponding 
year. The list consists of the 85 firms that have participated at least once in the SRI 
index during the period 2004 to 2009. The red X’s represent a year where the firm was 
removed from the index during the year. The blue X’s represent a firm’s final year in 
the index, i.e. where the firm participated in the index for the entire year, however failed 
to make it onto the index in the subsequent year. Finally, the firms whose names have 
been made bold are the firms that entered the index at some point in time, left the index, 
and then returned to the index during a later year. This is to give an idea of the 
movement of the constituent firms, and to see if they moved back and forth over the 
period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  205
Compositions of the Top 40 lists from 1995 until 2009 (taken as of January 31 in each year) 
 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group 
African Rainbow Minerals African Rainbow Minerals African Rainbow Minerals 
Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation African Bank Investments Anglo American Plc 
Amalgamated Beverage 
Industries Alexander Forbes 
Anglo American Coal Corporation 
Anglo American Gold Investment 
Company Anglo American Coal Corporation Anglo American Investment Trust 
Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation Anglo Platinum Anglo American Plc 
Amalgamated Beverage 
Industries 
Anglo American Gold Investment 
Company 
Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation 
Anglo American Gold Investment 
Company Anglo American Plc Anglo American Investment Trust Anglogold Ashanti Anglo Platinum Anglo American Plc 
Anglo American Industrial Corporation Anglo American Investment Trust 
Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation Anglo Platinum Anglo American Plc BHP Billiton Plc Anglogold Ashanti Anglo Platinum 
Anglo American Investment Trust Anglo American Plc Anglo American Investment Trust Barloworld Anglo Platinum Bidvest Group Barloworld Anglogold Ashanti 
Anglo American Plc Anglo Platinum Anglo American Plc 
Beverage & Consumer Industry 
Holdings Anglogold Ashanti BOE BHP Billiton Plc Barloworld 
Anglo Platinum Anglogold Ashanti Anglo Platinum BHP Billiton Plc 
Beverage & Consumer Industry 
Holdings CG Smith Bidvest Group BHP Billiton Plc 
Arcelormittal SA Arcelormittal SA Arcelormittal SA Bidvest Group BHP Billiton Plc Compagnie Fin Richemont BOE Bidvest Group 
AVI AVI Barloworld BOE Bidvest Group Comparex Holdings Compagnie Fin Richemont Compagnie Fin Richemont 
Barloworld Barloworld 
Beverage & Consumer Industry 
Holdings C G Smith Foods BOE Coronation Holdings Coronation Holdings Coronation Holdings 
Beverage & Consumer Industry 
Holdings 
Beverage & Consumer Industry 
Holdings C G Smith Foods CG Smith BOE Corporation Datatech De Beers Consolidated Mines Dimension Data Holdings Plc 
CG Smith C G Smith Foods CG Smith Compagnie Fin Richemont CG Smith De Beers Consolidated Mines Dimension Data Holdings Plc FirstRand 
Compagnie Fin Richemont CG Smith Compagnie Fin Richemont Comparex Holdings Compagnie Fin Richemont Dimension Data Holdings Plc ElementOne Gencor 
De Beers Consolidated Mines Compagnie Fin Richemont Comparex Holdings De Beers Consolidated Mines Comparex Holdings ElementOne FirstRand Gold Fields 
Edgars Consolidated Stores De Beers Consolidated Mines De Beers Consolidated Mines Dimension Data Holdings Plc Coronation Holdings FirstRand Gencor 
Harmony Gold Mining 
Company 
First National Bank Holdings Edgars Consolidated Stores Dimension Data Holdings Plc Fedsure Holdings Datatech Genbel Securities Gold Fields Impala Platinum Holdings 
Gencor First National Bank Holdings First National Bank Holdings First National Bank Holdings De Beers Consolidated Mines Gencor Impala Platinum Holdings Imperial Holdings 
Gold Fields Gencor Gencor FirstRand Dimension Data Holdings Plc Gold Fields Imperial Holdings Investec 
Ingwe Coal Corporation Gold Fields Gold Fields Imperial Holdings Fedsure Holdings Impala Platinum Holdings Investec Johnnic Holdings 
Johnnic Holdings Johnnic Holdings Imperial Holdings Investec FirstRand Imperial Holdings Investec Holdings Liberty Group 
Liberty Group Liberty Group Ingwe Coal Corporation Johnnic Holdings Genbel Securities Investec Johnnic Holdings Liberty Holdings 
Liberty Holdings Liberty Holdings Investec Liberty Group Goldfields Johnnic Holdings Liberty Group Liberty International 
Lonmin Plc Liblife Strategic Investments Johnnic Holdings Liberty Holdings Imperial Holdings Liberty Group Liberty Holdings Lonmin Plc 
Malbak Lonmin Plc Liberty Group Liblife Strategic Investments Investec Liberty International Liberty International Metropolitan Holdings 
Minorco Societe Anonyme Malbak Liberty Holdings Metropolitan Holdings Investec Holdings Lonmin Plc Lonmin Plc MTN Group 
Murray & Roberts Holdings Minorco Societe Anonyme Liblife Strategic Investments Minorco Societe Anonyme Liberty Group Mih Holdings Metropolitan Holdings Nampak 
Nampak Murray & Roberts Holdings Lonmin Plc Nampak Liberty Holdings MTN Group MTN Group Nedbank Group 
Nedbank Group Nampak Malbak Nbs Boland Group Liblife Strategic Investments Naspers Nedbank Group Old Mutual Plc 
Rembrandt Group Nedbank Group Minorco Societe Anonyme Nedbank Group Minorco Societe Anonyme Nedbank Group Old Mutual Plc Pick 'N Pay Stores 
SABmiller Plc Rembrandt Group Nampak Orion Selections Nedbank Group Old Mutual Plc Pick 'N Pay Stores RMB Holdings 
Safmarine and Rennies SABmiller Plc Nedbank Group Orion Selections Holdings Ltd New Africa Investments Rembrandt Group RMB Holdings SABmiller Plc 
Samancor Safmarine and Rennies Rembrandt Group Rembrandt Group Rembrandt Group RMB Holdings SABmiller Plc Sanlam 
Sappi Samancor SABmiller Plc RMB Holdings RMB Holdings SABmiller Plc Sanlam Sappi 
Sasol Sappi Samancor SABmiller Plc SABmiller Plc Sanlam Sappi Sasol 
Southern Life Association Sasol Sasol Sasol Sanlam Sappi Sasol Standard Bank Group 
Standard Bank Group Southern Life Association Southern Life Association Southern Life Association Sasol Sasol Standard Bank Group 
Steinhoff International 
Holdings 
Tiger Brands Standard Bank Group Standard Bank Group Standard Bank Group Standard Bank Group Standard Bank Group Tiger Brands Tiger Brands 
Venfin Tiger Brands Tiger Brands Tiger Brands Tiger Brands Tiger Brands Tigon Tongaat Hulett 
Wooltru Venfin Venfin Venfin Venfin Venfin Venfin Venfin 
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Top 40 company lists (continued) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group ABSA Group 
African Oxygen      Amalgamated Beverage Industries      Anglo American Plc     African Bank Investments      African Rainbow Minerals African Bank Investments      African Bank Investments      
Amalgamated Beverage Industries      Anglo American Plc     Anglo Platinum Anglo American Plc     Anglo American Plc     African Rainbow Minerals African Rainbow Minerals 
Anglo American Plc     Anglo Platinum Anglogold Ashanti Anglo Platinum Anglo Platinum Anglo American Plc     Anglo American Plc     
Anglo Platinum Anglogold Ashanti Arcelormittal SA Anglogold Ashanti Anglogold Ashanti Anglo Platinum Anglo Platinum 
Anglogold Ashanti Arcelormittal SA Barloworld      Arcelormittal SA Arcelormittal SA Anglogold Ashanti Anglogold Ashanti 
Arcelormittal SA Avgold       BHP Billiton Plc          Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Barloworld      Arcelormittal SA Arcelormittal SA 
Avgold       Barloworld      Bidvest Group Barloworld      BHP Billiton Plc          Aveng Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Barloworld      BHP Billiton Plc          Compagnie Fin Richemont BHP Billiton Plc          Bidvest Group Barloworld      BHP Billiton Plc          
BHP Billiton Plc          Bidvest Group Discovery Holdings Bidvest Group Compagnie Fin Richemont BHP Billiton Plc          Bidvest Group 
Bidvest Group Compagnie Fin Richemont Edgars Consolidated Stores      Compagnie Fin Richemont Discovery Holdings Bidvest Group Compagnie Fin Richemont 
Compagnie Fin Richemont Dimension Data Holdings Plc     FirstRand Discovery Holdings Edgars Consolidated Stores      Compagnie Fin Richemont Discovery Holdings 
Drd Gold FirstRand Foschini      Edgars Consolidated Stores      FirstRand Discovery Holdings Distell Group      
FirstRand Gold Fields Gold Fields FirstRand Gold Fields FirstRand FirstRand 
Gencor      Harmony Gold Mining Company      Harmony Gold Mining Company      Foschini      Harmony Gold Mining Company      Gold Fields Gold Fields 
Gold Fields Impala Platinum Holdings      Impala Platinum Holdings      Gold Fields Impala Platinum Holdings      Growthpoint Properties      Growthpoint Properties      
Harmony Gold Mining Company      Imperial Holdings Imperial Holdings Harmony Gold Mining Company      Imperial Holdings Harmony Gold Mining Company      Harmony Gold Mining Company      
Impala Platinum Holdings      JD Group JD Group Impala Platinum Holdings      Investec      Impala Platinum Holdings      Impala Platinum Holdings      
Imperial Holdings Liberty Group Liberty Group Imperial Holdings Liberty Group Imperial Holdings Liberty Holdings      
Johnnic Holdings Liberty Holdings      Liberty Holdings      JD Group Liberty International Investec      Liberty International 
Liberty Group Liberty International Liberty International Liberty Group Lonmin Plc     Liberty Group Lonmin Plc     
Liberty Holdings      Lonmin Plc     Lonmin Plc     Liberty International MTN Group      Liberty International Medi-Clinic Corporation      
Liberty International MTN Group      MTN Group      Lonmin Plc     Murray & Roberts Holdings      Lonmin Plc     MTN Group      
Lonmin Plc     Nampak      Nampak      MTN Group      Naspers MTN Group      Murray & Roberts Holdings      
MTN Group      Naspers Naspers Naspers Nedbank Group Murray & Roberts Holdings      Naspers 
Nampak      Nedbank Group Nedbank Group Nedbank Group Netcare Naspers Nedbank Group 
Naspers Netcare Netcare Netcare Old Mutual Plc Nedbank Group Netcare 
Nedbank Group Old Mutual Plc Old Mutual Plc Old Mutual Plc Pick 'N Pay Stores      Netcare Old Mutual Plc 
Old Mutual Plc Pick 'N Pay Stores      Pick 'N Pay Stores      Pick 'N Pay Stores      Pretoria Portland Cement Company     Old Mutual Plc Pick 'N Pay Stores      
Pick 'N Pay Stores      Pretoria Portland Cement Company     Pretoria Portland Cement Company     Pretoria Portland Cement Company      Reunert      Pick 'N Pay Stores      Pretoria Portland Cement Company      
Pretoria Portland Cement Company     RMB Holdings RMB Holdings RMB Holdings RMB Holdings Pretoria Portland Cement Company      RMB Holdings 
RMB Holdings SABmiller Plc     SABmiller Plc     SABmiller Plc     SABmiller Plc     RMB Holdings SABmiller Plc     
SABmiller Plc     Sanlam Sanlam Sanlam Sanlam SABmiller Plc     Sanlam 
Sanlam Sappi      Sappi      Sappi      Sappi      Sanlam Sappi      
Sappi      Sasol      Sasol      Sasol      Sasol      Sappi      Sasol      
Sasol      Standard Bank Group      Standard Bank Group      Standard Bank Group      Standard Bank Group      Sasol      Shoprite Hodings 
Standard Bank Group      Steinhoff International Holdings Steinhoff International Holdings Steinhoff International Holdings Steinhoff International Holdings Shoprite Hodings Standard Bank Group      
Steinhoff International Holdings Tiger Brands      Tiger Brands      Tiger Brands      Tiger Brands      Standard Bank Group      Steinhoff International Holdings 
Tiger Brands      Venfin Venfin Venfin Truworths International Steinhoff International Holdings Tiger Brands      
Venfin Woolworths Holdings Woolworths Holdings Woolworths Holdings Woolworths Holdings Tiger Brands      Truworths International 
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8.5 Event Study Lists 
 Event Date: 19 May 2004  Event Date: 19 May 2005  Event Date: 25 April 2006 
1 ABSA Group Ltd 1 ABSA Group Ltd 1 ABSA Group Ltd 
2 AdvTech Limited  2 AdvTech Limited  2 AdvTech Limited  
3 AECI 3 AECI 3 AECI 
4 African Bank Investments Ltd 4 African Bank Investments Ltd 4 African Bank Investments Ltd 
5 African Oxygen Ltd 5 African Oxygen Ltd 5 African Oxygen Ltd 
6 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 6 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 6 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 
7 Alexander Forbes Ltd 7 Alexander Forbes Ltd 7 Alexander Forbes Ltd 
8 Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd 8 Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd 8 Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd 
9 Allied Technologies Ltd 9 Allied Technologies Ltd 9 Allied Technologies Ltd 
10 Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd 10 Anglo American Platinum Corporation Ltd 10 Anglo American Platinum Corporation Ltd 
11 Anglo American Platinum Corporation Ltd 11 Anglo American plc 11 Anglo American plc 
12 Anglo American plc 12 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 12 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 
13 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 13 Arcelor Mittal (Iscor Ltd / Mittal Steel) 13 Arcelor Mittal (Iscor Ltd / Mittal Steel) 
14 Arcelor Mittal (Iscor Ltd / Mittal Steel) 14 Aveng Ltd 14 Aveng Ltd 
15 Aveng Ltd 15 BHP Billiton plc 15 AVI Ltd 
16 BHP Billiton plc 16 The Bidvest Group Ltd 16 BHP Billiton plc 
17 The Bidvest Group Ltd 17 Brait S.A. 17 The Bidvest Group Ltd 
18 Brait S.A. 18 Bytes Technology Group Limited  18 Brait S.A. 
19 Bytes Technology Group Limited  19 Capitec 19 Bytes Technology Group Limited  
20 Capitec 20 City Lodge Hotels Ltd 20 Capitec 
21 City Lodge Hotels Ltd 21 Dimension Data Holdings plc 21 City Lodge Hotels Ltd 
22 Dimension Data Holdings plc 22 Discovery Holdings Ltd 22 Dimension Data Holdings plc 
23 Discovery Holdings Ltd 23 DRDGold Limited  23 Discovery Holdings Ltd 
24 DRDGold Limited  24 Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd 24 DRDGold Limited  
25 Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd 25 Ellerine Holdings Ltd 25 Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd 
26 Ellerine Holdings Ltd 26 FirstRand Ltd 26 Ellerine Holdings Ltd 
27 FirstRand Ltd 27 Foschini  27 FirstRand Ltd 
28 Foschini  28 Gold Fields Ltd 28 Foschini  
29 Gold Fields Ltd 29 Gold Reef Casino Resorts Ltd 29 Gold Fields Ltd 
30 Gold Reef Casino Resorts Ltd 30 Grindrod Limited  30 Gold Reef Casino Resorts Ltd 
31 Grindrod Limited  31 Group Five Limited 31 Grindrod Limited  
32 Group Five Limited 32 Growthpoint Properties Limited  32 Group Five Limited 
33 Growthpoint Properties Limited  33 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd 33 Growthpoint Properties Limited  
34 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd 34 Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd 34 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd 
35 Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd 35 Illovo Sugar Ltd 35 Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd 
36 Illovo Sugar Ltd 36 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 36 Illovo Sugar Ltd 
37 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 37 Imperial Holdings Ltd 37 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 
38 Imperial Holdings Ltd 38 Investec Ltd 38 Imperial Holdings Ltd 
39 Investec Ltd 39 Investec Plc 39 Investec Ltd 
40 Investec Plc 40 Johnnic Communications Ltd 40 Investec Plc 
41 Johnnic Communications Ltd 41 Liberty Group Ltd 41 Johnnic Communications Ltd 
42 Liberty Group Ltd 42 Lonmin 42 Liberty Group Ltd 
43 Lonmin 43 Massmart Holdings Ltd 43 Lonmin 
44 Massmart Holdings Ltd 44 Medi-clinic Corporation Ltd 44 Massmart Holdings Ltd 
45 Medi-clinic Corporation Ltd 45 South African Chrome and Alloys Ltd / Merafe Ltd 45 Medi-clinic Corporation Ltd 
46 South African Chrome and Alloys Ltd / Merafe Ltd 46 Metropolitan Holdings Limited   46 South African Chrome and Alloys Ltd / Merafe Ltd 
47 Metropolitan Holdings Limited   47 MTN Group Ltd 47 Metropolitan Holdings Limited   
48 MTN Group Ltd 48 Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd 48 MTN Group Ltd 
49 Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd 49 Nampak Ltd 49 Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd 
50 Nampak Ltd 50 Nedcor Ltd / Nedbank Group Ltd 50 Nampak Ltd 
51 Nedcor Ltd / Nedbank Group Ltd 51 Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd 51 Nedcor Ltd / Nedbank Group Ltd 
52 Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd 52 New Clicks Holdings Limited  52 Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd 
53 New Clicks Holdings Limited  53 Northam Platinum Ltd 53 New Clicks Holdings Limited  
54 Northam Platinum Ltd 54 Oceana Group Ltd 54 Northam Platinum Ltd 
55 Oceana Group Ltd 55 Old Mutual plc 55 Oceana Group Ltd 
56 Old Mutual plc 56 Palabora Mining Company Limited  56 Old Mutual plc 
57 Palabora Mining Company Limited  57 Pick n Pay Holdings Ltd 57 Palabora Mining Company Limited  
58 Pick n Pay Holdings Ltd 58 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 58 Pick n Pay Holdings Ltd 
59 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 59 Rainbow chicken Limited  59 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 
60 Rainbow chicken Limited  60 RMB 60 Rainbow chicken Limited  
61 RMB 61 SABMiller plc 61 RMB 
62 SABMiller plc 62 Sanlam Ltd 62 SABMiller plc 
63 Sanlam Ltd 63 Santam Limited 63 Sanlam Ltd 
64 Santam Limited 64 Sappi Ltd 64 Santam Limited 
65 Sappi Ltd 65 Sasol Ltd 65 Sappi Ltd 
66 Sasol Ltd 66 Standard Bank Group Ltd 66 Sasol Ltd 
67 Standard Bank Group Ltd 67 Steinhoff International Holdings Limited 67 Standard Bank Group Ltd 
68 Steinhoff International Holdings Limited 68 Sun International Limited 68 Steinhoff International Holdings Limited 
69 Sun International Limited 69 Trans Hex Limited 69 Sun International Limited 
70 Trans Hex Limited 70 Truworths International 70 Trans Hex Limited 
71 Truworths International 71 Venfin Ltd 71 Truworths International 
72 Venfin Ltd 72 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd 72 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd 
73 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd 73 Woolworths Holdings Ltd 73 Woolworths Holdings Ltd 
74 Woolworths Holdings Ltd 
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 Event Date: 27 November 2007  Event Date: 26 November 2008  Event Date: 30 November 2009 
1 ABSA Group Ltd 1 ABSA Group Ltd 1 ABSA Group Ltd 
2 AdvTech Limited  2 AdvTech Limited  2 AdvTech Limited  
3 AECI 3 AECI 3 AECI 
4 African Bank Investments Ltd 4 African Bank Investments Ltd 4 African Bank Investments Ltd 
5 African Oxygen Ltd 5 African Oxygen Ltd 5 African Oxygen Ltd 
6 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 6 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 6 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 
7 Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd 7 Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd 7 Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd 
8 Allied Technologies Ltd 8 Allied Technologies Ltd 8 Allied Technologies Ltd 
9 Anglo American Platinum Corporation Ltd 9 Anglo American Platinum Corporation Ltd 9 Anglo American Platinum Corporation Ltd 
10 Anglo American plc 10 Anglo American plc 10 Anglo American plc 
11 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 11 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 11 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 
12 Arcelor Mittal (Iscor Ltd / Mittal Steel) 12 Arcelor Mittal (Iscor Ltd / Mittal Steel) 12 Arcelor Mittal (Iscor Ltd / Mittal Steel) 
13 Aveng Ltd 13 Aveng Ltd 13 Aveng Ltd 
14 AVI Ltd 14 AVI Ltd 14 AVI Ltd 
15 BHP Billiton plc 15 Barloworld Ltd 15 Barloworld Ltd 
16 The Bidvest Group Ltd 16 BHP Billiton plc 16 BHP Billiton plc 
17 Brait S.A. 17 The Bidvest Group Ltd 17 The Bidvest Group Ltd 
18 Bytes Technology Group Limited  18 Brait S.A. 18 Brait S.A. 
19 Capitec 19 Capitec 19 Capitec 
20 City Lodge Hotels Ltd 20 City Lodge Hotels Ltd 20 City Lodge Hotels Ltd 
21 Dimension Data Holdings plc 21 Dimension Data Holdings plc 21 Dimension Data Holdings plc 
22 Discovery Holdings Ltd 22 Discovery Holdings Ltd 22 Discovery Holdings Ltd 
23 DRDGold Limited  23 DRDGold Limited  23 DRDGold Limited  
24 Ellerine Holdings Ltd 24 Exxaro Resources Limited 24 Exxaro Resources Limited 
25 FirstRand Ltd 25 FirstRand Ltd 25 FirstRand Ltd 
26 Foschini  26 Foschini  26 Foschini  
27 Gold Fields Ltd 27 Gold Fields Ltd 27 Gold Fields Ltd 
28 Gold Reef Casino Resorts Ltd 28 Gold Reef Casino Resorts Ltd 28 Gold Reef Casino Resorts Ltd 
29 Grindrod Limited  29 Grindrod Limited  29 Grindrod Limited  
30 Group Five Limited 30 Group Five Limited 30 Group Five Limited 
31 Growthpoint Properties Limited  31 Growthpoint Properties Limited  31 Growthpoint Properties Limited  
32 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd 32 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd 32 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd 
33 Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd 33 Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd 33 Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd 
34 Illovo Sugar Ltd 34 Illovo Sugar Ltd 34 Illovo Sugar Ltd 
35 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 35 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 35 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 
36 Imperial Holdings Ltd 36 Imperial Holdings Ltd 36 Imperial Holdings Ltd 
37 Investec Ltd 37 Investec Ltd 37 Investec Ltd 
38 Investec Plc 38 Investec Plc 38 Investec Plc 
39 Johnnic Communications Ltd 39 JSE Limited 39 JSE Limited 
40 JSE Limited 40 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 40 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 
41 Liberty Group Ltd 41 Liberty Group Ltd 41 Lonmin 
42 Lonmin 42 Lonmin 42 Massmart Holdings Ltd 
43 Massmart Holdings Ltd 43 Massmart Holdings Ltd 43 Medi-clinic Corporation Ltd 
44 Medi-clinic Corporation Ltd 44 Medi-clinic Corporation Ltd 44 South African Chrome and Alloys Ltd / Merafe Ltd 
45 South African Chrome and Alloys Ltd / Merafe Ltd 45 South African Chrome and Alloys Ltd / Merafe Ltd 45 Metropolitan Holdings Limited   
46 Metropolitan Holdings Limited   46 Metropolitan Holdings Limited   46 Mondi 
47 MTN Group Ltd 47 Mondi 47 MTN Group Ltd 
48 Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd 48 MTN Group Ltd 48 Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd 
49 Nampak Ltd 49 Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd 49 Nampak Ltd 
50 Nedcor Ltd / Nedbank Group Ltd 50 Nampak Ltd 50 Nedcor Ltd / Nedbank Group Ltd 
51 Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd 51 Nedcor Ltd / Nedbank Group Ltd 51 Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd 
52 New Clicks Holdings Limited  52 Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd 52 New Clicks Holdings Limited  
53 Northam Platinum Ltd 53 New Clicks Holdings Limited  53 Northam Platinum Ltd 
54 Oceana Group Ltd 54 Northam Platinum Ltd 54 Oceana Group Ltd 
55 Old Mutual plc 55 Oceana Group Ltd 55 Old Mutual plc 
56 Palabora Mining Company Limited  56 Old Mutual plc 56 Palabora Mining Company Limited  
57 Pick n Pay Holdings Ltd 57 Palabora Mining Company Limited  57 Pick n Pay Holdings Ltd 
58 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 58 Pick n Pay Holdings Ltd 58 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 
59 Rainbow chicken Limited  59 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 59 Rainbow chicken Limited  
60 RMB 60 Rainbow chicken Limited  60 RMB 
61 SABMiller plc 61 RMB 61 SABMiller plc 
62 Sanlam Ltd 62 SABMiller plc 62 Sanlam Ltd 
63 Santam Limited 63 Sanlam Ltd 63 Santam Limited 
64 Sappi Ltd 64 Santam Limited 64 Sappi Ltd 
65 Sasol Ltd 65 Sappi Ltd 65 Sasol Ltd 
66 Standard Bank Group Ltd 66 Sasol Ltd 66 Standard Bank Group Ltd 
67 Steinhoff International Holdings Limited 67 Standard Bank Group Ltd 67 Steinhoff International Holdings Limited 
68 Sun International Limited 68 Steinhoff International Holdings Limited 68 Sun International Limited 
69 Trans Hex Limited 69 Sun International Limited 69 The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd 
70 Truworths International 70 The Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd 70 Trans Hex Limited 
71 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd 71 Trans Hex Limited 71 Truworths International 
72 Woolworths Holdings Ltd 72 Truworths International 72 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd 
  73 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd 73 Woolworths Holdings Ltd 
  74 Woolworths Holdings Ltd   
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8.6 SRI and Conventional comparison portfolio lists 
SRI portfolio: July 1995 to June 2009 
1 ABSA Group 
2 AECI 
3 African bank investments 
4 African Oxygen 
5 African Rainbow Minerals 
6 Allied Electronics Corporation 
7 Allied Technologies 
8 Anglo American plc 
9 Anglogold Ashanti 
10 ArcelorMittal SA 
11 AVI 
12 Barloworld 
13 Bidvest Group 
14 Brait SA 
15 City Lodge Hotels 
16 Dimension Data Holdings plc 
17 DRD Gold 
18 FirstRand 
19 Foschini 
20 Gold Fields 
21 Gold Reef Resorts 
22 Grindrod 
23 Group Five 
24 Growthpoint Properties 
25 Harmony Gold Mining Company 
26 Highveld Steel & Vanadium Corporation 
27 Illovo Sugar 
28 Impala Platinum Holdings 
29 Imperial Holdings 
30 Investec 
31 Lonmin Plc 
32 Medi-clinic Corporation 
33 Merafe Resources 
34 Metropolitan Holdings 
35 Murray & Roberts Holdings 
36 Nampak 
37 Nedbank Group 
38 Northam Platinum 
39 Oceana Group 
40 Palabora Mining Company 
41 Pick 'n Pay Holdings 
42 Pretoria Portland Cement Company 
43 Rainbow chicken 
44 RMB holdings 
45 SABMiller plc 
46 Santam 
47 Sappi 
48 Sasol 
49 Standard Bank Group 
50 Sun International 
51 Tongaat Hulett 
52 Trans Hex Group 
53 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon  -A- 
 
SRI portfolio: November 1999 to June 2009 
1 ABSA Group 
2 Advtech 
3 AECI 
4 African bank investments 
5 African Oxygen 
6 African Rainbow Minerals 
7 Allied Electronics Corporation 
8 Allied Technologies 
9 Anglo American plc 
10 Anglogold Ashanti 
11 ArcelorMittal SA 
12 Aveng 
13 AVI 
14 Barloworld 
15 BHP Billiton plc 
16 Bidvest Group 
17 Brait SA 
18 City Lodge Hotels 
19 Dimension Data Holdings plc 
20 Discovery Holdings 
21 DRD Gold 
22 FirstRand 
23 Foschini 
24 Gold Fields 
25 Gold Reef Resorts 
26 Grindrod 
27 Group Five 
28 Growthpoint Properties 
29 Harmony Gold Mining Company 
30 Highveld Steel & Vanadium Corporation 
31 Illovo Sugar 
32 Impala Platinum Holdings 
33 Imperial Holdings 
34 Investec 
35 Liberty International 
36 Lonmin Plc 
37 Medi-clinic Corporation 
38 Merafe Resources 
39 Metropolitan Holdings 
40 MTN Group 
41 Murray & Roberts Holdings 
42 Nampak 
43 Nedbank Group 
44 Clicks Group 
45 Northam Platinum 
46 Oceana Group 
47 Old Mutual plc 
48 Palabora Mining Company 
49 Pick 'n Pay Holdings 
50 Pretoria Portland Cement Company 
51 Rainbow chicken 
52 RMB holdings 
53 SABMiller plc 
54 Sanlam 
55 Santam 
  
  
  
 
SRI portfolio: 1999 to 2009 - Continued 
56 Sappi 
57 Sasol 
58 Standard Bank Group 
59 Steinhoff International Holdings 
60 Sun International 
61 Tongaat Hulett 
62 Trans Hex Group 
63 Truworths International 
64 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon  -A- 
65 Woolworths Holdings 
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Conventional portfolio: (10 and 15 year) 
1 ADCOCK INGRAM HOLDINGS LIMITED                          
2 AFGRI LIMITED                                           
3 ARGENT INDUSTRIAL LIMITED                               
4 ASPEN PHARMACARE HOLDINGS LIMITED                     
5 ASSORE LIMITED                                          
6 BASIL READ HOLDINGS LIMITED                             
7 BELL EQUIPMENT LIMITED                                  
8 BICC CAFCA LIMITED                                      
9 BOWLER METCALF LIMITED                                  
10 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO PLC                            
11 CAPITAL PROPERTY FUND                                   
12 CARGO CARRIERS LIMITED                                  
13 CASHBUILD LIMITED                                       
14 CAXTON CTP PUBLISHERS AND PRINTERS                    
15 CERAMIC INDUSTRIES LIMITED                              
16 CLIENTELE LIMITED                                       
17 COMBINED MOTOR HOLDINGS LIMITED                        
18 COMPAGNIE FIN RICHEMONT                                 
19 CONTROL INSTRUMENTS GROUP LIMITED                     
20 CROOKES BROTHERS LIMITED                                
21 CULLINAN HOLDINGS LIMITED                               
22 DATATEC LIMITED                                         
23 DELTA EMD LIMITED                                       
24 DISTELL GROUP LIMITED                                   
25 DISTRIB. AND WAREHOUSING NETWORK LD                  
26 DORBYL LIMITED                                          
27 ELB GROUP LIMITED                                       
28 FAMOUS BRANDS LIMITED                                   
29 Fountainhead Property Trust                             
30 HOSKEN CONSOLIDATED INVESTMENTS LD                  
31 HUDACO INDUSTRIES LIMITED                               
32 HWANGE COLLIERY COMPANY LIMITED                        
33 HYPROP INVESTMENTS LIMITED                              
34 INVICTA HOLDINGS LIMITED                                
35 ITALTILE LIMITED                                        
36 JASCO ELECTRONICS HOLDINGS LIMITED                     
37 JD GROUP LIMITED                                        
38 KAGISO MEDIA LIMITED                                    
39 KAP INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED                     
40 MARSHALL MONTEAGLE HLDGS SOC ANON                  
41 MASONITE (AFRICA) LIMITED                               
42 METAIR INVESTMENTS LIMITED                              
43 METOREX LIMITED                                         
44 METROFILE HOLDINGS LIMITED                              
45 MOBILE INDUSTRIES LIMITED                               
 
Conventional portfolio: (10 and 15 year) - Continued 
46 MR PRICE GROUP LIMITED                                  
47 MVELAPHANDA GROUP LIMITED                               
48 MVELAPHANDA RESOURCES LIMITED                           
49 NASPERS LIMITED                                         
50 NET 1 UEPS TECHNOLOGIES INC                             
51 NEW AFRICA INVESTMENT LIMITED      
(Excluded from the analysis using the Findata@Wits Database) 
52 NU-WORLD HOLDINGS LIMITED                               
53 OCTODEC INVESTMENTS LIMITED                             
54 OMNIA HOLDINGS LIMITED                                  
55 PANGBOURNE PROPERTIES LIMITED                           
56 PEREGRINE HOLDINGS LIMITED                              
57 PREMIUM PROPERTIES LIMITED                              
58 PSG GROUP LIMITED                                       
59 PUTPROP LIMITED                                         
60 RANDGOLD & EXPLORATION COMPANY LD                    
61 REAL AFRICA HOLDINGS LIMITED                            
62 REUNERT LIMITED                                         
63 SA CORPORATE REAL ESTATE FUND                           
64 SAAMBOU HOLDINGS LIMITED                                
65 SABLE HOLDINGS LIMITED                                  
66 SABVEST LIMITED                                         
67 SASFIN HOLDINGS LIMITED                                 
68 SEARDEL INVESTMENT CORPORATION LD                     
69 SENTULA MINING LIMITED                                  
70 SHOPRITE HOLDINGS LIMITED                               
71 SIMMER AND JACK MINES LIMITED                           
72 SOVEREIGN FOOD INVESTMENTS LIMITED                    
73 SPESCOM LIMITED                                         
74 SUPER GROUP LIMITED                                     
75 SYCOM PROPERTY FUND                                     
76 TIGER BRANDS LIMITED                                    
77 TRENCOR LIMITED                                         
78 WOOLTRU LIMITED                                         
79 ZCI LIMITED                                             
80 ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY S A LTD                       
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8.7 Regression results 
The tables from the various regressions shall be included in this section in the order that 
they were presented in the methodology section. 
Chapter 5.3.1 – McWilliams and Siegel (2000): 
McWilliams Siegel (2000)       
Period: 1995-2009 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c 
VARIABLES roe roe roe roa roa roa 
       
sri 11.18* 8.13 0.0477 -0.616 -1.824** -0.00172 
 (6.078) (6.196) (0.0300) (0.908) (0.924) (0.00966) 
totalassets -2.90e-08   -2.25e-08   
 (1.18e-07)   (1.77e-08)   
turnover  2.64e-07   8.71e-08***  
  (2.23e-07)   (3.32e-08)  
nopersonsemployed   -4.11e-07   -7.35e-07*** 
   (6.40e-07)   (2.06e-07) 
ltda -68.88*** -67.70*** -0.0412 -4.169* -3.587* -0.0344 
 (14.25) (14.15) (0.0822) (2.128) (2.111) (0.0265) 
consserv 0.344 0.953 0.0482 3.890*** 4.127*** 0.0470*** 
 (8.913) (8.914) (0.0417) (1.331) (1.330) (0.0134) 
financials 20.16** 19.63** 0.00436 0.294 -0.148 -0.0602*** 
 (9.931) (9.621) (0.0538) (1.483) (1.435) (0.0173) 
basicmat -22.42*** -21.93*** -0.000807 -0.275 -0.153 0.0383*** 
 (7.972) (7.975) (0.0400) (1.191) (1.190) (0.0129) 
telecomm -8.898 -13.36 0.0389 5.045* 3.350 0.103*** 
 (19.24) (19.41) (0.0862) (2.873) (2.896) (0.0278) 
consgoods 0.0392 0.00953 0.0150 0.705 0.692 0.0148 
 (9.378) (9.374) (0.0424) (1.401) (1.398) (0.0136) 
technology -58.02*** -57.21*** -0.315*** -12.12*** -11.82*** -0.125*** 
 (18.41) (18.42) (0.0863) (2.750) (2.747) (0.0278) 
healthcare 7.870 8.993 0.0310 6.972*** 7.338*** 0.0785*** 
 (16.94) (16.96) (0.0807) (2.530) (2.530) (0.0260) 
oilgas -1.083 -10.62 0.0403 3.973 0.337 0.0543 
 (26.23) (26.80) (0.115) (3.917) (3.998) (0.0371) 
Constant 18.01*** 16.99*** 0.123*** 12.96*** 12.61*** 0.133*** 
 (6.136) (6.189) (0.0297) (0.916) (0.923) (0.00955) 
       
Observations 1,683 1,683 1,235 1,683 1,683 1,235 
R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.017 0.029 0.032 0.074 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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The following two tables represent the regression results from the McWilliams and Siegel (2000) models that were restricted to the 2004-2009 
sample period. For these models, the firm’s prior financial performance from the previous five years was included in a step-wise progression and 
the results were as follows: 
* Due to the fact that the industry variables did not change over time, the fixed effects specification resulted in all of the industry dummy variables being dropped. As a result they were not presented in the table of results. 
 
McWilliams and  
Siegel (2000)               
Including Prior Performance (ROE)               
Period: 2004-2009 3a1 3a2 3a3 3a4 3a5 3b1 3b2 3b3 3b4 3b5 3c1 3c2 3c3 3c4 3c5 
VARIABLES roe roe roe roe roe roe roe roe roe roe roe roe roe roe roe 
               
sri 20.82** 21.27** 21.34** 21.64** 22.63** 21.01** 21.13** 21.20** 21.51** 22.53** 23.17** 17.17* 18.34* 21.33* 25.14** 
 (9.726) (10.68) (10.58) (10.58) (10.76) (9.618) (10.56) (10.47) (10.46) (10.67) (10.64) (9.125) (10.23) (10.86) (11.86) 
totalassets 2.26e-07 -2.77e-08 -2.28e-08 -1.96e-08 9.13e-09          
 (2.01e-07) (1.32e-07) (1.32e-07) (1.32e-07) (1.38e-07)          
turnover      4.09e-07 2.94e-08 3.67e-08 4.29e-08 9.02e-08     
      (2.62e-07) (1.37e-07) (1.37e-07) (1.38e-07) (1.52e-07)     
nopersonsemployed           7.86e-06 -4.14e-05 -4.08e-05 -3.36e-05 -2.48e-05 
           (0.000121) (0.000103) (0.000105) (0.000110) (0.000117) 
ltda -40.00 -55.67 -52.11 -49.89 -47.09 -38.83 -56.04 -52.45 -50.22 -47.25 33.54 18.45 19.81 27.57 31.35 
 (51.10) (58.61) (58.07) (58.01) (57.29) (50.48) (57.77) (57.23) (57.18) (56.51) (36.62) (39.81) (40.73) (40.37) (38.41) 
roet1 -0.211** -0.0253 -0.0329 -0.0401 -0.0629 -0.212** -0.0253 -0.0329 -0.0401 -0.0630 -0.308* -0.176 -0.187 -0.223 -0.282* 
 (0.0841) (0.0279) (0.0294) (0.0330) (0.0502) (0.0844) (0.0279) (0.0294) (0.0330) (0.0503) (0.158) (0.117) (0.131) (0.151) (0.160) 
roet2 -0.205**  -0.0372 -0.0443 -0.0640 -0.206**  -0.0372 -0.0443 -0.0641 -0.222  -0.0584 -0.131 -0.173 
 (0.0843)  (0.0286) (0.0323) (0.0463) (0.0846)  (0.0286) (0.0323) (0.0464) (0.191)  (0.160) (0.177) (0.195) 
roet3 -0.192**   -0.0262 -0.0479 -0.193**   -0.0262 -0.0480 -0.342**  -0.233 -0.292* 
 (0.0845)   (0.0246) (0.0441) (0.0849)   (0.0246) (0.0442) (0.174)  (0.153) (0.169) 
roet4 -0.209**    -0.0581 -0.210**    -0.0582 -0.246*   -0.200 
 (0.0853)    (0.0472) (0.0856)    (0.0474) (0.146)   (0.140) 
roet5 -0.210**     -0.211**     -0.136    
 (0.0871)     (0.0875)     (0.0841)    
Constant 14.41 16.59 16.17 15.88 15.27 12.94 15.95 15.51 15.20 14.45 22.03*** 12.29 12.85* 15.70** 18.70*** 
 (9.512) (10.59) (10.52) (10.50) (10.43) (10.22) (11.30) (11.24) (11.22) (11.16) (6.693) (7.715) (7.255) (6.594) (6.885) 
               
Observations 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 535 535 535 535 535 
R-squared 0.150 0.020 0.030 0.034 0.049 0.151 0.020 0.030 0.034 0.049 0.179 0.037 0.040 0.094 0.137 
Number of firm 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 105 105 105 105 105 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses               
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               
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McWilliams and Siegel (2000) 2004-2009: continued 
 
 
 
McWilliams and  
Siegel (2000)                
Including Prior  
Performance (ROA)                
Period: 2004-2009 4a1 4a2 4a3 4a4 4a5 4b1 4b2 4b3 4b4 4b5 4c1 4c2 4c3 4c4 4c5 
VARIABLES roa roa roa roa roa roa roa roa roa roa roa roa roa roa roa 
                
sri 2.046 1.080 1.873 1.912 2.209 1.928 0.891 1.737 1.785 2.111 1.797 1.084 1.493 1.836 2.068 
 (1.313) (1.195) (1.333) (1.328) (1.357) (1.291) (1.165) (1.309) (1.304) (1.336) (1.195) (1.118) (1.183) (1.222) (1.284) 
totalassets 1.48e-08 -3.10e-08 -1.22e-08 -1.16e-08 4.70e-09           
 (3.63e-08) (2.96e-08) (2.91e-08) (2.88e-08) (3.47e-08)           
turnover      1.19e-07** 5.08e-08 6.33e-08* 6.39e-08* 9.84e-08**      
      (4.99e-08) (3.55e-08) (3.53e-08) (3.54e-08) (4.42e-08)      
nopersonsemployed           -2.65e-05 -3.76e-05 -3.35e-05 -3.34e-05 -3.24e-05 
           (3.18e-05) (3.23e-05) (3.27e-05) (3.25e-05) (3.24e-05) 
ltda -12.81* -10.89 -13.17* -13.22* -13.24* -12.94* -11.39 -13.52* -13.57* -13.51** -7.596 -6.451 -8.319 -8.904 -8.645 
 (7.001) (7.874) (7.286) (7.185) (6.953) (6.915) (7.787) (7.181) (7.086) (6.853) (7.191) (7.333) (7.084) (6.915) (6.918) 
roat1 0.176** 0.177** 0.208*** 0.206*** 0.186** 0.171** 0.175** 0.207*** 0.205*** 0.183** 0.0772 0.0980* 0.123** 0.105** 0.0923* 
 (0.0727) (0.0747) (0.0703) (0.0713) (0.0723) (0.0725) (0.0742) (0.0701) (0.0712) (0.0721) (0.0530) (0.0527) (0.0509) (0.0515) (0.0530) 
roat2 -0.247***  -0.226*** -0.225*** -0.242*** -0.250***  -0.228*** -0.226*** -0.245*** -0.117***  -0.118*** -0.105** -0.116** 
 (0.0779)  (0.0765) (0.0769) (0.0776) (0.0778)  (0.0764) (0.0768) (0.0775) (0.0449)  (0.0403) (0.0443) (0.0448) 
roat3 -0.0198   -0.00911 -0.0102 -0.0233   -0.0106 -0.0119 -0.0922   -0.0785 -0.0764 
 (0.0610)   (0.0594) (0.0589) (0.0613)   (0.0596) (0.0590) (0.0624)   (0.0600) (0.0599) 
roat4 -0.116*    -0.118* -0.124*    -0.126* -0.0628    -0.0721 
 (0.0650)    (0.0654) (0.0644)    (0.0649) (0.0494)    (0.0494) 
roat5 -0.0522     -0.0622     -0.0735     
 (0.0504)     (0.0511)     (0.0461)     
Constant 18.55*** 13.69*** 16.15*** 16.26*** 17.87*** 17.84*** 12.82*** 15.39*** 15.52*** 17.09*** 18.90*** 14.32*** 15.71*** 16.81*** 17.88*** 
 (2.144) (1.952) (1.830) (1.882) (2.010) (2.092) (1.996) (1.880) (1.919) (1.999) (1.954) (1.856) (1.857) (1.974) (1.933) 
                
Observations 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 669 535 535 535 535 535 
R-squared 0.143 0.060 0.122 0.122 0.139 0.148 0.060 0.124 0.124 0.143 0.080 0.030 0.052 0.063 0.071 
Number of firm 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 105 105 105 105 105 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                
 
 
  214
The following table represents the results from the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) regressions performed on the McWilliams and Siegel (2000) equations. In 
place of the five lagged prior performance variables, L.roa and L.roe represent the 
lagged variables used as per the xtabond2 command in Stata. 
 
GMM method for McWilliams  
and Siegel (2000) 
Period: 2004-2009 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES roa roa roa roe roe roe 
              
L.roa 0.454*** 0.483*** 0.372***    
 (0.0835) (0.0790) (0.0955)    
L.roe    -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.0472 
    (0.0208) (0.0210) (0.0478) 
sri -1.252 -1.430 0.148 14.51 21.67 23.34** 
 (2.654) (2.884) (2.146) (9.619) (14.16) (10.31) 
ltda -5.200 -7.807 -0.188 -1.892 -6.438 -29.09 
 (14.52) (18.19) (6.310) (27.93) (32.27) (23.13) 
totalassets -1.69e-08   -9.20e-08   
 (1.07e-08)   (7.77e-08)   
turnover  4.81e-08   -1.20e-07  
  (3.68e-08)   (1.83e-07)  
nopersonsemployed   -0.000109**   -0.000297** 
   (5.30e-05)   (0.000147) 
Constant 9.024** 8.376** 10.43*** 15.85** 13.81 20.34*** 
 (3.498) (3.962) (1.936) (6.960) (9.649) (5.972) 
       
Observations 532 532 421 532 532 421 
Number of firm 124 124 103 124 124 103 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Chapter 5.3.2 – Callan and Thomas (2009): 
The following regression table came from the sections looking at Callan and Thomas 
(2009) where regressions 5a, 6a and 7a are the normal regressions. In contrast 5b, 6b 
and 7b are the fully specified models which included the quadratic terms for all of the 
size proxies. 
 
Callan and Thomas (2009)       
Period: 1995-2009 5a 5b 6a 6b 7a 7b 
VARIABLES operatingprofit operatingprofit roa roa roe roe 
       
sri 13,916 -68,461 -0.631 -0.315 3.583 2.902 
 (183,918) (176,945) (0.985) (1.039) (3.064) (3.244) 
ltde 77,557 37,347 -0.272 -0.293 3.500*** 3.423*** 
 (61,056) (55,516) (0.327) (0.326) (1.017) (1.018) 
totalassets -18,876*** 110,846*** -0.0812*** -0.0887* -0.116 -0.139 
 (4,619) (9,091) (0.0247) (0.0534) (0.0770) (0.167) 
totalassets2  -492.0***  3.28e-05  0.000169 
  (30.40)  (0.000179)  (0.000557) 
turnover 201,929*** 118,481*** 0.227*** 0.468*** 0.384*** 0.943*** 
 (8,750) (15,292) (0.0469) (0.0898) (0.146) (0.280) 
turnover2  722.6***  -0.00237***  -0.00625** 
  (142.7)  (0.000838)  (0.00262) 
nopersonsemployed -2,606 -32,529*** -0.109*** -0.258*** -0.110 -0.279* 
 (4,146) (8,931) (0.0222) (0.0525) (0.0691) (0.164) 
empl2  106.8**  0.000826***  0.000806 
  (47.77)  (0.000281)  (0.000876) 
consserv 133,583 334,700 4.925*** 4.812*** 4.746 4.484 
 (248,505) (225,943) (1.331) (1.327) (4.140) (4.142) 
financials -208,944 -861,406*** -3.817** -3.519* 1.379 2.203 
 (352,705) (323,003) (1.889) (1.897) (5.877) (5.922) 
basicmat 1.579e+06*** 1.272e+06*** 4.671*** 4.688*** 1.956 1.993 
 (241,346) (219,875) (1.292) (1.291) (4.021) (4.031) 
telecomm 6.678e+06*** 5.152e+06*** 8.208*** 6.518** -0.463 -2.755 
 (568,784) (530,173) (3.046) (3.114) (9.477) (9.720) 
consgoods 721,629*** 930,085*** 1.840 2.345* 2.507 2.665 
 (253,103) (233,280) (1.355) (1.370) (4.217) (4.277) 
technology 6,308 114,216 -12.07*** -12.36*** -30.66*** -30.88*** 
 (515,090) (467,933) (2.758) (2.748) (8.582) (8.579) 
healthcare 805,591* 506,793 8.420*** 8.550*** 0.455 0.782 
 (481,443) (437,380) (2.578) (2.569) (8.022) (8.019) 
oilgas 5.838e+06*** 2.976e+06*** 1.181 2.413 -3.295 0.707 
 (719,184) (680,592) (3.851) (3.998) (11.98) (12.48) 
Constant -566,298*** -454,347*** 12.18*** 12.07*** 9.292*** 8.433*** 
 (167,974) (155,320) (0.900) (0.912) (2.799) (2.848) 
       
Observations 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,231 
R-squared 0.601 0.672 0.092 0.102 0.032 0.037 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
  216
 
5.3.3 Waddock and Graves (1997) – Testing for Causality: 
The following regression results came from the tests of causality as per Waddock and 
Graves (1997). The first table gives the results from the linear regression analysis where 
post ROA and ROE were used as the dependent variables regressed against the control 
variables from the current period. The second table gives the results from the logistic 
regression which set the SRI proxy as the dependent variable, and regressed it against 
the financial performance and control variables from the prior year. 
 
Waddock and Graves (1997)       
Linear Regression       
Period: 2004-2009 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e 8f 
VARIABLES ROE(T+1) ROE(T+1) ROE(T+1) ROA(T+1) ROA(T+1) ROA(T+1) 
       
sri(T) 6.115 4.363 3.622544 -0.118 -1.352 0.2448658 
 (4.616) (4.763) 3.539842 (1.536) (1.592) 1.494458 
totalassets(T) -5.46e-08   -4.85e-08**   
 (6.43e-08)   (2.14e-08)   
turnover(T)  1.92e-08   -2.76e-09  
  (1.27e-07)   (4.24e-08)  
nopersonemployed(T)   -0.0001315**  -0.0000998*** 
   7.05E-05   0.0000298 
ltda(T) -1.055 -0.389 -7.317688 1.131 1.692 2.294941 
 (8.812) (8.787) 6.811209 (2.933) (2.937) (2.87557) 
consserv 10.49* 10.61* 12.78297 7.579*** 7.651*** 7.986912*** 
 (6.281) (6.286) 4.43715 (2.091) (2.101) (1.873285) 
financials 0.735 -0.619 -4.379837 -1.810 -3.051 -8.482306*** 
 (6.245) (6.036) 5.106762 (2.079) (2.017) (2.155983) 
basicmat -14.13*** -14.23*** -0.291904 -1.962 -2.122 3.118006* 
 (5.401) (5.419) 4.225618 (1.798) (1.811) (1.78398) 
telecomm -0.182 -1.281 -19.32465 12.60*** 11.95*** 11.0716*** 
 (12.53) (12.68) 9.367268 (4.171) (4.237) (3.542111) 
consgoods -4.236 -4.255 7.929203 -0.302 -0.337 0.7689271 
 (6.590) (6.595) 8.465195 (2.194) (2.204) (1.905872) 
technology -21.15 -20.98 -3.195358 -16.16*** -16.10*** -13.12319*** 
 (13.04) (13.06) 4.514338 (4.340) (4.364) (3.954692) 
healthcare 3.745 4.016 7.929203 6.565* 6.642* 6.886743* 
 (11.34) (11.39) 8.465195 (3.774) (3.807) (3.573853) 
oilgas -3.666 -7.270 -3.659496 1.461 -0.912 1.571056 
 (16.62) (17.14) 11.54164 (5.534) (5.727) (4.872672) 
Constant 19.70*** 19.50*** 22.64568*** 14.94*** 14.88*** 15.36866*** 
 (4.274) (4.345) 3.034413 (1.423) (1.452) (1.281075) 
       
Observations 577 577 444 577 577 444 
R-squared 0.035 0.034 0.0316 0.097 0.088 0.1499 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Waddock and Graves (1997)       
Logistic Regression       
Period: 2004-2009 9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f 
VARIABLES sri(T) sri(T) sri(T) sri(T) sri(T) sri(T) 
       
ROE(T-1) 0.00246 0.00112 0.0040885    
 (0.00232) (0.00183) (0.0043676)    
ROA(T-1)    0.00121 -0.00904 0.0166291 
    (0.00806) (0.00771) (0.01214) 
Assets(T-1) 8.77e-08***   8.87e-08***   
 (1.19e-08)   (1.20e-08)   
Turnover(T-1)  1.23e-07***   1.25e-07***  
  (1.60e-08)   (1.60e-08)  
Employees(T-1)   0.0001471***   0.0001509*** 
   (0.0000169)   (0.0000174) 
LTDA(T-1) -1.068 -1.542** -2.422571** -1.160* -1.669** -2.226261** 
 (0.697) (0.711) (1.116754) (0.690) (0.714) (1.091903) 
consserv -0.226 -0.471 -0.3946654 -0.221 -0.414 -0.4955081 
 (0.337) (0.375) (0.3923305) (0.340) (0.380) (0.4013054) 
financials -1.777*** -0.120 0.3188775 -1.756*** -0.119 0.4830642 
 (0.509) (0.409) (0.5087562) (0.510) (0.409) (0.5239228) 
basicmat 0.282 0.767*** 0.5053925 0.233 0.703** 0.4519909 
 (0.287) (0.296) (0.3720025) (0.286) (0.295) (0.3725446 ) 
consgoods -0.536 -0.615 -2.187168*** -0.548 -0.617 -2.243355*** 
 (0.362) (0.388) (0.5253684) (0.362) (0.388) (0.5298703) 
technology -1.231 -1.362 -0.9923012 -1.254 -1.503 -0.8445879 
 (1.063) (1.117) (1.089071) (1.067) (1.128) (1.099883) 
healthcare 1.215** 1.646*** 0.7854066 1.221** 1.767*** 0.6178763 
 (0.534) (0.543) (0.7033743) (0.541) (0.553) (0.7094196) 
oilgas -4.346*** -5.354*** -1.087205 -4.417*** -5.444*** -1.216209 
 (1.477) (1.549) (1.102636) (1.481) (1.549) (1.130453) 
Constant -1.313*** -1.661*** -1.997626*** -1.271*** -1.510*** -2.193674*** 
 (0.234) (0.252) (0.3127397) (0.260) (0.271) (0.3685758) 
       
Observations 562 562 429 562 562 429 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.2441 0.256 0.3562 0.2417 0.2572 0.3578 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
